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ABSTRACT

THE ALLIES OF OTHERS:
HOW STAKEHOLDERS’ RELATIONSHIPS SHAPE NON-MARKET STRATEGY
Katarzyna D. Odziemkowska
Witold J. Henisz
This dissertation shifts analytic focus from firm, stakeholder and institutional characteristics as
drivers of a firm’s non-market strategy to the fields in which stakeholders are embedded which are
characterized by their own social relationships, norms and identities. In so doing, I strive to develop
a more socialized view of non-market strategy. The first chapter provides evidence that the identity
of stakeholders in their fields and the structure of relations between them can circumscribe firms’
strategic responses to stakeholder conflict that require stakeholder cooperation. The second chapter
explores the pathways by which firms attenuate stakeholder threats through an understudied
phenomenon: cooperative non-market strategy, or when firms establish formal cooperative
relationships with stakeholders. I find that cooperative non-market strategy is an effective way for
firms allay threats from a broad swathe of stakeholders by exploiting the social networks and
identity of an allied stakeholder. The first two chapters draw on a unique, self-constructed 25-year
panel of all contentious and collaborative interactions between 118 environmental movement
organizations and Fortune 500 firms, complemented by multiplex network data on movements and
firms. While the first two chapters explore cooperative non-market strategy, the last chapter
demonstrates the utility of taking account of stakeholder fields in unilateral non-market strategy, in
this case, improvements in corporate social and environmental performance. Drawing on a dataset
of 250 million media-reported events to construct comprehensive socio-political networks and
stakeholder fields across 42 countries, I find that stakeholder ties to country-level socio-political
networks and to each other, and who participates in stakeholder fields and mobilizes against firms,
manifest in observable differences in corporate social and environmental performance across
vi

countries. In addition to establishing that stakeholder fields are central to explanations of nonmarket strategy, this dissertation finds that the mechanisms underlying their impact are multifaceted, and consistently operate through two characteristics of stakeholder fields: the relational
ties of stakeholders, and the identity of stakeholders within their field. Stakeholder fields are central
to understanding firms’ strategic management of stakeholders because fields constrain stakeholder
agency, are susceptible to influence through their relational structures and member identities, and
in turn, influence issue salience for outsiders.
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INTRODUCTION

A central question in strategic management research is how firms respond to and actively
manage their external environments to improve performance. While much of the research
addressing this question has focused on competitive threats, a growing research stream concerns
threats from firms’ non-market environment. As social activists, social movement organizations,
and communities increasingly mobilize against firms, scholars have highlighted the impacts of
these non-market threats on location choice (Ingram, Yue, and Rao, 2010), firm scope (Soule,
Swaminathan, and Tihanyi, 2014), profits (Luders, 2006), market returns (King and Soule, 2007),
and market risk (Vasi and King, 2012). Firms manage these threats by improving their social and
environmental performance (Bartley, 2003; Soule, 2009), impression management (McDonnell and
King, 2013), adopting social management devices (McDonnell, King, and Soule, 2015), or forming
formal cooperative relationships with the most threatening stakeholders (Dorobantu and
Odziemkowska, 2019). In doing so, they hope to quell future threats (McDonnell, 2016), promote
their social image (McDonnell et al., 2015), and improve market and financial performance
(Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2017; Henisz, Dorobantu, and
Nartey, 2014).
To date, research on firms’ strategic management of non-market stakeholders has focused
on stakeholder characteristics, firm characteristics and institutional underpinnings that condition
unilateral actions firms take in response to stakeholder pressure and the returns to those actions.
Firms have been shown to be more responsive to stakeholders with greater power and legitimacy
(Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld, 1999; Julian, Ofori-Dankwa, and Justis, 2008; Mitchell, Agle,
and Wood, 1997; Yang and Rivers, 2009). Firm characteristics such as financial performance,
reputation (King, 2008), corporate social responsibility board committees (McDonnell et al., 2015),
CEO ideology (Briscoe, Chin, and Hambrick, 2014), and the response of industry peers (Briscoe
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and Safford, 2008), have been shown to condition which firms respond and how. Institutions, such
as shareholder protection laws, are also common explanatory variables both through their effect on
stakeholder power (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) or how prevailing societal norms influence the
legitimacy of stakeholder requests (Eesley and Lenox, 2006). Similarly, work focused on outcomes
of firms’ non-market strategy has shown that returns are contingent on stakeholder characteristics
(Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2017), firm characteristics (Barnett and Salomon, 2012), or
prevailing institutions (Flammer, 2013).
Although past research has advanced our understanding of how disparate stakeholders can
pressure organizations, and prompt organizational actions with different performance outcomes,
this work reflects a general analytic strategy of studying interactions between firms and non-market
stakeholders as detached from the larger social structures in which stakeholders are embedded. To
date explorations of stakeholders’ ability to induce a response from the firm paint stakeholders as
largely atomistic actors with more or less influence as a function of their characteristics, tactics or
the institutions that confer power or legitimacy. Similarly, research on the outcomes of firms’
strategic management of non-market stakeholders typically does not consider how outcomes may
be contingent on the position and identity of stakeholders in broader networks (see Nartey, Henisz,
and Dorobantu, 2018 for an exception). Finally, in focusing on unilateral actions firms take in
response to non-market stakeholders, such as conceding to stakeholder demands or reforming their
practices (Bartley, 2003; McDonnell et al., 2015), existing research says little about the efficacy of
cooperative strategy in non-market settings, where firms establish formal interorganizational
relationships with non-market stakeholders to manage external threats.
Detaching the antecedents and outcomes of firm-stakeholder interactions from larger social
structures in which these are embedded is problematic if we consider that the individual
components of an organization’s external environment are inter-linked (Wry, Cobb, and Aldrich,
2013). The interconnectedness of organizations and actors in the environment creates “webs of
2

power” that affect the level of influence associated with different interests (Pfeffer and Salancik,
2003: 65). In other words, firms are not perceiving, nor responding to, atomistic stakeholders in a
vacuum of dyadic interactions, but rather the interaction of multiple influences from their entire
stakeholder environment (Rowley, 1997). Therefore, dis-embedding non-market strategy from the
interconnected environment in which it is enacted overlooks relational sources of power and
influence, where stakeholders may wield influence via ties to powerful others, use their networks
to propagate issue frames (Beckfield, 2003), or engage in coordinated action (Coff, 1999; Rowley,
1997). Simultaneously, a dis-embedded view cannot not adequately model the outcomes of nonmarket strategy without considering how stakeholders are influenced by others in their environment
to whom they are connected or perceive as peers (Dorobantu, Henisz, and Nartey, 2017) or how
firms’ interactions with one set of stakeholders can affect their interactions with others in their nonmarket environments (McDonnell and Werner, 2016).
Finally, a dis-embedded view is particularly problematic for the emergent study of
cooperative non-market strategy, where firms attempt to manage threats in their non-market
environment by establishing formal cooperative relationships with stakeholders (Dorobantu and
Odziemkowska, 2019; den Hond, de Bakker, and Doh, 2015). Cooperative strategy in market
settings (i.e., alliances) has repeatedly been shown to be influenced by the social structures in which
alliances are embedded (Gulati, 1998). Conversely, existing research has not considered how firms’
cooperative non-market strategy is shaped by the social structures (i.e., networks) in which
stakeholder counterparties are embedded. Instead, the focus has been on the firm-stakeholder dyad,
and the implementation activities underlying collaborations (Selsky and Parker, 2005), or the
motivation of firms to enter collaborations (Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2019; den Hond et al.,
2015).
In sum, if non-market strategy is concerned with actions firms take in their non-market
environment to improve performance (Baron, 1995), and non-market environments are composed
3

of myriad actors that are inter-linked and take each other into account, then it follows that taking
account of the interconnectedness of actors in firms’ non-market environments is critical to
understanding which stakeholders and issues firms engage and how, and the outcomes of nonmarket strategy. Despite the foregoing, the structural embeddedness of firm-stakeholder
interactions in broader interconnected stakeholder fields is not commonly addressed in empirical
research on firm-stakeholder relationships (de Bakker et al., 2013), nor in non-market strategy
(Mahon, Heugens, and Lamertz, 2004). Unsurprisingly then, social movement, non-market strategy
and stakeholder theory scholars have repeatedly called for research on firm-stakeholder relations
to take more seriously the embeddedness of their interactions in broader fields (de Bakker et al.,
2013), encouraging researchers “to study the network dynamics of stakeholder relationships”
(Wood et al., 2018: 36).
Theoretical Approach, Research Questions and Settings
This dissertation answers this call by developing a more socialized view of the antecedents
and outcomes of firms’ non-market strategy by taking account of the embeddedness of stakeholders
in broader fields with their own relations, norms and common understandings. Considering
stakeholders as embedded in broader fields relaxes the assumption that stakeholder power and
influence is a discrete organizational characteristic operating at the firm-stakeholder dyad level.
This is particularly important in non-market strategy, where some of the greatest pressures on firms
to change their practices have come from interconnected networks of activists, governments, or
inter-governmental efforts (Bartley, 2003; Doh and Guay, 2006). Further, field theory departs in
important ways from past work on the embeddedness of actors and action from a network or
institutional theory perspective. Compared to network perspectives, field theory emphasizes fieldlevel understandings and norms even in the absence of ties between actors in the field. Explicitly
acknowledging shared understandings of “what tactics are possible, legitimate, and interpretable”
(Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 11) in a field is particularly important for non-market strategy where
4

two counterparties (i.e., firms and stakeholders) are embedded in disparate social contexts with
different understandings and norms. Juxtaposed against institutional theory, field theory more
explicitly allows for conflict within fields and places less emphasis on conformity (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983). As firms increasingly engage stakeholders in novel ways, field theory offers the
possibility to consider how these novel tactics may represent deviance from stakeholder field norms
and result inter-stakeholder discord. In sum, I employ field theory as my overarching theoretical
lens because it not only explicitly acknowledges how structure and field understandings shape
power and action, but is also focused on understanding field dynamics rather than actors’
conformity within fields.
I define a stakeholder field as a set of stakeholders concerned with collective strategic
action to achieve tangible change in the private sector, where stakeholders “interact with knowledge
of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the
relationships in the field, and the field's rules.” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011: 3). A social
movement is one archetype of a stakeholder field, where activists (i.e., stakeholders) mobilize and
coordinate to further a specific agenda and members connection to the field is related to their
ideological commitment (Zietsma et al., 2017). Stakeholder fields can also form around specific
issues where stakeholders interact and take one another into account on issues like environment or
human rights (Hoffman, 1999). Stakeholder fields that form around issues typically contain a
diverse set of stakeholders with distinct identities such as government, communities, activists, or
intergovernmental organizations (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008).
In this dissertation I consider how both movement fields and stakeholder issue fields shape
firms’ non-market strategy. In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I focus on the interplay of
movement fields and cooperative non-market strategy. Specifically, I study firm-activist
collaborations where firms and social activist work together by committing resources to achieve
mutually relevant outcomes, such as McDonald’s collaboration with the Environmental Defense
5

Fund to reduce waste in its operations. I complement and extend social movements theory with
field theory and network perspectives to answer two questions central to research on cooperative
non-market strategy, partner selection and outcomes. In the third chapter, I explore how stakeholder
issue fields shape unilateral non-market strategy, where firms’ strategies are not dependent on the
voluntary cooperation of stakeholders. I focus on corporate social performance, or the outcome of
the activities firms’ engage in on environmental, labor and human rights issues, often in response
to pressure from stakeholders (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Murillo-Luna, Garcés-Ayerbe, and
Rivera-Torres, 2008; Yang and Rivers, 2009).
In the context of cooperative non-market strategy, I find that the structures of stakeholder
fields are critical to explaining firms’ ability to form formal cooperative relationships with
stakeholders in the field. Interestingly however, the means by which inter-stakeholder relationships
affect non-market collaboration formation differ from those emphasized by network perspectives
on cooperative strategy in market settings, where networks facilitate information and learning about
potential partners and can act as safeguards against opportunism (Gulati, 1998). In cooperative nonmarket strategy, where firms seek out collaborations following conflict with the broader
stakeholder field, I find that stakeholder field structure is a determinant of the degree to which
collaborations with firms besieged by conflict are, or can become, acceptable to other stakeholders.
In other words, social structure matters to cooperative non-market strategy because it is a
determinant of whether firms and stakeholders can cooperate without fear of reprisal from other
stakeholders when conflict precedes cooperation.
I also find that stakeholder fields play an equally important role in conditioning the returns
from cooperative non-market strategy. Building on and extending past work on interorganizational
ties as both pipes and prisms (Podolny, 2001), I argue and find that firms can indirectly co-opt the
broader stakeholder field by exploiting the social networks and identity of their partner stakeholder.
Although the role of networks in stakeholder mobilization and influence have long been argued
6

(Rowley, 1997), this chapter highlights that networks are equally operative as pathways by which
stakeholders demobilize against firms that succeed in penetrating stakeholder fields. Importantly I
also find that stakeholder networks alone are insufficient in explaining the co-optation of the
stakeholder field. Instead, the identity of the stakeholder with whom firms collaborate are powerful
pathways of co-optation because they do not rely on inter-stakeholder ties and therefore operate at
the field-level rather than at the level of individual interconnected members of the stakeholder field.
In the third chapter, I expand the stakeholder field to include all stakeholders with interests
in corporate performance on human rights, environmental and labor issues (i.e., stakeholder issue
fields). I show how differences in the ties that stakeholders have in broader socio-political networks
and to each other, and who participates in stakeholder fields and mobilizes against firms, contribute
to differences in corporate social and environmental performance across countries. Complementary
to my findings on cooperative non-market strategy, both stakeholders’ ties and identity in their
fields are key determinants of observable differences in firms’ unilateral non-market strategies (i.e.,
corporate social performance).
Taken together, the three chapters demonstrate the utility of taking account of the
interconnectedness of firms’ environment in understanding the actions firms take in their nonmarket environment to improve performance (Baron, 1995). Across all three studies, two
characteristics of stakeholder fields are consistently found to impact non-market strategy: the
relational ties of stakeholders, and the identity of stakeholders within their field. The results
demonstrate the need for an embedded perspective for both cooperative and unilateral non-market
strategy, and across both fields populated by a single stakeholder type (e.g., activists in social
movements), and those fields populated by multiple non-market stakeholders that form around a
single issue.

7

Empirical Approach
Generally, theory development (de Bakker, 2012; Mahon et al., 2004; Rowley, 1997;
Sciarelli and Tani, 2013) has outpaced empirical work examining the intersection of non-market
strategy and stakeholder fields or networks. This may not be surprising given the methodological
challenges of simultaneously studying interactions between firms and stakeholders and interstakeholder relationships (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012), in the absence of archival databases on
which scholars of cooperative strategy in market settings typically rely (Schilling, 2009).
In my empirical approach, I attempt to overcome this data collection challenge in two ways.
First, in studying the interplay of stakeholder fields and cooperative non-market strategy I
circumscribe the stakeholder field to include only the social movement organizations (SMOs)
operating in various environmental movements. Relying entirely on hand-collected data for all
relational ties between every SMO (nearly 14,000 dyads), as well as their participation in different
movements over time, necessitated that the data collection focused on SMOs only, rather than
expanding the fields to other non-market stakeholders with interests in environmental issues. As
my interest is the interplay of field-level conflict and cooperative strategy, I focus on environmental
movement fields because of the large variance in tactics employed by environmental SMOs
(Bertels, Hoffman, and DeJordy, 2014) in engaging firms (i.e., conflictual and cooperative).
Further, prior research suggested that the structure of environmental movements are highly
clustered and there is large variation in the network profiles of individual SMOs (ibid.). This gave
me confidence that sufficient variation across movement fields and time existed to investigate their
impact on cooperative non-market strategy. I further manage the primary data collection challenge
by randomly sampling Fortune 500 companies, which are most likely to have conflictual and/or
collaborative relations with social activists.
The last chapter of the dissertation complements the first two by expanding the scope of
the stakeholder fields to include a broader swathe of non-market stakeholders, including
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governments, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, social movement
organizations and communities that coalesce around environmental and social issues. To overcome
the challenges of building a relational network for all of these stakeholder, I rely on secondary data
on media-reported verbal and material, cooperative and conflictual ties. The data set allows me to
expand the scope of stakeholder fields across multiple countries, myriad stakeholders, and construct
directed and valued networks of relations between all corporate social performance stakeholders
and socio-political and private sector actors within a country. To my knowledge, the construction
of stakeholder, business, and socio-political fields across 42 countries, represents the first crossnational study of fields of this scale.
Relevance to Existing Research
In taking account of the interconnectedness of firms’ non-market environment, this
dissertation documents that stakeholder fields not only matter to non-market strategy, but that the
mechanisms underlying their impact are multi-faceted. In cooperative non-market strategy,
stakeholder identities and inter-stakeholder relationships are pathways by which firms can
favorably influence stakeholders beyond their partner. This finding extends past work on the role
that stakeholder prior beliefs and peers play in stakeholder mobilization (Dorobantu et al., 2017),
to highlight how stakeholders can be demobilized through formal collaborations, a heretofore
understudied phenomenon. As non-market and stakeholder research increasingly emphasizes the
value of cooperative stakeholder relationships, this dissertation also highlights that the structure of
stakeholder fields is important to understanding when cooperative strategy can be effected.
Acrimonious relationships with the broader stakeholder field can crowd out firms’ ability to shift
to more cooperative strategies where inter-stakeholder relationships that enable negotiation
between stakeholders are absent. Finally, the composition of stakeholder fields and the identities
of stakeholders that mobilize against firms are important to understanding firm responsiveness to
the issues non-market stakeholders advocate. Similarly, the degree to which stakeholders are
9

connected to broader socio-political networks matter for non-market strategy because they
influence managerial perceptions of the salience of issues advocated by the field. Taking account
of the relationships within stakeholder fields and their relationships with others demonstrates the
importance of relational sources of stakeholder power and influence that more atomistic
characteristics like resources cannot account for. In sum, stakeholder fields contribute to our
understanding of the actions firms take in their non-market environment (Baron, 1995) because
fields are susceptible to influence through their relational structures and member identities, field
norms can constrain stakeholder agency, and the composition and ties of issue fields influence issue
salience and in turn firm responsiveness.
In developing an embedded view of non-market strategy, this dissertation also speaks to
several open questions in research on social movements, field theory, cooperative strategy and
organizational theory.
First, this dissertation is one of the first empirical studies of collaboration between social
activists and firms, an increasingly prevalent way of interacting that Heyes and King (2018)
describe as an understudied phenomenon in need of deeper theoretical and empirical understanding.
Contrary to existing research on contentious targeting where firm characteristics exogenous to
movements feature prominently as explanations for which firms are chosen for contention, I find
that partner choice for collaboration is driven by the dynamics and structure of the social movement
itself. Further, in accounting for both contention and collaboration, the first chapter is one of the
first empirical tests of the positive radical flank effect (Haines, 1984) in the context of movements
and firms. Building on the idea that the legitimacy of tactics is context bound (Ingram and Yue,
2008), I find an important boundary condition on the positive radical flank materializing: the
relational configurations of movement fields. While not undermining past findings on the positive
radical flank effect where firms’ responses to contentious targeting are unilateral (McDonnell,
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2016), this dissertation suggests that complications arise where firms respond to the radical flank
with bilateral efforts that require the voluntary cooperation of activists.
Relatedly, in focusing on the interaction between non-market stakeholders and firms, this
dissertation sheds light on how relationships between fields evolve over time, iteratively shaped by
and shaping the conditions within the respective fields, an underexplored area in field theory
(Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Beginning with the idea that fields are characterized by a shared
understanding of the rules in the field, or “what tactics are possible, legitimate, and interpretable,”
(ibid.,: 11), I document that the structure of fields are key to explanations of when field actors can
pivot from using legitimate tactics to novel ones without fear of reprisal from the broader field. In
considering the mechanisms underlying the influence of cross-field ties on fields, I diverge from
Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) picture of shocks in one field sending ripples to another by way of
pre-existing cross-field ties. While this may well be true, I find that cross-field ties can also
influence a focal field by way of a slow trickle that successively shapes the calculus of field actor’s
decision-making in relation to actors in other fields.
In considering the interplay between conflict and collaboration, this dissertation is also
poised to contribute to cooperative strategy research where scholars are increasingly considering
the multiplexity of interorganizational ties (e.g., Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014). To date,
cooperative strategy research emphasizes the role of conflict in crowding out collaboration at the
level of a dyad or triad. By taking a field-level perspective, this dissertation highlights that the
crowding out of collaboration by conflict does not require relational ties between actors nor occurs
only at the level of a dyad or triad. That is, when members of a field have conflictual ties with
another actor, actors embedded in that field may be circumscribed in forming cooperative
relationships with that actor. This draws attention to the value of a field-level perspective on
multiplex ties which explicitly acknowledges norms and field-level understandings, rather than just
networks of relations within a field.
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Finally, to organizational theory, this dissertation highlights the importance of considering
the legitimacy of interorganizational relationships. Despite the ubiquity of the ‘legitimacy’
construct in organizational theory, few studies have considered how the legitimacy of
interorganizational relationships or linkages (see Baum and Oliver, 1991; Dacin, Oliver, and Roy,
2007 for exceptions) impacts interorganizational strategies and outcomes. By theoretically
engaging interorganizational relationships as potentially contested practices or tactics, I highlight
how field-level relations can constrain field members in forming novel interorganizational
relationships. Removing the assumption of the legitimacy of interorganizational relationships is
likely most relevant in settings where members of an organizational field define their identity in
opposition to another field, or where there is a history of acrimonious relations between two
organizational fields. In such organizational fields, the logic underlying partner selection may not
be focused on partner capabilities or bargaining power, but instead be driven by the social
acceptability of the partner and interorganizational form.
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CHAPTER 1: Frenemies: Partner Selection in Firm-Activist Collaborations

In directly engaging firms to change their behavior, activist groups employ a wide array of tactics,
ranging from more contentious (e.g., protests, lawsuits, sabotage) to more collaborative (e.g., crosssector partnerships or alliances) (Baron, Neale, and Rao, 2016; Soule and King, 2008). To date,
most inquiries into social activist strategies have focused on contentious tactics. Research in this
stream suggests activists target large, visible, branded firms with commitments to social or
environmental responsibility (Bartley and Child, 2014; McDonnell et al., 2015) with the aim of
winning concessions in the form of practice change. Conversely, activists’ collaborative strategies
and tactics are less well understood. The direct import of insights from contentious targeting to the
study of collaboration is complicated by collaboration requiring a willing partner (i.e., a firm).
Moreover, contention (i.e., conflict) is typically understood as crowding out collaboration (Heider,
1946; Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014). Therefore, in addition to the challenges of collaborations
forming where interests, practices and goals of participants differ, firm-activist collaborations have
the added challenge of being set against a backdrop of typically acrimonious relations between
movements and firms. In this paper, I seek to contribute to emergent inquiries into when social
movements and firms transform contention into collaboration (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008; Van
Wijk et al., 2013), by asking: which firms and activists form collaborations?
Existing literature offers seemingly contradictory answers to this question. On the one
hand, existing theory and evidence suggests contentious targeting by social movements is precisely
what drives firms to seek out collaborations with activists (Baron, 2012; Haines, 1984; McDonnell,
2016). On the other hand, social movement theory also suggests movements actively work to
identify adversaries in order to mobilize resources and improve their prospects of success against
them (Hunt, Benford, and Snow, 1994). From this perspective, collaborating with contentiously
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targeted firms, or adversaries of the movement, may be seen as undermining the broader
movement’s goals and result in peer sanctioning. As such, the emphasis on the symbiosis between
contention and collaboration for the firm in the first perspective, belies the tension created for
activists suggested by the second perspective: firms most motivated to enter collaborations are
precisely those that pose risks to their partner activists. I directly engage the tension activists face
in collaborating with adversaries of the movement and suggest the social structure of the movement
influences the magnitude of the risks they face. Specifically, because field members develop shared
understandings of what tactics are legitimate (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) and ideology shapes
social relations within a movement (Diani and McAdam, 2003), the social structure of the
movement is a determinant of the degree to which collaborations with ‘adversary’ firms are, or can
become, acceptable to other activists.
In my theoretical development, I take account of how the objectives of both counterparties
interact in driving the probability of firm-activist collaborations forming. I argue that while forming
collaborations with activists can be a powerful tool for firms to improve their legitimacy, their
associated costs suggest their discriminant use when firms face increasing costs of contention.
However, activists’ ability to collaborate with firms besieged by contention from the movement is
dependent on the level of risk they face from the broader social movement, as well as the firm.
Specifically, the number of cooperative ties between activists that rely exclusively on contentious
tactics (i.e., radical activists) and those that employ both contention and cooperation (i.e., moderate
activists) determines both the probability of open attacks on collaborating activists for “selling out”
(Zald and McCarthy, 1980) and their ability to leverage prior ties to negotiate over the legitimacy
of emergent practices (Mair and Hehenberger, 2014). Therefore, I hypothesize that in movements
where radical and moderate activists share few ties, firm-activist collaborations are unlikely to
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form. Activists also actively manage ‘greenwashing’1 risk by partnering with firms most likely to
follow through on their commitments. In doing so, activists use firms’ reputations for
responsiveness to activism to avoid firms more likely to use the collaboration for greenwashing
their reputation rather than making substantive changes during the course of the collaboration.
I rely on over 130,000 archival documents, including media articles, press releases, legal
proceedings, congressional documents, and firms’ annual reports to construct a novel 25-year panel
of social movement networks and all contentious and collaborative interactions between 118
environmental movement organizations and 300 of the largest firms in the United States. I control
for firm-level characteristics that past research has shown to drive contentious targeting (e.g., firm
visibility, public approval), to isolate the additive effect of contention on collaboration. To improve
the causal interpretation of my findings, I instrument for the non-random assignment of firms to
responsiveness, and contentious targeting, using exogenous extreme weather events in the firm’s
headquarter city, and legal cases brought by the Environmental Protection Agency, respectively. I
find that firms besieged by contention succeed in forming collaborations with activists, if they can
assure the activist they won’t use the collaboration for greenwashing through their reputation for
being responsive to activism. I also find that in movements with few social relations between
radical and moderate activists, activists avoid collaborations with firms that are adversaries of the
movement. Interestingly, this results in activists being more likely to collaborate with firms that
have been contentiously targeted by peers with whom they have ties.
Contrary to existing research on target selection for contention, which focuses on firm
characteristics exogenous to the movement, I find that partner selection for collaboration is
influenced by the dynamics and structure of the social movement itself. Complementary to research

1

Greenwashing refers to selective disclosure of positive environmental information by firms with poor
environmental performance to improve their image (Delmas and Burbano, 2011). Collaborations with
activists may be used for ‘greenwashing’ if a firm touts the intention to improve performance via a
collaboration without following through.
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on the diffusion of contentious tactics through activist ties (Wang and Soule, 2012), I highlight the
constraints segmented social structures place on tactical innovation (Wang and Soule, 2016) where
new tactics (i.e., collaboration) transgress the movements’ understanding of what tactics are
legitimate. In doing so, this paper suggests an important precursor to conflict enabling
collaboration: cooperative ties between conflictual and collaborative segments of a field.
Intuitively, we may think activists will avoid collaborating with firms that are adversaries of their
friends because field members have a desire to maintain their social bonds. I find it is precisely in
the absence of social bonds that social movements and firms fail to “transform contestation into
collaboration” (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008: 422). Answering the call for a field-level perspective
on interactions between social movements and firms (McAdam and Scott, 2005), this paper
contributes to emergent research on boundary conditions (Hiatt, Grandy, and Lee, 2015) on a
central construct in social movement theory: the radical flank effect (Haines, 1984, 2013).
This paper focuses on partner selection, a central question in cooperative strategy, but one
yet to be examined in the context of firm-activist collaborations (Montgomery, Dacin, and Dacin,
2012). As such, it also answers the call for research to examine firms’ governance of relationships
with nonmarket stakeholders where the interplay of private and public incentives and interests (Jia
and Mayer, 2017; Mahoney, McGahan, and Pitelis, 2009) and strained historical relations pose
challenges. This paper highlights that strained relations do not only manifest within a dyad, but also
in the social context in which a stakeholder is embedded. This suggests that for firms to succeed in
managing threats in their nonmarket environments through formal relationships (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978), they must shift from a dyadic to a network perspective on the strategic
management of stakeholder relationships (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Rowley, 1997). To cooperative
strategy research, the findings draw attention to the idea that the legitimacy of collaborative
interorganizational relationships is context bound (Ingram and Yue, 2008). In contexts where
collaborations may be contested practices, the logic underlying partner selection is not exclusively
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focused on partner capabilities or resources, but also a logic of social acceptability of the
interorganizational relationship.
FIRM AND SOCIAL ACTIVIST COLLABORATIONS
Social activists’ direct engagement of firms to change their behavior has risen in recent decades as
a result of facilitating technologies and perceptions that government is less responsive and statelevel corporate regulation is increasingly ineffective (Soule, 2009). Most research to date focuses
on activists’ use of contentious tactics like boycotts, protests and shareholder proxy proposals to
change firm behavior. However, in the 1990s a new form of direct engagement emerged: activists
collaborating with firms to reform their behavior. Prominent examples include the Environmental
Defense Fund’s (EDF) partnership with McDonald’s to examine waste reduction opportunities in
its operations, which resulted in the substitution of polystyrene containers with paper packaging for
its hamburgers. Similarly, consumers increasingly get their Coke from hydrofluorocarbon-free
refrigerators and vending machines thanks to a collaboration between Coca-Cola and Greenpeace.
Firm-activist collaborations also involve co-management of assets or projects which produce public
goods (King, 2007). The Conservation Fund’s purchase agreement to a critical forest habitat from
International Paper, which allowed International Paper to harvest timber from the property, is one
example of asset co-management. In an example of public goods creation, Starbucks partnered with
Global Green to develop and promote an online game to educate the public about climate change.
I define a firm-activist collaboration as an instance of ‘organizations working together by
committing resources to achieve mutually relevant outcomes.’ Similar to definitions of strategic
alliances between firms (Gulati, 1995; Kale and Singh, 2009), a collaboration’s key characteristics
are that organizations work together in a purposeful way (i.e., with a goal of creating outcomes)
and that each party commits resources (i.e., financial, human capital etc.). As such, collaboration
does not include purposeful but unilateral transactions, such as when a firm donates to an activist
organization, or bilateral arms-length arrangements like licensing of logos or cause-related
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marketing (Galaskiewicz and Colman, 2006). The mutually relevant outcomes to be created via the
collaboration are broad enough to encompass changes within company practices (e.g., EDFMcDonald’s collaboration), as well as outcomes whose primary purpose is public goods creation
(e.g., Starbucks-Global Green climate change education). Finally, the focus on ‘outcomes’ means
the firm and activist can have separate motivations for entering the collaboration (e.g., the firm
seeks to repair its reputation, and the activist wishes to influence best practices in an industry) that
are achieved through the pursuit of an outcome desired by both parties.
Firm-activist collaborations offer the possibility of advancing progress on grand challenges
like climate change (Howard-Grenville et al., 2014), offer activists direct say in how firms design
their social and environmental practices, while offering firms contextual knowledge about issues
important to stakeholders and allowing them to leverage the collaboration as a shield against future
contention (McDonnell, 2016). Despite potential benefits, research on firm-nonprofit
collaborations, which typically takes the form of rich case studies, points to the challenges of
relationships with two parties with different backgrounds, motivations and goals (Selsky and
Parker, 2005). Recent research has emphasized the role of boundary work (Zietsma and Lawrence,
2010) and organizations (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008) in facilitating collaborative settlements
which maintain disparate interests.
However, a separate challenge may emerge where potential collaborations are set against
a backdrop of contention, as is often the case with social movement activists and firms. Burchell
and Cook (2013a: 511) summarize the challenge to activists as juggling the potential for change in
firm behavior with “a continuing commitment to reflect the concerns and demands of their own
stakeholders whose support for direct action activities provided the basis for gaining influence in
the first place.” Because social activists are members of broader movements that target firms
contentiously, they may not only have disparate interests, but also face disparate risks associated
with diverging from the direct contentious actions of the movement. In addition to partner-specific
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risks associated with interorganizational relationships (e.g., risk of unfulfillment of contract,
reputational risk etc.), activists face risks that peer activists question the collaboration and launch
an attack. One Fortune 500 executive I interviewed explained the challenge of forming
collaborations with activists as follows:
Here you had all these groups that want to better the world … and no one wanted
to work with us. Some of it was motivated in a broader concern: it’s that whole
idea that you’re going to work with the enemy… and pressure from their own
community that if somebody gets in bed with [the enemy firm], “what are you
doing?”
So while research suggests firms may be most motivated to seek out collaborations when
beset by contention (Baron, 2012; Haines, 1984; McDonnell, 2016), understanding when firmactivist collaborations form requires taking account of the unique risks activists face in
collaborating with contentiously targeted firms.
Little is known about when social activists engage collaboratively with which firms. Most
inquiries into which firms activists choose to interact with have focused on their choice of targets
for contention (e.g., protests, boycotts, lawsuits). This stream of research focuses on features of a
targeted firm or its circumstance that are exogenous to a targeting campaign and yet influence its
probability of eliciting a positive firm response (e.g., Bartley and Child 2014; Briscoe et. al. 2014;
King 2008). The direct import of insights from contention to the analysis of collaboration is limited
by the fact that selection of firms for contention is driven by an underlying mechanism of shaming
the corporation into action, while collaborations involve bi-directional voluntary interactions,
whose mechanism for effecting change is not shaming but working together to change practices.
As such, the question of which firms and activists form collaborations remains open (Montgomery
et al., 2012).
In answering this question, I start from the assumption that interaction between activist
groups and firms is, at least partly, guided by an instrumental logic under resource constraints,
where firms seek to maximize shareholder returns, and activists seek to maximize institutional
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change (den Hond and Bakker, 2007). Gray (1989: 263) points out that collaborations are not
founded solely on altruistic motives, but require that “parties see a direct opportunity to pursue their
self-interest.” Firms maximize shareholder returns by seeking collaborations with activists in
instances where the benefits of collaboration outweigh the costs associated with formal
interorganizational relationships. For activists, collaborations with firms achieve the goal of
institutional change by working to change a practice within the firm, that may subsequently
influence other firms to change their practices (Briscoe, Gupta, and Anner, 2015). Therefore,
activists seek out collaborations with firms with whom they have strong bargaining power to
negotiate substantive changes in practices, and with firms likely to follow through on negotiated
commitments. Additionally, activists have to consider the risks of peer sanctioning associated with
cross-sector collaborations, which can undermine their goal of institutional change and endanger
the credibility and legitimacy that they rely on to mobilize financial and human capital resources.
With the preceding logic of how collaborations contribute to achieving the firms’ and
activists’ respective goals, in the following section I develop hypotheses regarding the factors that
influence the probability a firm and social activist form a collaboration. In developing my
arguments, I incorporate the objectives of both the firm and activist, with a particular focus on how
contention between firms and social movements drive the respective costs and benefits of engaging
in collaborations. As my theoretical inquiry focuses on the interplay of conflict and collaboration,
I set to the background, and empirically control for, other characteristics of counterparties (e.g.,
collaboration experience), the firm-activist dyad (e.g., interactional history of the two parties) and
the institutional context (e.g., policy environment) that have been shown to drive collaboration in
other contexts. Importantly, I also acknowledge that firm-level characteristics predictive of
contentious targeting by a movement (e.g., firm visibility, public approval, CEO ideology) may
also influence an activist’s desire to collaborate with such firms. I empirically separate out the effect
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of contention on collaboration, independent of these potentially common correlates by including
them as controls in my models.
PARTNER SELECTION FOR COLLABORATION
Contention as a driver of collaboration
Firms seek out collaboration with activists as a means by which to establish external legitimacy
(Baron, 2012; McDonnell, 2016; Rondinelli and London, 2003; Selsky and Parker, 2005). There
are many avenues by which firms can improve their social or environmental performance to better
align with the expectations of stakeholders, including drawing on internal capabilities (King and
Lenox, 2002), leveraging outside consultants (Boleslavsky, Chatterji, and Lewis, 2014), or through
acquisition of those capabilities (Berchicci, Dowell, and King, 2012). The distinct benefit of a
collaboration with an activist is the public certification and legitimacy the activist offers.2 As Baron
(2012:148) notes, a firm may recognize changing its practices would improve its performance, “but
it may lack a mechanism to assure [external audiences] that it has actually changed its practices.”
Social activists’ focus on social causes imbues them with a moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) that
firms may struggle to build on their own, but may nevertheless be endowed with, through their
association with organizations reflecting a prosocial logic. Steven W. Percy, former chairman and
CEO of BP America Inc., for example, lists “the halo effect that the NGO’s reputation brings to a
partnership,” (Percy, 2010: 235) as the top benefit for firms in associating with activists.
Nevertheless, collaborations with activists are not costless, and in fact, are likely to be more
costly than unilateral actions. In addition to the negotiation and monitoring costs associated with
formal interorganizational relationships, activists’ advice is “typically biased toward larger

2

Research also points to other benefits of cross-sector partnerships to firms, such as leveraging non-profit
capabilities in countries with low institutional development (Ballesteros and Gatignon, 2019). While nonprofit organizations offer partnering firms various capabilities, this inquiry focuses on ‘activist’ non-profit
organizations with capabilities in mobilizing contentiously against public and private organizations, rather
than service-oriented non-profits (e.g., the Red Cross) which offer firms distinct partner capabilities.
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investments,” than the firm requires or others advise (Boleslavsky et al., 2014: 3). Unlike paid
external advisors, such as environmental consultancies, activists goal of effecting institutional
change drives them to seek larger, and likely more costly, changes in firm practices. As information
about a firm’s practices is revealed during the course of a collaboration, the collaborating activist’s
asks can escalate where transparency reveals unanticipated issues. Finally, an arms-length counterparty with experience in contentious targeting raises the costs of defection, should the firm not be
able to meet its commitments due to unforeseen changes in circumstances. Commenting on the
activist backlash that followed Ford’s failure to meet its commitments, Martin B. Zimmerman, then
vice president of Corporate Affairs, suggests firms “need to weigh the risks of changed
circumstances making the commitments unattainable,” (Zimmerman, 2010: 227).
As such, I do not expect collaborations with activists to be used by all firms. Instead, I
expect that firms will seek collaborations with activists when the value of the legitimacy the
relationship offers is greatest, thereby offsetting the costs and risks of collaboration. That value is
likely to be greatest in times of contention, when firms’ profits (Luders, 2006), market returns (King
and Soule, 2007) and reputation (King 2008) are threatened. By establishing external legitimacy,
collaborations with activists are a means by which to defuse future contention and its associated
costs (Baron, 2012; Baron et al., 2016).3 This is consistent with the assumption that firms seek to
maximize shareholder returns, as shareholders are more likely to respond positively to the use of
costlier formal governance mechanisms (e.g., contracts) with non-market stakeholders where
stakeholders pose a credible threat to their investment (Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2017).
The idea that firms are most motivated to form collaborations with activists in times of
contention finds support in social movement theory, formal models of strategic activism, as well
as anecdotal evidence from both firms and activist organizations. In social movement theory, this

3

This is in line with research on strategic alliances where resource complementarities drive partner
selection, where resources can include social legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1996).
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dynamic is called the positive radical flank effect (Haines, 1984, 2013). Radical flank effects are
the effects that ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ factions of a movement have on each other through their
interactions with third parties outside the movement. Radical activists, which typically rely on more
contentious tactics and oppositional ideology, can strengthen the bargaining position of moderate
activists (Haines 1984) by making the moderates’ demands seem more reasonable, and by creating
crises for targets (i.e., firms or government) that they seek to resolve by accommodating moderates.
The mechanism underlying the effect in Haines’ (1984) landmark study was that corporate elites
recognized their interest in pacifying contention by accommodating certain manageable demands.
Typically considered an unintended results of uncoordinated efforts (Haines 2013), the positive
radical flank effect suggests that firms are pushed into collaborating with more moderate activists
thanks to the more contentious tactics of their radical peers. For example, in response to a toxics in
electronics campaign, Sony released communication to key players in the industry, noting the
contentious threat of "highly active, well organized [environmental] groups," and recommended
companies “look into partnership support with reliable NGOs.” (Multinational Monitor, 2000)
Formal models of firm-activist interactions similarly suggest the greater the threat from
confrontational activists, the more aggressively firms seek collaborations with moderate activists
(Baron, 2012). The mechanism underlying the effects is that collaboration with an activist
“provides a shield against a confrontational activist” (Baron 2012: 150), because the firm has
committed to change its practices through a transparent process with an external party with
legitimacy (ibid.). Empirical support is provided by McDonnell (2016), who found that as firms
experienced more contentious targeting from activists, they were more likely to voluntarily
cooperate with activists to sponsor boycotts of other companies.
From the perspective of the activist, this research also posits that the bargaining power of
the collaborating activist is strengthened when a firm is repeatedly threatened by confrontational
activists (Baron, 2012). Increased bargaining power increases the magnitude of the practice change
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that the collaborating activist can negotiate and increases the probability that the firm will actually
change its practices (Baron, 2012). Both these effects suggest activists evaluating potential
collaboration partners are likely to view firms besieged by contention as valuable partners for
achieving their goal of institutional change. Mindy Lubber, president of Ceres, explains the
symbiosis between contention and collaboration as follows (Lubber, 2018):
The effect that some of the grassroots activists go after banks or other companies,
we get the phone call the next day saying “what do we do?”, our answer is “this is
how you get them off your back,” our answer is well “you’re asking for this, we’ll
help you get there, let’s figure out how to make it happen.”
The foregoing suggests that firms contentiously targeted will be most motivated to seek the
legitimacy offered by a collaboration with activists, and offer activists greater bargaining power to
achieve institutional change. Therefore, I predict:
Hypothesis 1: The probability that a firm collaborates with an activist increases in the
contentious challenges the firm experiences.

Activist risks as boundary conditions
Although firms previously contentiously targeted are both willing partners and offer greatest
bargaining power, activists may be circumscribed in taking advantage of these opportunities where
the risks of doing so are prohibitive. Risk is an important determinant of partner selection (Baum
et al., 2005; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012), and often associated with the characteristics of the
potential partner (Gulati, 1995), as well as the social context in which the collaboration is embedded
(Granovetter, 1985). Below I develop arguments regarding two risks activists face that undermine
their goal of effecting institutional change, and therefore, inform their partner selection decisions.
The first, peer sanctioning, stems from the social context in which firm-activist collaborations are
embedded. The second, the firm’s potential unfulfillment of commitments is grounded in the
assumption that all contracts are inherently incomplete, and puts the activist at risk of the firm using
the collaboration to greenwash its reputation. Both moderate the relationship between the
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contentious challenges the firm experiences and the probability that it forms a collaboration through
their effect on the activist’s risk.
Peer sanctioning risk
Beginning with the social context, collaborating with firms previously contentiously
targeted puts the activist at risk of costly peer sanctioning. Social movement theory suggests
activists clearly identify adversaries to mobilize resources and improve the effectiveness of
contentious tactics (Hunt et al., 1994). As such, an activist that collaborates with an adversary firm
(i.e., one contentiously targeted by the movement), may be seen by its field peers as undermining
their goals, which may result in peer sanctioning (Bacharach, Bamberger, and Sonnenstuhl, 1996).
Peer sanctioning, which often takes the form of allegations of ‘selling out’ or ‘sleeping with the
enemy’ (Burchell and Cook, 2013a), is particularly damaging to activist organizations that rely on
their credibility to mobilize the financial and human capital resources necessary to achieve their
goals. Such allegations also undermine the activist’s goal of effecting broader institutional change
by undermining the diffusion of new practices to other firms, because observing firms will be more
cautious when deciding whether to adopt practices that result from collaborations that have been
criticized (Briscoe and Murphy, 2012).
Anecdotal evidence of peer sanctioning abounds. Following the EDF signing on as a
strategic partner in the Center for Sustainable Shale Development, a coalition of 67 groups,
including prominent environmental movement organizations like Greenpeace and Friends of the
Earth, released a statement that EDF does not speak for them on climate change issues – essentially
making EDF part of the out-group (Hunt et al., 1994). Criticism of activists’ collaborations have
also resulted in reputational damage, defections by parts of the activist organization, and
endangered the activist’s survival. A collaboration between environmental activist Pollution Probe
and a grocery retailer to certify its products, for example, was met with a public attack from
Greenpeace shortly after its announcement. With demonstrations and satirical leafleting at stores,
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the controversy achieved wide-spread awareness, and left Pollution Probe with a battered
reputation, staff layoffs, and the resignation of its executive director (Stafford and Hartman, 1996).
In another case, a local Sierra Club in Michigan disbanded to protest a collaboration with Clorox,
citing concerns the national organization “sold their soul to the highest bidder," (Flesher, 2008).
Therefore, although firms previously contentiously targeted are both willing partners and
offer the greatest bargaining power, activists will vary in the degree to which they can pursue such
partners due to the risk of peer criticism and its associated costs. What remains an open question is
when are such risks greatest? I argue that the answer lies in the movement field itself, because fields
are characterized by a shared understanding of the rules in the field, or “what tactics are possible,
legitimate, and interpretable,” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 11). In fields where collaborative
tactics are perceived as illegitimate, field members who engage in such tactics face heightened
probability of sanctioning. I focus on the social structure of the social movement field to understand
the acceptability of collaborative tactics within the field.
The structure of social relations within a field evolve through several mechanisms that
constrain and enable network building including similarity (i.e., homophily), resource dependence,
and competition. However, in the context of social movement fields, social distance or proximity
is also driven by the ideological stances of activists (Diani and McAdam, 2003). Although
membership in a movement is defined by a shared collective identity (i.e., common purpose and
shared commitment to a cause) activist groups can be distinguished by their ideological stance since
“nearly all social movements divide into ’moderate’ and ’radical’ factions at some point in their
development” (Haines 1984:31). In the context of effecting change in the private sector, moderate
groups “believe that although companies are part of the problem, they can also be part of the
solution,” while radical groups do not believe firms can be part of the solution (den Hond and
Bakker, 2007: 903). As such, moderate groups use a combination of contentious and cooperative
tactics, while radical groups only use the former. As one interviewee from a prominent activist
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organization explains, “I think most people understand that there's a left flank that... is like sue, do
big public facing campaigns... push for the aspirational goal. Then there's the sort of practical, yes
but don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good [approach].”
If tactics are an indicator of ideology and ideology can relationally segment movement
fields into moderate and radical groups, I expect that the degree to which the two groups share
social relations is an indicator of their ideological commitment or purity (Diani and McAdam,
2003). Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz (1977) show that if two groups with different
preferences can negotiate instrumentally on an outcome, they create cross-group ties to bargain
over the outcome despite differing opinions and practices. Conversely, when “clearly held value
commitments” are threatened (Laumann et al., 1977: 601) by particular tactics, segmented social
structures are more likely, where little discussion occurs across groups. The foregoing suggests the
degree of ideological commitment of field members will manifest in the observable social relations
that characterize the field. It follows that social movements where few social relations exist between
radical activists (i.e., using solely contentious tactics) and moderate activists (i.e., using both
contentious and collaborative tactics) are likely populated by radical activists with strong
ideological commitments. For radical activists with strong ideological commitments, “alliances
with corporations are anathema” (Hoffman, 2006: 28). In segmented movement fields, where
ideological commitments are stronger, the probability of open conflict between activists is
heightened because conflict over ideology “normally takes the form of open attacks” by radical
activists upon moderate activists for “selling out” (Zald and McCarthy, 1980: 12).
Conversely, in movement fields where radical and moderate activists have relational spaces
(Kellogg, 2009) for negotiation over institutional practices, actors who support dissimilar
institutional models can overcome conflict (Mair and Hehenberger, 2014). Pre-existing ties enable
the sharing of trustworthy and nuanced information about the potential collaboration and partner
firm, and facilitate the exploration of possible bases of compromise between radical and moderate
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groups (Laumann et al., 1977), thereby lowering the risk of peer criticism. The role of social
proximity between radical and moderate activists in attenuating the risk of peer criticism is
supported by qualitative research on firm-activist collaborations. For instance, Earthwatch
consulted with other activist groups prior to collaborating with Rio Tinto asking them whether they
would regard Earthwatch badly if it entered a partnership with Rio Tinto (Seitanidi and Crane,
2009). Pre-existing ties between Earthwatch and other activist groups facilitated consultation on
possible collaboration targets. Such ties are most likely to exist where radical activists do not define
their identity in opposition to corporations.
Intuitively, we may think activists will not collaborate with firms that peers with whom
they have relations have contentiously targeted because field members have “a desire to maintain
their social bonds” (Zietsma et al., 2017: 399). However, I propose that it is counterintuitively in
the absence of social bonds that previously targeted firms will be avoided. My argument centers on
the role of cooperative ties in facilitating dialogue, and segmented social structure being reflective
of strong ideological commitments that increase the probability of open conflict (Zald and
McCarthy, 1980). In movements characterized by greater social proximity between contentious and
cooperative activists, collaborations with firms have a lower probability of garnering criticism from
contentious activists because they do not define their identity in opposition to corporations. Instead,
collaboration is a legitimate tactic that they themselves may not engage in, but that can nevertheless
supplement their own more contentious tactics in effecting institutional change. In the presence of
pre-existing ties, activists considering collaborations can consult with their trusted radical peers
and find common ground that mitigates peer criticism.
Therefore, I expect that in social movements with relatively few ties between radicals and
moderates, activists that collaborate with firms face heightened probability of criticism from their
contentious activist peers, and therefore, will avoid collaborations with previously contentiously
targeted firms.
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Hypothesis 2: The probability that a previously contentiously targeted firm
collaborates with an activist decreases in the level of segmentation along tactical
lines in the social movement in which the activist operates.
Greenwashing risk
Whether using contentious or collaborative tactics, the aim of activists is in changing the practices
of focal firms with the hope of effecting broader institutional change (den Hond and Bakker, 2007;
Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003). A cross-sector collaboration with a firm achieves the goal of
institutional change by working to change a practice within a firm that may subsequently influence
other firms to change their practices (Briscoe et al., 2015). However, these benefits can only be
realized in the course of the collaboration because, given the inherent incompleteness of contracts,
the activist has no assurance that the firm will change its practices. As such, activist perceptions of
the risk that a firm may not follow through on its commitments are also relevant to partner selection.
I argue that activists make ex ante judgements about a firm’s willingness to change during
the course of a collaboration to mitigate such risk. They do so by looking to a firms’ history of
responses to contention, which vary substantially across firms. Some firms are ‘receptive’ to
contention, conceding to pressure and seeking to address activists’ concerns by reforming their
practices and operations (Bartley, 2003; King, 2008; McDonnell et al., 2015). Conversely, other
firms are ‘resistant,’ taking a defensive or evasive stand against contentious activists (Briscoe and
Safford, 2008; McDonnell and King, 2013; McDonnell et al., 2015). Over time, prominent
organizations that are targets of campaigns acquire reputations for being resistant or receptive based
on their past willingness to change (Baron and Diermeier, 2007; Briscoe and Safford, 2008). While
a firm’s responsiveness to activism may change over time with the adoption of new social issue
management devices (McDonnell et al., 2015) or changes in top management teams (Briscoe et al.,
2014), in the absence of updating, these reputations are sticky because they are typically attributed
to persistent internal characteristics of the firm, such as corporate culture, founder effects or its
strategic focus (Briscoe and Safford, 2008).
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These sticky reputations are salient identity categories that contentious activists employ in
selecting targets (McDonnell et al., 2015), and as such, should be equally salient for activists when
considering collaborations. Moreover, they are likely to be particularly important in collaborations
where activists’ greatest asset, their credibility, is on the line. As a spokesperson from Natural
Resources Defense Council explains, “The biggest danger to an environmental group when it looks
for common ground with one company is that [it] will be used by the company for public relations
advantage.” (Philadelphia Inquirer, 1994).
In evaluating potential collaboration partners, activists look to a firm’s reputation as
activism-receptive or activism-resistant to make ex ante judgements about its propensity to change
its practices. Specifically, activists will avoid resistant firms because they have a history of using
impression management strategies that evade, rather than address, activists’ concerns (McDonnell
and King, 2013). Resistant firms will be seen by activists as having a low propensity to undertake
substantive changes in the course of a collaboration, being instead motivated to use a collaboration
with an activist as a means of impression management via greenwashing. A campaigner with
Friends of the Earth notes, "we're very wary of companies using us to `greenwash' their reputation,"
(Stecklow, 2006). Conversely, firms that have previously positively responded to activism, suggest
to activists a future willingness to change. Activists are also likely to judge receptive firms as
carrying lower risks of negative reputation spillover in the future (McDonnell and Pontikes, 2017).
The foregoing arguments suggest a firm’s reputation on the continuum of resistant to
receptive to activism influences the probability that an activist accepts an offer of collaboration
from a contentiously targeted firm through its effects on the activist’s perception of ex post risk.
For firms with a history of being resistant to activism, the heightened risks of the collaboration
being used for greenwashing lowers the probability they will be chosen for collaboration.
Conversely, such risks are mitigated as the firm’s receptivity to activism increases, and therefore,
should positively moderate the relationship hypothesized in H1.
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Hypothesis 3: The probability that a previously contentiously targeted firm collaborates
with an activist increases in the firm’s history of receptivity to activism.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample
I test these hypotheses using a novel 25-year panel database that tracks all contentious and
cooperative interactions reported in the media, or by activist or corporate press releases or filings,
between 118 U.S.-based environmental social movement organizations (SMOs) and a sample of
300 large U.S. companies between 1988 and 2012. While reliance on publicly reported or disclosed
data may be biased if either contentious or cooperative interactions are underreported, I believe this
risk is mitigated by both firms’ and SMOs’ incentives to disclose. Firms are motivated to make
public their collaborations with SMOs as their goal in entering these collaborations is to build their
legitimacy. This is confirmed in my data where over 50 percent of the sources for collaboration
data are press releases. Conversely, contentious challenges are unlikely to be underreported because
of the incentives of both SMOs and media outlets. SMOs seek media attention to their cause and
mobilization, while media outlets are focused on the newsworthiness of events for audiences, where
negative news, and particularly that surrounding prominent firms like those in the Fortune 500 and
sponsored by an SMO are more likely to be reported (Earl et al., 2004).
The panel begins in 1988 because the collaboration between McDonald’s and EDF, first
announced in 1990, is commonly considered one of the first environmental SMO-firm
collaborations. Comments made two decades later by the head of EDF's corporate partnerships
suggest SMO-firm collaborations did not exist at the time: “At the time, it was heresy to say that
companies and NGOs could work together; now it is dogma, at least for the Fortune 500”
(Economist, 2010). Beginning data collection in 1988, two years before the EDF-McDonald’s
collaboration, ensures the panel tracks the evolution of SMO-firm collaborations and confirms no
collaborations existed in the preceding two years.
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The 300 companies in the sample were randomly drawn from the pool of all companies
that appeared in the Fortune 500 during the sample period. The Fortune 500 list was sampled
because prior research has shown that activists tend to contentiously target large, high-status firms
(King, 2008; McDonnell et al., 2015) and engage them in collaborations, as suggested by the
preceding quote from EDF. The sample of activist organizations, or SMOs, was created by
analyzing Factiva archives of US newspapers for all organizations described in media as an
“environmental activist group/organization” or “conservation activist group/organization” or
“environmental advocacy group/organization” or “conservation advocacy group/organization.”
The organizations this search yielded were subsequently matched with formal non-profit tax filings
made available by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). The terms ‘activist’ and
‘advocacy’ were employed in the searches because activism and advocacy are a key function of an
SMO and is necessary to classify an organization as belonging to a social movement (Soule and
King, 2008). This approach distinguishes SMOs from other non-advocacy non-profits listed in the
NCCS database (e.g., non-profits that are service oriented) which are not part of the environmental
movement. Finally, while others have relied on archival directories such as the Encyclopedia of
Associations (Minkoff, 1999) or the Yearbook of International Associations (e.g., (Smith and
Wiest, 2005), such directories rely on self-reporting by the SMO which can lead to
underrepresentation of some activist organizations, especially protest organizations (Minkoff,
1999) or smaller organizations (Larson and Soule, 2009).
Data sources
SMO-Firm Interactions. Following common practice in social movements research (Earl
et al., 2004), I rely on media reports to code contentious and collaborative interactions between an
SMO and firm. Relying on media reports can create two forms of bias: selection bias (i.e.,
ideological biases, over-reporting of negative events) and description bias (i.e., the veracity of the
coverage) (Earl et al., 2004). To overcome selection bias due to ideological biases, the media source
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list includes a wide range of major news and business publications rather than relying on one media
outlet. Secondly, to overcome selection bias associated with over-reporting of negative events (e.g.,
protests may be over-reported in comparison to collaborations), the source list also includes press
releases, which tend to report more positive news from the perspective of the issuer. To mitigate
description bias, I rely only on “hard facts” of the event (e.g., who, what, when), which is relatively
accurate in media reports (Earl et al. 2004: 65). The source list includes all English-language
sources included in Factiva’s categories of major news and business publications and press release
wires for North America4, which includes major wire sources providing corporate press releases.
I restrict my search to North America for two reasons. First, the impact of SMOs and their
tactics vary by region (Durand and Georgallis, 2018), therefore SMOs’ decision-making on
campaign strategy is often geography specific. Secondly, the environmental performance of firms,
a likely driver of contentious targeting, may vary across countries (e.g., due to the pollution haven
hypothesis) and comparable environmental performance data is not available across countries for
the same firm. Finally, North America was employed as the filter because of Canada’s economic
integration with the United States and because many of the most environmentally controversial
events or projects resulted in contentious mobilization that crossed borders (e.g., Exxon Valdez,
Keystone Pipeline). This source list was searched for any articles or press releases where the firm
name and SMO name appear in the same report, resulting in over 60,000 individual articles or press
releases. Each resulting article or press release was read by undergraduate student coders, and then
reviewed again by the author,5 selecting instances where the SMO contentiously interacted with a

4

The major news and business publications category includes over 100 print and online sources from
outlets such as ABC News, The Boston Globe, and the Wall Street Journal, while the press release wire
category includes over 200 press release wires such as Business Wire, Greenwire and
Nasdaq/Globenewswire.
5
During the training period, which spanned one month and approximately 2,000 articles coded by each coder,
I read every article that the undergraduate students coded and provided feedback. Once each coder was
trained to a performance level of at least 95% correct coding, I continued to read and enter into a database
every article that was coded as containing either a contentious or cooperative interaction, but not those that
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firm (e.g., protests, boycotts, shareholders’ proposals, lawsuits), or cooperatively interacted with a
firm (e.g., monetary or in-kind donations, board interlock, collaboration). All contentious and
cooperative interactions between a firm-SMO dyad are recorded by the author with unique
identifiers, allowing for deduplication of a single event (e.g., SMO A protested against firm B)
reported multiple times in the media.
Identifying SMO-Firm Collaborations. I define a collaboration between an SMO and firm
as ‘organizations working together by committing resources to achieve mutually relevant
outcomes.’ Included in the definition of collaborations are what Rondinelli and London (2003)
describe as intensive environmental management alliances and interactive collaborations. Intensive
environmental management alliances are collaborations aimed at improving environmental
performance of the firm, such as when the EDF and McDonald’s created a task force to study ways
in which McDonald’s can reduce waste in its operations. Interactive collaborations are similarly
purposeful, interactional and involve the commitment of resources by each party, but their primary
focus is not changing the firm’s internal practices. Interactive collaborations are more externally
focused and include: targeted project support (e.g., development of eco-preserves on company
property); environmental awareness and education collaborations (e.g., co-sponsorship of
education programs, producing research in support of policy change); and SMO certification of
practices or products.6 Excluded from the definition of collaboration are any arms-length
cooperative interactions or transactions, such as corporate contributions and gifts to the SMO,
marketing affiliations (e.g., licensing of SMO name or logo), support for employee participation in

were coded as containing neither. Inter-coder reliability tests conducted half-way through the coding exercise
demonstrated a high rate of agreement (95 percent average, three coders, random sample of 3,465 articles).
6
SMO’s certification of firm products are classified as collaborations only in instances where evidence exists
of the SMO and firm having worked together in a purposeful way with a commitment of resources. For
example, some certification processes involve a preliminary period where the SMO advises the firm on
changes needed in its processes for it to obtain certification, and the firm consults the SMO on its changes.
In the absence of such evidence, SMO certification of products is treated as arms-length transactions that do
not constitute collaborations, akin to logo licensing (Rondinelli and London 2003).
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SMO activities, or market transactions, such as the purchasing of the SMOs’ products or services
(e.g., airlines purchasing Carbonfund’s carbon credits). These are excluded because they either do
not involve working together or do not involve the commitment of resources by both parties.
Appendix A.1 details the procedures used to identify SMO-firm collaborations.
SMO-firm collaborations were identified from the broader population of cooperative
interactions found in the Factiva media and press release search described above, as well as firm’s
financial filings by searching for each SMO name in firms’ 10-K filings. Each resulting media
report, press release, or company filing was read carefully by the author to identify those
interactions that conformed with the definition of ‘collaboration’ as such. Relying on media reports,
press releases and company filings is consistent with methods employed by databases (e.g., SDC,
MERIT-CATI, and CORE) commonly used for research on firm-firm alliances (Schilling, 2009).
Further, I improve on most alliance databases, which sample on alliances rather than firms
(Schilling, 2009), by first identifying a group of relevant companies and SMOs, and then searching
for publicly disclosed collaborations within each SMO-firm dyad. Similar to commercial alliances
with a for-profit firm (Schilling, 2009), firms are not required to report their collaborations with
SMOs to any governing body. Although firms are often motivated to disclose collaborations with
SMOs to build their legitimacy, my data does not capture any collaborations that are kept secret.
As such, the findings are only generalizable to publicly-disclosed SMO-firm collaborations.
I find that firms with the greatest number of SMO collaborations are concentrated in
consumer-facing industries (e.g., retail, consumer products). Consistent with past research on
contentious targeting, the greatest number of contentious challenges are concentrated amongst
several large firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries (e.g., extractives or energy)
and those that are consumer facing (e.g., consumer products manufacturers). Table 1 lists the top
15 most contentiously targeted firms, and those with the greatest number of collaborations with
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SMOs in the sample. While eight firms appear in both lists, the partial overlap suggests the positive
radical flank effect does not operate in all circumstances or with all firms.
Table 1: Top 15 firms by contentious challenges and SMO collaborations

Firm
Exxon Mobil
Monsanto
Shell Oil
ChevronTexaco
Procter & Gamble
Entergy
Smithfield Foods
Occidental Petroleum
American Electric Power
Safeway
Home Depot
General Electric
McDonald's
Coca-Cola

No. of
contentious
challenges
126
123
113
81
55
50
42
41
37
27
26
25
25
24

Firm
Coca-Cola
Walmart
General Electric
Starbucks
McDonald's
Shell Oil
Alcoa
Entergy
Johnson & Johnson
General Motors
Home Depot
Johnson Controls
Procter & Gamble
Safeway

No. of
collaborations
18
14
11
11
9
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4

Staples

4

Whole Foods Market

4

Note. Number of contentious challenges and SMO collaborations represent sum of unique events
or collaborations from 1988 to 2012. Number of organizations may exceed 15 where two or more
firms have experienced the same number of contentious challenges or have the same number of
SMO collaborations (i.e., a tie).

Social Movement Structures. To understand how the structure of a movement impacts the
propensity to collaborate with firms, I first define movement populations by each SMO’s issue
focus, and then collect data on relations between SMOs in a given movement. I follow Soule and
King (2008) in classifying an SMO into a movement based on the issue they are advocating for or
campaigning on in a given year. As environmental issues, such as greenhouse gases, water quality
or genetically modified organisms (GMOs) gain and lose salience with different stakeholder
groups, the use and effectiveness of tactics varies by the targeted issue (King and Soule, 2007) as
does the population of SMOs involved in the issue. I read media reports and press releases
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containing the name of the SMO in order to determine if an SMO mobilized either through extrainstitutional (e.g., protest, boycotts) or institutional means (e.g., lawsuit, proxy proposal) against
any target (e.g., state government, private company, regulator) in a given year. Relying on the topics
codebook developed by the Comparative Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002) each
article or press release with evidence of mobilization is then coded according to the primary issue
being advocated by the SMO (Appendix A.2 lists the 14 sub-categories of environmental issues).
Some SMOs mobilize on multiple issues in a given year, and they are assigned membership in
more than one movement accordingly. The Comparative Agendas Project codebook is used because
its categories contain rich descriptions of what falls under each issue category, include
contemporary issues, such as GMOs, which other issue typologies do not, and is a source of
important control variables (e.g., congressional hearings on an issue).
After identifying the population of SMOs belonging to a movement, I construct movement
networks by manually coding interactions between SMOs reported in an article, press release or
other public report. Over 73,000 documents, obtained from a search of Factiva where the names of
two SMOs appear in the same document, were carefully read and coded by undergraduate student
coders, and then by the author. The Factiva source list was expanded to be inclusive of all Englishlanguage sources included in Factiva over the period to ensure that non-media and press release
sources, such as Congressional Documents and Publications, and legal alerts were included for
greatest comprehensiveness. Each resulting article or report was read to determine if two SMOs
interacted cooperatively, and reports were de-duplicated to ensure only unique cooperative
interactions were counted within a given SMO dyad-year. Cooperative interactions between SMOs
that constitute the ties within the movement typically took the form of SMOs co-filing a lawsuit,
co-organizing a rally or conference, joint testimony or statements at Congressional hearings,
amongst others. Further, each interaction was coded by the author on the environmental issue on
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which the two SMOs cooperated (e.g., GMOs, air quality, water quality, energy efficiency) using
the definitions from the Comparative Agendas Project codebook.
Measures
Dependent Variable. The existence of a collaboration between a given SMO and firm – SMO-firm
collaboration – is the dependent variable used to test the hypotheses. The dependent variable is
coded as 1, if an SMO is collaborating with a firm in a given year, and 0 if it is not.
Independent Variables. In hypothesis 1, I expect that the propensity of a firm and SMO to
form a collaboration increases with the number of times the firm has been contentiously targeted.
I obtain the number of contentious challenges (e.g., protests, boycotts, lawsuits) a firm received
from the previously described coding of media articles and press releases from 1988 to 2012.
Contentious challenges is the sum of all contentious challenges a firm received by any SMO in the
previous year. The previous year’s contention is a conservative test of the hypothesis, and
consistent with past approaches (McDonnell 2016); however, the results are robust to a rolling sum
of contentious challenges (e.g., 2-year, 3-year).
I test the attenuating effect of the movement’s segmentation along tactical lines
hypothesized in H2, using Freeman's (1978) segregation index to measure the movement
segmentation by tactic of each movement network described above. Freeman’s segregation index
compares the proportion of observed between-group ties with the number expected under random
mixing, accounting for the size and connectedness of the underlying network. I use Bojanowski
and Corten's (2014) reformulation of the index that allows for between-group ties to exceed those
expected under random mixing. As my interest is measuring the degree to which movements are
segmented along the tactical repertoires of the SMOs, I classify all SMOs in a given year as having
‘cooperative’ or ‘contentious’ tactical repertoires in relation to firms based on their interactions
with firms in the sample. SMOs with cooperative tactical repertoires are those that have employed
cooperative tactics (i.e., collaboration, logo licensing, accepted corporate donations etc.) in
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preceding years, and SMOs with contentious tactical repertoires are those that exclusively employ
contentious tactics. This classification best conforms with the ideological stances of moderate
groups who believe that firms can be part of the solution, and radical groups who do not believe
firms can be part of the solution (den Hond and Bakker, 2007). Movement segmentation by tactic
can take both positive and negative values. Negative values correspond to networks where
interactions between cooperative and contentious SMOs (i.e., between-group ties) is higher than
expected under random tie formation; a value of zero corresponds to networks where betweengroup ties is exactly that expected under random tie formation; positive values correspond to
networks where between-group ties are less than that expected to exist in a purely random network
with the same group sizes and density as the observed one (Freeman, 1978).
Hypothesis 3 is tested by interacting two variables – contentious challenges and firm
receptivity to activism. Consistent with past research (Briscoe and Safford, 2008; McDonnell and
King, 2013; McDonnell et al., 2015), I rely on a firm’s history of responses to activists’ targeting
them to identify ‘receptive’ firms as those that seek to address activists’ concerns. Firms’ responses
to social and environmental issue shareholder proposals are one observable and unambiguous
indicator of receptivity to activism (McDonnell et al., 2015). Firms respond to shareholder
proposals in three distinct ways: positively (when the firm voluntarily cedes to the proposal leading
to its withdrawal), neutrally (when the firm does nothing and the proposal is put to a vote at its
annual meeting), or negatively (when the firm petitions the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission to exclude the proposal). Firm responses to environmental and social shareholder
proposals are obtained from the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) and
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)7. I follow McDonnell et al. (2015) in measuring firm

7

ISS has data available from 1997 onwards, therefore, ICCR data was used from 1993 to 2007. Additionally,
coverage of firms in the sample was inconsistent between the two sources (i.e., ICCR had some companies
that ISS didn’t and vice versa), therefore, for overlapping years (1997 to 2007) observations were manually
de-duplicated.
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receptivity to activism using the Janis-Fadner (JF) coefficient of imbalance,8 where a JF coefficient
of -1 (minimum value), indicates that a firm challenged all proposals in a given year, while a firm
with a JF coefficient of 1 (maximum value) voluntarily implemented all proposals it received.9
I control in the empirical estimation for a number of factors pertaining to the SMO-firm
dyad, firm, SMO, and institutional environment which may influence the propensity of a given firm
and SMO to collaborate.
Dyad-level controls. The choice of collaboration partner is, among other things, influenced
by the interactional history of the two parties. In a survey of Dutch firms, for instance, den Hond
et al. (2015) found the frequency of contact a firm has with SMOs increases its propensity to
collaborate with SMOs. Therefore, I include dyad-level controls to account for past interactions
within the dyad. First, using the media and press release reports of cooperative interactions between
an SMO and firm (e.g., donations, logo licensing), I sum the number of cooperative events between
the SMO and firm in the preceding year, which I term dyad cooperative interactions. Similarly, a
history of conflict within the dyad may attenuate the likelihood of collaboration. Therefore, I also
control for the number of contentious challenges by the SMO of the focal firm in the preceding
year.
Firm-level controls. I include several firm-level covariates that past research has shown to
drive contentious targeting that may also correlate with collaboration, to better isolate the additive
effect of contention on collaboration beyond covariates that may be predictive of both. I control for
a firm’s media attention, size, and public approval, based on McDonnell’s (2016) findings on the
characteristics of firms allying with activists on boycotts. Firm media attention is the sum of all

8

JF coefficient = (P2-PN)/V2 if P>N; 0 if P=N; and (PN-N2)/V2 if N>P where P is the number of positive
firm responses to social-issue proxy proposals (i.e., withdrawals), N is the number of negative responses (i.e.,
challenges), and V is the total number of social-issue proxy proposals submitted to a firm in a given year.
9
If a firm did not receive a shareholder proxy proposal in a given year, I carry over the firm’s past receptivity
because reputations for receptivity are sticky, and run robustness checks omitting firm-years with no proxy
proposals.
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articles containing the firm’s name that appeared in the six largest U.S. newspapers in the prior
year (divided by 1,000 articles).10 To control for firm size I include a firm’s logged employees and
logged assets in the previous year, obtained from the Compustat database. I follow McDonnell
(2016) in operationalizing public approval using the affective valence of all articles published about
the firm in USA Today. Each article is analyzed using the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC)
program, which uses word dictionaries to calculate statistics of the extent of positively and
negatively valenced emotional words within each article. I use the JF coefficient (described above),
which is commonly employed to control for the emotional valence of media coverage (Pfarrer,
Pollock, and Rindova, 2010; Pollock and Rindova, 2003), to obtain a public approval measure that
varies from -1 (only negative coverage) to 1 (only positive coverage). I use a cut-off of 60% for the
LIWC scores, following others (McDonnell, 2016; Pfarrer et al., 2010), to classify an article as
positive or negative. The political liberalism of CEOs also increases the probability of activism
(Briscoe et al., 2014) and may also influence which firms seek out collaborations. I account for this
possibility by controlling for the fraction of a CEO’s contributions to electoral candidates that were
to Republican candidates, based on data from Fremeth, Richter, and Schaufele (2013). CEO
contributions to Republic candidates is the fraction of all contributions the CEO made to political
campaigns that are to Republican candidates.
I control for a firm’s environmental performance, as activists may be less willing to
collaborate with firms with poor environmental records as this increases the risk of tarnishing their
own reputations (McDonnell and Pontikes, 2017). Further, firms with greater commitments to
corporate social responsibility have been shown to be more willing to collaborate with SMOs (den
Hond et al., 2015) and may be more likely to be contentiously targeted (McDonnell et al., 2015). I
rely on Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) environmental concerns rating

Focusing on the six largest newspapers — the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street
Journal, the Chicago Tribune, USA Today, and the Los Angeles Times — reduces variability due to
organizational survival of newspapers and changes in coverage of media outlets in Factiva over time.
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to measure a firm’s environmental performance. In an assessment of the KLD environmental
ratings, (Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2009) find that KLD “concern” ratings are “fairly good
summaries of past environmental performance”, and are predictive of future pollution and
regulatory compliance violations. A firm’s environmental performance is the sum of seven
environmental “concern” variables provided by KLD in the prior year (e.g., hazardous waste).
I control for the centrality of the firm within the board interlock network of U.S.-based
public and private firms, as central firms may be more attractive collaboration targets because
models of management diffuse from central firms (Fligstein 1990) thereby effecting institutional
change. The firm’s centrality is the number of firms with whom it has a board interlock (e.g., degree
centrality), using data from Boardex. I include all U.S.-based public and private firms because
activists’ institutional change aspirations generalize across multiple industries, and practices
diffuse across industries in response to activism (Briscoe and Safford, 2008).
While the salience of contentious threats may be highest for targeted firms, firms operating
in the same industry are also attuned to contentious targeting of their peers (Yue, Rao, and Ingram,
2013) which raises the perceived risk of future targeting against the focal firm. Therefore, I control
for industry contentious challenges, or the sum of contentious challenges that other firms in the
same industry in which the focal firm operates (at the 3-digit NAICS level) received in the previous
year.
SMO-level controls. I include SMO-level covariates that may be predictive of a firm’s
desire to collaborate with an SMO, and vice versa. One of the key motivations for firms to
collaborate with SMOs is to benefit from the SMO’s legitimacy or status (Baron, 2012). Therefore,
I expect that firms seek out collaborations with SMOs with high levels of legitimacy. I proxy for
SMO legitimacy using the number of congressional appearances an SMO made before
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congressional committee hearings.11 Public policy makers’ evaluations of an organization’s
sociopolitical reputation affects the number of congressional committee hearing invitations
extended to that organization (Werner, 2015) and therefore is an indirect proxy for an SMO’s
legitimacy. Data on SMOs’ invited appearances before congressional committee hearings are
collected from ProQuest’s Congressional Hearings data archives, searching for each SMO and
recording the number of times a representative of a given SMO testified in congressional hearings
in a given year. Firms may also seek out collaborations with SMOs that have experience partnering
with firms, as these SMOs may have built up alliance capabilities (Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002)
that could make the collaboration more successful. Therefore, I control for SMO collaboration
experience, which is the cumulative sum of collaborations the SMO has had with firms in preceding
years. Finally, SMOs may vary in the degree to which they resist pressures for conformity from
their peers. Specifically, large well-resourced organizations “may be insulated from institutional
pressures in a way that is unavailable to smaller, more resource-strapped organizations”
(Greenwood et al., 2011: 319). As such, better-resourced SMOs may be more likely to collaborate
with previously contentiously targeted firms, ceteris paribus. Therefore, I include a control for
SMO resources, which are the SMO’s net assets at the end of the prior fiscal year (logged due to
skewness), which I obtain from their tax filing data from NCCS.
Institutional environment controls. Activists’ use of contentious or collaborative tactics is
related to the openness of the state to regulate industry, as well as the degree to which a particular
environmental issue is prominent in the public policy space. Similarly, the salience of
environmental issues may be correlated with the tactical segmentation of movements (e.g., highly
salient issues may attract more SMOs and collaborations). In order to minimize the effects of such
biases, I use congressional hearings data from the Comparative Agendas Project described above,

Unfortunately, ratings commonly used as proxies for firm status, such as the Fortune America’s Most
Admired Companies list, are unavailable for SMOs.
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to control for the prominence of the environmental issue in the policy space. Public policy openness
is the count of congressional hearings held on a given environmental issue (e.g., climate change,
GMOs etc.) that is also the subject of the SMO-firm collaboration. To account for the possibility
that resource partitioning within the movement (Soule and King, 2008) drives tactical
segmentation, I control for the number of SMOs operating in a given movement. I also control for
the party of the state governor in the headquarters state of the firm – headquarter state party –
coded 0 if the governor is Republican, 1 for Democrat, and 0.5 for other.
Table 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics, and correlations, respectively, for the variables
in the sample. While contentious challenges of firms greatly outnumber collaborations, as would
be expected, both events are rare overall. In total 1,316 contentious challenges took place and 272
collaborations were formed over the 25-year period between 118 environmental SMOs and the
random sample of 300 Fortune 500 companies. However, these interactions are far from distributed
equally amongst either the SMOs or firms. Of the 118 SMOs, only 28 (23.7%) have collaborated
with a firm, and while 118 firms have been contentiously targeted at least once, less than half (54)
of those previously contentiously targeted had SMO collaborations. In total, 63 firms in the sample
had collaborations with SMOs, and more than 85 percent of those firms had been contentiously
targeted by activists in years preceding the collaboration.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable
Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
1 SMO-Firm Collaboration (DV)
0.006
0.078
0
1
2 Contentious challenges
0.519
1.495
0
17
3 Movement segmentation
0.820
0.095
0.5
1
4 Firm receptivity to activism
0.254
0.611
-1
1
5 Dyad cooperative interactions
0.078
0.290
0
3
6 Contentious challenges by SMO
0.021
0.204
0
7
7 Firm media attention
2.007
3.655
0
33.002
8 Firm assets logged
10.038
1.405
6.327
13.929
9 Firm employees logged
3.780
1.175
0.642
7.696
10 Firm public approval
0.375
0.505
-1
1
11 CEO contributions to Rep. candidates
0.635
0.480
-3.067
1.235
12 Firm environmental performance
1.020
1.336
0
5
13 Firm centrality
26.491
13.203
0
75
14 Industry contentious challenges
2.278
4.409
0
27
15 SMO congressional appearances
4.576
6.213
0
40
16 SMO collaboration experience
3.728
5.911
0
23
17 SMO resources
-3.206
2.195 -14.276
1.794
18 Public policy openness
8.251
11.195
0
61
19 Number of SMOs
28.926
13.311
2
64
20 Headquarter state party (Dem=1)
0.457
0.495
0
1
Instruments:
21 EPA cases
1.079
2.790
0
60
22 Extreme weather events
3.234
4.091
0
22
Note. Number of SMO-firm-year observations is 148,605 corresponding to the instrumental
variables probit model (i.e., non-collaborating SMOs dropped).
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Variable
16 SMO collaboration experience
17 SMO resources
18 Public policy openness
19 Number of SMOs
20 Headquarter state party (Dem=1)
21 EPA cases
22 Extreme weather events

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Variable
SMO-Firm Collaboration (DV)
Contentious challenges
Movement segmentation
Firm receptivity to activism
Dyad cooperative interactions
Contentious challenges by SMO
Firm media attention
Firm assets logged
Firm employees logged
Firm public approval
CEO contributions to Rep. candidates
Firm environmental performance
Firm centrality
Industry contentious challenges
SMO congressional appearances
SMO collaboration experience
SMO resources
Public policy openness
Number of SMOs
Headquarter state party (Dem=1)
EPA cases
Extreme weather events

16
1
0.500
0.062
0.124
0.133
-0.053
0.089

1
1
0.018
-0.036
-0.018
0.044
-0.004
0.029
0.037
0.054
0.018
-0.007
0.048
0.023
0.007
0.015
0.080
0.055
0.063
0.071
0.006
0.014
0.008

1
-0.022
0.022
0.042
-0.020
0.028

17

1
-0.004
-0.054
0.092
0.149
0.046
0.166
0.085
0.025
0.039
0.361
0.050
0.220
-0.007
0.020
0.005
0.001
0.014
-0.040
0.185
-0.006

2

19

1
-0.035
-0.008
-0.085
-0.140
-0.111
0.001
0.029
-0.164
-0.114
-0.051
0.003
0.037
0.013
0.017
0.023
0.047
-0.104
0.099

4

20

1
-0.012
0.060
0.071
0.092
0.065
-0.046
0.065
0.057
0.037
0.068
0.116
0.151
-0.002
0.015
0.024
0.008
0.033

5

21

1
0.011
0.042
0.008
-0.004
0.019
0.119
0.019
0.075
0.006
-0.034
0.005
-0.003
-0.015
-0.014
0.059
-0.001

6

1
0.562
1
0.057 0.081
1
-0.010 -0.045 -0.039
1
0.021 0.054 0.009 -0.046

18

1
-0.020
0.002
0.006
0.013
-0.016
0.007
-0.036
0.022
-0.015
-0.007
-0.020
0.073
-0.065
0.022
-0.105
-0.111
-0.055
0.034
-0.044

3

7

1

22

1
0.515
0.341
-0.003
-0.145
0.049
0.229
-0.143
0.018
-0.040
-0.012
0.001
-0.028
-0.024
0.140
-0.099

Table 3: Correlations

1
0.400
0.048
-0.148
0.229
0.412
0.011
-0.007
0.027
0.012
0.008
0.024
-0.049
0.195
-0.049

8

1
0.020
-0.048
0.033
0.239
-0.294
0.009
-0.013
-0.004
0.000
-0.009
-0.013
0.260
0.012

9

1
-0.061
-0.040
0.053
0.063
-0.013
0.066
0.022
0.012
0.044
0.001
-0.077
-0.046

10

1
0.092
-0.057
0.009
-0.005
-0.044
-0.016
-0.016
-0.028
-0.083
0.073
0.006

11

1
0.049
0.377
0.010
0.018
0.011
0.015
0.011
0.004
0.389
-0.015

12

1
-0.062
-0.023
0.014
0.008
-0.007
0.018
-0.036
0.007
0.132

13

1
-0.005
0.063
0.018
0.015
0.038
-0.043
0.039
-0.036

14

1
0.301
0.370
0.024
-0.078
0.017
0.022
-0.011

15

Methodology
The key challenge in establishing causality between past contention against a firm, its receptivity
to activism, and the probability it establishes a collaboration with an SMO is that neither
contentious challenges against firms, nor their receptivity, are randomly assigned. As such, firmlevel unobservables that may correlate with either contentious challenges or firm receptivity, and
collaborations with SMOs, may bias results. To deal with this concern, I use an instrumentalvariables (IV) analysis that exploits variation in the distribution of extreme weather events and
legal cases brought by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) against firms in the
sample. In the absence of a plausible instrument for movement segmentation, I conduct
supplementary analyses to explore possible mechanisms behind the results and to rule out alternate
explanations.
I use extreme weather events in the firm’s headquarters city to instrument for firm
receptivity because when individuals experience extreme weather events they increase their
behavioral intentions for sustainability related actions (Demski et al., 2017). The idea underlying
this identification strategy is that the occurrence of extreme weather events provides an exogenous
shock to firms’ key decision-makers’ sustainability intentions and, therefore, their receptivity to
making changes to their environmental practices. Brandon and Krueger (2018), for instance, found
that institutional investors headquartered in areas hit by extreme weather events held more
sustainability-related investments in periods following the event. To construct the instrument, I
match each firm’s headquarters county with data from SHELDUS (Spatial Hazard and Loss
Database for the United States) on which counties in the United States were affected by 38 extreme
weather disasters, defined as disasters lasting less than 30 days with total estimated damages above
$1 billion (Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016).
I instrument for contentious challenges against the firm using the number of cases brought
by the EPA against a focal firm (EPA cases). Legal cases and proceedings against a firm on
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environmental issues are likely to increase contentious targeting by environmental SMOs by
making the firm a more salient target for activists. Although EPA legal cases are not randomly
assigned to firms (as in the case of weather), they are unlikely to drive a firm’s propensity to
collaborate with an SMO except through their effect on contentious challenges against the firm.
The rationale lies in the costs, articulated above, that firms face in formal collaborations with
SMOs. Those costs are unlikely to be offset by the legitimacy benefits of collaboration if EPA cases
are not associated with increased contentious targeting. Because environmental SMOs frequently
contentiously target the EPA itself, it is not clear a collaboration with an SMO will provide the firm
significant sway with the EPA, given its generally acrimonious relationship with many
environmental SMOs. A t-test of differences in EPA case outcomes valuable to the firm (e.g. dollar
amount of penalties, duration of cases) suggests there is no difference in outcomes between those
firms with and without an SMO collaboration (Table 4). In the absence of contentious targeting
brought on by EPA legal cases then, the costs of collaborations are likely to outweigh non-existent
or minimal benefits. As such, I argue that EPA legal cases are unlikely to drive a firm to collaborate
with an SMO except through their effect on contentious targeting. This logic suggests that the
exclusion condition is likely to be met.
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Table 4: EPA Case Outcomes by Firms with and without SMO Collaborations

Variable

All Firms
(1)

Firms with and without SMO
collaborations
With
Without
Difference
(2)
(3)
(4)

Average case duration (years)

2.5584
(0.0874)

2.7979
(0.2342)

2.5251
(0.0941)

0.2727
(0.2673)

Total cost ($millions)

2.3238
(0.2119)

3.0549
(0.8694)

2.2223
(0.2090)

0.8325
(0.6476)

Total penalty assessed ($millions)

0.0798
(0.0157)

0.0439
(0.0162)

0.0848
(0.0177)

-0.0409
(0.0479)

Cases withdrawn (% of cases)

0.0139
(0.0022)

0.0104
(0.0054)

0.0144
(0.0024)

-0.0040
(0.0068)

Cases completed without penalty (% of cases)

0.0932
(0.0056)

0.0965
(0.0151)

0.0927
(0.0061)

0.0038
(0.0172)

Number of EPA cases

2.5239
(0.0693)

3.7056
(0.2446)

2.3599
(0.0703)

1.3457***
(0.2094)

Number of observations
1756
214
1542
Note. The table presents EPA case outcomes by firm-year for all firms that had at least one EPA case
conclude during the sample period. Firm sample is split in columns 2 and 3 based on whether the firm had
one or more SMO collaborations in the year preceding the EPA case concluding (column 2), and those that
had no SMO collaborations (Column 2). Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001
of two-sided t-test of difference in means. Average case duration is the number of years between the case
conclusion and when it was first brought by the EPA. Total cost is the sum of the dollar amounts of
penalties assessed, cost recovery awarded, and the estimated cost of environmentally beneficial projects
which the firm agrees to undertake as part of the settlement of a case. Total penalty assessed is the dollar
amount of penalties assessed in the case. Cases withdrawn is the percent of all cases conclude in that year
that were withdrawn by the EPA or otherwise dismissed. Cases completed without penalty is the percent of
all cases concluded without a penalty, cost recovery or beneficial projects. Number of EPA cases is the
number of all cases concluded in the firm-year.

I use two specifications to test my hypotheses. First, in line with the predominant empirical
approach in the literature on alliance formation (Mindruta, Moeen, and Agarwal, 2016), I use a
discrete choice model to estimate the probability that an SMO and a firm form a collaboration,
within the set of all firm-SMO dyads with realized and unrealized (counterfactual) collaborations.
The dependent variable, SMO-firm collaboration, is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if
an SMO is collaborating with a firm in a given year, and 0 otherwise. I use instrumental variable
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probit (IV-probit) regression at the SMO-firm-year level with year, industry and SMO fixed effects,
and robust standard errors. The inclusion of SMO fixed effects minimizes confounding effects of
unobserved time-invariant SMO heterogeneity, and effectively makes the analysis a within-SMO
estimation. The second specification uses two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression which has the
distinct advantage of avoiding selection on SMOs that have had at least one collaboration. Probit
models with SMO fixed effects drop SMOs that lack variation in the dependent variable (i.e., have
never collaborated with a firm). A linear probability model (LPM) retains all perfectly predicted
groups (i.e., SMOs with no firm collaboration), thereby more accurately estimating the effect of
covariates for the entire population of SMOs. This is critical in my setting given that 90 of 118
SMOs never form a collaboration over the 25-year panel; therefore, the LPM captures meaningful
variation in the propensity of SMOs to partner with firms, including potentially the level of
segmentation of the movement they are a member of. The LPM also offers the ability to test for
weak identification, and eases interpretation of interaction terms. I deal with the inherent
heteroskedasticity in the LPM model by specifying robust standard errors. 12
RESULTS
Results using IV-probit and 2SLS regression with year, industry and SMO fixed effects are reported
in Table 5. I begin by discussing the first stage results and relevant test statistics for IV regression,
before moving to the models testing the hypotheses. Models 1 and 2 report the first stage of the IVprobit regression for the two endogenous regressors, and Models 5 and 6 report the first stage of
the 2SLS regression. Beginning with contentious challenges, a strong and significant relationship
between EPA legal cases and the number of contentious challenges exists in both the IV-probit
regression (Model 1: beta=0.0323, p=0.000), as well as the 2SLS regression (Model 5:

12

Results are also robust to a rare events logit model (King and Zeng, 2001) which adjusts explicitly for rare
events bias, as well as simultaneous clustering of standard errors on both members of the dyad (Kleinbaum,
Stuart, and Tushman, 2013), to account for correlation resulting from each firm and SMO appearing in
numerous dyads.
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beta=0.0264, p=0.000), suggesting the relevance of EPA cases as an instrument for contention. I
also find a strong and significant relationship between extreme weather events in a firm’s
headquarter city and the firm’s receptivity to activism in both the IV-probit regression (M2:
beta=0.0133, p=0.000), as well as the 2SLS regression (M6: beta=0.0109, p=0.000). The Wald test
for exogeneity in the IV-probit model was significant (chi2=39.21, p=0.000), suggesting that an IV
regression is appropriate in this sample. From the 2SLS regression, the heteroskedasticity robust
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic equals 180.2, allowing rejection of the null that the equation is
weakly identified (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006; Stock and Yogo, 2005).
Models 3 and 7 report the second-stage with only the main effects of the endogenous
regressors estimated (i.e., no interaction terms). Contrary to hypothesis 1, the results suggest that
contentious challenges against the firm decrease the probability of a firm-activist collaboration
forming (M3: beta=-0.591; p=0.000; M7: beta=-.00597, p=0.000). Interestingly, the main effect of
movement segmentation (not hypothesized) is highly significant and negative (M3: beta=-1.442;
p=0.000; M7: beta=-.00452, p=0.000), suggesting that in movements with fewer ties between
contentious and cooperative activists, it is less likely a firm-SMO collaboration forms. At the same
time, several other covariates are consistent with past research on cooperation between firms and
activists. Consistent with den Hond et al. (2015), for example, the greater the number of times the
firm and SMO cooperated in the previous year (e.g., donations), the greater the probability of a
collaboration (M3: beta=0.106; p=0.000; M7: beta=.00701, p=0.000). Consistent with
McDonnell’s (2015) findings on corporate-sponsored boycotts, the probability of a firm-SMO
collaboration is positively and significantly associated with the firm’s media attention (M3:
beta=0.0147; p=0.007), size (M3: beta=0.229; p=0.000; M7: beta=0.00212, p=0.000), and public
approval (M7: beta=0.00062; p=0.002).
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Firm public approval

Firm employees logged

Firm assets logged

Firm controls
Firm media attention

Contentious challenges by SMO

Dyad controls
Dyad cooperative interactions

Extreme weather events

Contentious challenges x
firm receptivity to activism
Instruments
EPA cases

Contentious challenges x
movement segmentation
Firm receptivity to activism

Movement segmentation

Hypothesized effects
Contentious challenges

-0.0116***
(0.000807)
0.299***
(0.00499)
-0.0933***
(0.00453)
-0.0319***
(0.00681)

0.0635***
(0.0156)
0.502***
(0.0425)

0.0323***
(0.00243)
0.00463***
(0.00130)

0.00579***
(0.000542)
-0.0797***
(0.00241)
-0.0143***
(0.00251)
-0.0158***
(0.00318)

-0.00357
(0.00502)
0.0729***
(0.00611)

-0.00189***
(0.000403)
0.0133***
(0.000380)

0.0147**
(0.00542)
0.229***
(0.0384)
0.0595
(0.0328)
0.00372
(0.0217)

0.106***
(0.0256)
0.252**
(0.0950)

0.00980***
(0.00161)
0.0526**
(0.0163)
-0.0310***
(0.00904)
0.0293***
(0.00795)

0.0574***
(0.0134)
-0.0357
(0.0300)

Instrumental Variables Probit Regression
1st-stage:
1st-stage:
2nd-stage:
Contentious Firm
2nd-stage: All
Challenges receptivity
H1 only
Hypotheses
M1
M2
M3
M4
H1
-0.591***
0.234*
(0.0815)
(0.115)
0.00253
-0.0000467
-1.442***
-0.742
(0.0336)
(0.0162)
(0.257)
(0.975)
H2
-0.429**
(0.164)
-0.378
-1.575***
(0.207)
(0.0343)
H3
1.044***
(0.0445)

-0.01037***
(0.0005)
0.29343***
(0.00297)
-0.08893***
(0.00265)
-0.00485
(0.00413)

0.04383**
(0.01415)
0.6323***
(0.03562)

0.02636***
(0.00141)
0.00458***
(0.00073)

-0.00042
(0.00036)
-0.01189***
(0.00149)
-0.07514***
(0.00155)
-0.02635***
(0.00187)

-0.00747
(0.00448)
0.0547***
(0.00491)

-0.00131***
(0.00026)
0.01088***
(0.00022)

0.0000397
(0.0000286)
0.00212***
(0.000351)
0.000617**
(0.000204)
0.000307*
(0.000133)

0.00701***
(0.00121)
0.00273**
(0.000842)

0.0000328
(0.0000336)
0.00134***
(0.000183)
-0.00123
(0.000965)
0.000423**
(0.000139)

0.00580***
(0.00132)
0.000113
(0.000765)

Two Stage Least Squares Regression
1st-stage:
1st-stage:
2nd-stage:
Contentious Firm
2nd-stage: All
Challenges receptivity
H1 only
Hypotheses
M5
M6
M7
M8
-0.00597*** 0.00831***
(0.00112)
(0.00252)
0.00575
0.00015
-0.00452*** 0.00273
(0.02175)
(0.01023)
(0.000601)
(0.00145)
-0.0148***
(0.00278)
0.00266
-0.0216
(0.00187)
(0.0111)
0.0155*
(0.00742)

Table 5: Instrumental Variables Regressions of a Firm-SMO Collaboration (Continued on next page)

53
148605

N
Log likelihood
Adjusted R-squared

148605

0.585***
(0.0356)

0.000000297
(0.000169)
3.85e-08
(0.000149)
0.0472***
(0.00317)

-0.0000814
(0.000469)
0.000466
(0.000469)
0.000465
(0.00379)

148605
-374578.1

-0.138
(0.524)

0.00360***
(0.000999)
0.0111***
(0.00196)
-0.161***
(0.0248)

0.00558
(0.00306)
-0.00502
(0.00369)
0.0713
(0.0560)

148605
-446152.2

2.613**
(0.881)

0.000829
(0.000428)
0.00215**
(0.000753)
0.166***
(0.0117)

0.000782
(0.00110)
-0.000547
(0.00123)
0.0138
(0.0144)

427102
14.59

29.02

0.2657***
(0.0379)

0.0000004
(0.0001)
0.000002
(0.00009)
0.05944***
(0.00188)

-0.00003
(0.00034)
0.00026
(0.00035)
0.00009
(0.00191)

427102

2.1107***
(0.105)

-0.00001
(0.00022)
0.00003
(0.00023)
-0.1538***
(0.00437)

0.00076
(0.00068)
0.00012
(0.00084)
0.00034
(0.00412)

6.4

427102

0.05343***
(0.0118)

0.0000844***
(0.0000112)
0.0000900***
(0.00000883)
-0.00154***
(0.000267)

0.0000418
(0.0000421)
0.000680***
(0.0000560)
0.000219
(0.000116)

7.04

427102

0.03514
(0.0203)

0.0000849***
(0.0000113)
0.0000898***
(0.00000904)
0.00197
(0.00139)

0.0000325
(0.0000429)
0.000689***
(0.0000571)
0.000201
(0.000123)

Two Stage Least Squares Regression
1st-stage:
1st-stage:
2nd-stage:
Contentious Firm
2nd-stage: All
Challenges receptivity
H1 only
Hypotheses
M5
M6
M7
M8
-0.02388*** 0.02835***
-0.000503*** 0.000550
(0.00385)
(0.00196)
(0.000152)
(0.000497)
0.22021*** -0.04377***
0.00201*** 0.000317
(0.00308)
(0.00093)
(0.000325)
(0.000495)
0.00116*** -0.00232***
0.0000166
-0.0000684
(0.00016)
(0.00008)
(0.00000940) (0.0000393)
0.00954*** 0.01433***
0.00000221 0.000164
(0.00079)
(0.0003)
(0.0000402) (0.0000988)

Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm-SMO dyad level in parentheses. All models include year, industry and
SMO fixed effects. IV-probit regression sample sizes in M1 to M4 are reduced by perfectly predicted groups (i.e., SMOs and industries with no
collaborations). M5 to M8 employs 2SLS regression which retains all perfectly predicted groups. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001.

2.037***
(0.103)

0.0000166
(0.000391)
-0.0000301
(0.000361)
-0.126***
(0.00762)

0.000863
(0.000994)
0.000543
(0.00115)
0.000978
(0.00807)

Constant

Headquarter state party (Dem=1)

Number of SMOs

Institutional environment controls
Public policy openness

SMO resources

SMO collaboration experience

SMO controls
SMO congressional appearances

Industry contentious challenges

Firm centrality

Firm environmental performance

Firm controls
CEO contributions to Rep. candidates

Instrumental Variables Probit Regression
1st-stage:
1st-stage:
2nd-stage:
Contentious Firm
2nd-stage: All
Challenges receptivity
H1 only
Hypotheses
M1
M2
M3
M4
-0.00300
0.0562***
-0.102**
0.0867***
(0.00648)
(0.00325)
(0.0319)
(0.0130)
0.188***
-0.0149***
0.120***
-0.0207**
(0.00526)
(0.00168)
(0.0216)
(0.00700)
0.00248*** -0.00241***
0.000997
-0.00449***
(0.000248)
(0.000142)
(0.000999)
(0.000333)
0.0182***
0.0119***
0.00978*
0.00705***
(0.00129)
(0.000532)
(0.00420)
(0.00145)
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Models 4 and 8 report the second-stage of the full model with all hypothesized interaction
effects, where endogenous regressors are instrumented using EPA legal cases and extreme weather
events and their interactions instrument for the endogenous interacted regressors. In the full models,
the coefficient for contentious challenges shifts to being positive and significant (M4: beta=0.234;
p=0.042; M8: beta=0.00831, p=0.001), while movement segmentation is no longer significant, and
the interaction of movement segmentation with contentious challenges has a large negative and
significant effect (M4: beta=-0.429; p=0.009; M8: beta=-0.0148, p=0.000). The shifts in the sign
of coefficients from the non-interacted models suggests that the effects of contentious challenges
are contingent on the level of segmentation in the movement. Combined, the three coefficients
suggest that at low levels of movement segmentation, contentious challenges at the firm level
increase the probability that a firm-SMO collaboration forms, as would be predicted by the positive
radical flank effect and hypothesis 1. As movement segmentation increases, however, the effect of
contentious challenges on firm-SMO collaborations is attenuated, and in highly segmented
movements contention has no significant impact on collaborations.
To ease interpretation of the results, Figures 1 and 2 plot the predicted probability of a firmSMO collaboration at different levels of contentious challenges, and at three different levels of
movement segmentation (Figure 1 corresponds to M4; Figure 2 corresponds to M8). A margins
analysis of the IV-probit regressions, with all other variables held at their mean, suggests that for
firms with no contention, a one standard deviation increase in contentious challenges corresponds
to a 23% increase in the probability of a collaboration if the SMO operates in a movement in the
10th percentile of movement segmentation observations, in comparison to 2% for SMOs that
operate in movements in the 90th percentile of segmentation. These differences in probabilities
across movement segmentation increase exponentially with the number of contentious challenges
the firm faces. Comparing within the same level of contention, firms that experienced twelve
contentious challenges in the previous year have 2.0 times greater probability of having a
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collaboration with an SMO, if the SMO operates in a movement in the bottom decile of movement
segmentation observations in comparison to SMOs that operate in the top decile. The preceding
suggests contentious challenges against firms are more likely to drive collaborations with SMOs
where those SMOs are members of movements with greater cooperative ties between radical and
moderate activists. Conversely, in highly segmented movements, contention is not predictive of
collaboration, in line with arguments advanced in hypothesis 2.
Turning to hypothesis 3, I find support for a positive moderating effect of firm receptivity
on the probability that a previously contentiously targeted firm collaborates with an SMO. In
Models 3 and 7 with only the main effects of the endogenous regressors estimated (i.e., no
interaction terms), firm receptivity does not have a significant effect on collaboration, suggesting
more activism-receptive firms are not more likely to have collaborations. Conversely, when
interacted with contentious challenges, firm receptivity has a positive and significant effect (M4:
beta=1.044; p=0.000; M8: beta=0.0155, p=0.036), while its main effect is negative and significant.
The shifts in the sign of coefficients from the non-interacted models suggests that firm receptivity
to activism increases the probability of collaborations when firms face greater contentious
challenges from the movement. Conversely, in the absence of contention, activism receptive firms
are less likely to form collaborations with activists. This may be driven by the fact that such firms
have reformed their practices in response to activism in the past and in the absence of a motivation
to do so again (i.e., continuing contention) are less likely to seek out collaborations. Figures 3 and
4 plot the predicted probability of a firm-SMO collaboration at different levels of contentious
challenges, and at three different levels of firm receptivity (Figure 3 corresponds to M4; Figure 4
corresponds to M8). A margins analysis of the IV-probit regressions, with all other variables held
at their mean, suggests for firms that experienced six contentious challenges in the previous year,
the probability of a collaboration with an SMO is 1.7 times higher if that firm is in the 90th percentile
of observations on receptivity, in comparison to a firm in the bottom 10th percentile of receptivity.
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Figure 1: IV-Probit Predicted Probability of Firm-SMO Collaboration and Observations (H2)

Note. IV-probit regression (M4) predicted probabilities of a firm-SMO collaboration at different levels for
movement segmentation and contentious challenges (95% confidence intervals; other variables held at
means). Bottom graph presents the number of sample observations by contentious challenges on logarithmic
scale. When the SMO is part of a movement in the 10th percentile of movement segmentation or at the median
value of segmentation, the probability of a firm-SMO collaboration increases with contentious challenges
against them in the previous year. However, in highly segmented movements, contentious challenges do not
drive firm-SMO collaborations.
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Figure 2: 2SLS Predicted Probability of Firm-SMO Collaboration and Observations (H2)

Note. 2SLS regression (M8) predicted probabilities of a firm-SMO collaboration at different levels for
movement segmentation and contentious challenges (95% confidence intervals; other variables held at
means). Bottom graph presents the number of sample observations by contentious challenges on logarithmic
scale. When the SMO is part of a movement in the 10th percentile of movement segmentation, the probability
of a firm-SMO collaboration increases with contentious challenges against them in the previous year.
Conversely, in movements at median levels of segmentation and above, contentious challenges do not
increase the probability of collaboration significantly.
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Figure 3: IV-Probit Predicted Probability of Firm-SMO Collaboration and Observations (H3)

Note. IV-probit regression (M4) predicted probabilities of a firm-SMO collaboration at different levels for
firm receptivity to activism and contentious challenges (95% confidence intervals; other variables held at
means). Bottom graph presents the number of sample observations by contentious challenges on logarithmic
scale. Firms in the 90th percentile of receptivity to activism have a higher probability of an SMO
collaboration, the greater the contentious challenges against them in the previous year, while the probability
falls for those firms resistant to activism (bottom decile).
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Figure 4: 2SLS Predicted Probability of Firm-SMO Collaboration and Observations (H3)

Note. 2SLS regression (M8) predicted probabilities of a firm-SMO collaboration at different levels for firm
receptivity to activism and contentious challenges (95% confidence intervals; other variables held at means).
Bottom graph presents the number of sample observations by contentious challenges on logarithmic scale.
Firms in the 90th percentile of receptivity to activism have a higher probability of an SMO collaboration, the
greater the contentious challenges against them in the previous year, while the probability falls for those firms
resistant to activism (bottom decile) or at median levels of receptivity to activism.
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The positive effect of firm receptivity increases with greater contention, as predicted in hypothesis
3, so that firms in the top decile of receptivity that experienced twelve contentious challenges in
the previous year have a probability 3.5 that of firms with the same level of contention but in the
bottom decile of receptivity.
Movement segmentation supplementary analysis
I conduct supplementary analyses to further investigate the mechanism underlying the findings on
movement segmentation, as well as investigating other possible explanations for the results. I begin
by looking for evidence that the mechanism underlying my segmentation hypothesis – peer
sanctioning risk – is plausible. First, I look for evidence of greater peer sanctioning in more
segmented movements. While not common, I observe 72 instances where one SMO criticized
another (i.e., peer sanctioning), collected using the method employed for cooperative ties between
SMOs (i.e., coding of archival documents). Using SMO-movement panel count models of peer
sanctioning, and panel logistic regression (where peer sanctioning is a dummy of 0 or 1), I find that
the intensity (count model; p=0.002) and probability (logistic; p=0.005) of peer sanctioning is
higher if the SMO is part of more segmented movements. Moreover, the probability of peer
sanctioning is positively associated with the number cooperative interactions (e.g., collaborations,
donations) the SMO has had with firms (p=0.005) on the issue in the previous year.
Second, I investigate whether movement segmentation has a more pronounced effect on
those SMOs for whom peer sanctioning risks are more salient. Peer sanctioning risks are most
salient for SMOs that are in more precarious financial positions, because public peer criticisms
could endanger their survival, as in the case of Pollution Probe and Greenpeace. Conversely,
financially stable SMOs may be able to absorb peer criticism with less fear of dissolution. I
calculate annual z-scores for each SMO, relying on (Keating et al., 2005) adaptation of Altman’s
z-score to nonprofits, which they found to be a good predictor of insolvency risk. A split sample
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analysis indicates that for SMOs in poorer financial health, the attenuating effect of movement
segmentation is significantly higher than for SMOs in good financial health (p=0.0074).13
Third, I investigate whether firm preferences for less segmented movements may be
driving the results. For example, firms may be motivated to form collaborations with moderate
activists with more ties to radicals (i.e., those in less segmented movements) which they could
indirectly exploit to quell conflict. I investigate this by including in my models the number of
cooperative ties the focal activist has to radicals in the movement, as well as ties to radicals in any
movement, and my results remain unchanged. Another possibility is that firms avoid collaborations
on issues where there is more polarization amongst consumers (e.g., the public). To the degree that
movement segmentation represents broader public polarization on an issue, this could bias my
results. As such, I look for evidence that movement segmentation has a more pronounced
attenuating effect on collaborations in the face of contention from radicals rather than moderates,
which is consistent with activists’ fearing retribution from radicals, but shouldn’t affect a firm’s
proclivity for more or less polarized issue areas. I compare results from two models, one with
contentious challenges from radicals against the firm interacted with movement segmentation, and
the other with contentious challenges from moderates similarly interacted. The attenuating effect
of movement segmentation on contention is more significant and larger if the contention is from
radical activists (LPM: beta=-0.258; p=0.000) than if moderate activists are the source of the
contentious challenges against the firm (LPM: beta=-0.016; p=0.048).
In the absence of an exogenous shock to movement social structures, my results may be
biased due to the non-random assignment of SMOs into environmental issues and their choices in
respect of which other SMOs to cooperate with on that issue (i.e., movement segmentation). One

13

I employ the suest command in STATA that allows for correlated errors across models allowing for crossmodel hypothesis testing, followed by test to test the null that the coefficient for the interaction term of
contentious challenges and movement segmentation is higher for SMOs with greater insolvency risk (i.e.,
lower z-scores).
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unobservable that may be biasing my results, is the possibility that in more socially cohesive
movements, radicals and moderates may be cooperating to bring about positive radical flank
effects. Baron et al. (2016) propose that given that moderates have greater bargaining power when
firms experience contentious targeting, moderate activists have an incentive to fund their radical
peers’ campaigns. It is plausible that in less segmented movements, moderates and radicals are
more likely to exploit this positive externality either because of their pre-existing ties or because
radicals are not opposed to their peers’ collaborations with firms. If such coordination exists, this
would undermine the theoretical mechanism I advance. I look for evidence that moderate activists
provide support to radical activists by reading their annual IRS tax filings, 14 which I obtain from
NCCS and other sources, available from 2001 onwards. In the subsample of SMOs that ever had a
collaboration with a firm, I find no evidence that they provided cash or in-kind support to more
contentious SMOs for contentious targeting campaigns. In the rare instances such grants do occur,
they are described as research activities, federal award (i.e., grant disbursed as part of a broader
program), or conservation activities. The absence of moderates funding radicals’ campaigns is
consistent with Haines’ (2013) argument that purposeful cooperation between SMOs to bring about
the radical flank effect is a risky strategy if exposed. Given the reliance of SMOs on donations, if
such cooperation were exposed, donors may pull their support. As such, it is much more likely that
“positive radical flank effects are almost always unintended.” (ibid., :1049)
Another potential concern is that movements segment for reasons other than ideology that
could also correlate with the propensity of activists or firms to collaborate. As such, I explore
robustness of my results during a time when researchers have documented that is was ideological
differences between moderates and radicals that created a split in the environmental movement. I
do so by comparing SMO-firm collaborations formed during the negotiation of the North American

14

In Part IV of their 990 forms to the IRS, non-profits are required to disclose the name and amount of cash
and non-cash assistance and its purpose to other organizations if the amount exceeds $5,000.
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Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which produced a split between more ideologically radical and
moderate SMOs (Dreiling and Wolf, 2001), in comparison to other periods in the panel. The
ideological split began in 1993 when leaders of six moderate environmental organizations 15
publicly announced their support for NAFTA, and ended in 1999 with the Seattle protests against
the World Trade Organization. Organizations opposing NAFTA were described as “activists who
bear a deep distrust of corporations and regulators,” and included Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth,
and the Sierra Club (Behr, 1993). The NAFTA split in the environmental movement spilled over
into multiple environmental issues (Dreiling and Wolf, 2001), and represents a quasi-exogenous
shock to social movement relational structures that fractured on ideological lines. A t-test of means
in movement segmentation confirms that between 1993 and 1998, movement segmentation was
significantly higher than the preceding and following periods (p=0.000). Splitting the sample into
the period representing the NAFTA split, and other periods, I rerun the baseline model and find
that the number of contentious challenges and firm receptivity are insignificantly associated with
collaborations during the NAFTA split. The null result, however, cannot be interpreted as evidence
that ideological segmentation in the movement reduced the positive radical flank effect, because
very few SMO-firm collaborations were formed during the NAFTA split. However, of those that
were formed, none involved a firm that was contentiously targeted in the previous year. In
comparison, in the post-NAFTA split period nearly 40% of firms that formed SMO collaboration
had experienced contentious targeting. These results by no means establish causality in the effect
of movement segmentation, but provide anecdotal evidence that during a period where movement
segmentation was high due to ideological differences with few ties between radical and moderates,
SMOs never partnered with previously contentiously targeted firms.

15

The Audubon Society, World Wildlife Fund, National Wildlife Federation, National Resources Defense
Council, Environmental Defense Fund and Conservation International.
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DISCUSSION
Prior work in movements and markets focuses on features of a targeted firm that are exogenous to
a social movement driving selection of firms for contentious targeting. While this argument is
straightforward as applied to contentious tactics, its import into selection for collaboration is limited
by the fact that firm-activist collaborations require a willing firm partner, and can result in
allegations of activist co-optation and greenwashing. On the other hand, the analytical focus of
emergent research examining firm-activist collaborations are the implementation activities
underlying collaborations (Selsky and Parker, 2005), and the motivation of firms and activists to
enter collaborations (den Hond et al., 2015). Importantly, both research streams tend to set to the
background “the structural embeddedness of interactions in fields and networks” (de Bakker et al.,
2013: 580). In this paper, I argue and find that the embeddedness of firm-activist collaborations in
different movement structures is an important determinant of the degree to which collaborations
can form against a backdrop of contention (Haines, 1984, 2013).
This paper speaks to several streams of research. First, it complements existing research at
the intersection of social movements and markets by exploring the selection of partners for crosssector collaborations, a heretofore understudied phenomenon. In my theoretical development, I
incorporate the objectives of both the firm and activist, with a particular focus on how contention
between firms and social movements drive the respective costs and benefits they face in engaging
in collaborations. In doing so, this paper answers a call made by Rucht (2004: 197) that activists’
cooperative alliances “and their interplay with conflict-ridden relationships, should become part
and parcel of social movement studies.” I propose that while firms may be motivated to seek
collaborations with activists to quell conflict, the disparate risks their potential partners’ face in
collaborating with ‘enemies’ of the broader movement, can dampen the formation of such
collaborations. In a 25-year panel of movement networks, and contentious and collaborative
interactions between 118 social movement organizations and 300 of the largest firms in the U.S., I
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find the formation of firm-activist collaborations is driven by both the pattern of contentious
challenges by the movement more broadly and firms’ receptivity to activism, but is diminished in
movements with few cooperative ties between radical and moderate factions of a movement. As
such, contrary to existing research on target selection for contention, which focuses on firm
characteristics exogenous to the movement, I find that partner selection for collaboration is driven
by the dynamics and structure of the social movement itself.
In accounting for both contention and collaboration, this paper is one of the first empirical
tests of the positive radical flank effect in the context of movements and firms (see Hiatt et al.,
2015 for an exception). By problematizing firm-activist collaborations as potentially contested
practices, this research uncovers an important boundary condition on a concept regaining popularity
in both movements research (Hiatt et al., 2015; Schifeling and Hoffman, 2018) and organizational
theory more broadly (Truelove and Kellogg, 2016). Building on the idea that the legitimacy of
practices is context bound (Ingram and Yue, 2008) and fields have a shared understanding of what
practices are legitimate (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012), I highlight that the relational configurations
of movement fields can constrain activists from collaborating with contentiously targeted firms.
Specifically, in the absence of social bonds between radical and moderate activists, where open
conflict is more likely and inter-activist negotiation is hampered by few prior ties, the positive
radical flank does not materialize and social movements and firms fail to “transform contestation
into collaboration” (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008: 422). This does not challenge past findings on
the positive radical flank where firms’ responses to contention are unilateral (McDonnell 2016),
but instead suggests that complications arise where firms respond with bilateral efforts that require
the voluntary cooperation of activists.
In focusing on partner selection, a central question in cooperative strategy, this paper also
complements an emerging stream of research on firms’ cooperative strategies with nonmarket
stakeholders (Bhanji and Oxley, 2013; Dorobantu, Kaul, and Zelner, 2017; Dorobantu and
65

Odziemkowska, 2017; King, 2007). While a considerable body of evidence points to firms actively
managing threats from nonmarket stakeholders through unilateral actions, such as concessions to
boycotts (King 2008) or prosocial claims (McDonnell and King, 2013), one strategic response that
has garnered considerably less scholarly attention is the use of bilateral formal cooperative
relationships. This is surprising given one of the best ways for firms to actively manage threats in
their external environments is by establishing a formal relationship with sources of that threat
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This paper highlights that firms’ use of formal relationships to manage
stakeholder threats is complicated by conflict crowding out subsequent collaboration (Sytch and
Tatarynowicz, 2014), not only within a dyad, but also the broader field of stakeholders that the
counterparty is a member of. While building cooperative relationships with well-connected
stakeholders is valuable (Dorobantu et al., 2017a), those same networks can constrain the
stakeholder in engaging in cooperation.
To cooperative strategy research, the findings draw attention to a unique risk that
counterparties can face – peer sanctioning – when counterparties are embedded in broader
organizational fields with their own understandings of what is appropriate or common enemies.
This has implications for interorganizational relationships in market settings where members of an
organizational field define their identity in opposition to another field, or where there is a history
of acrimonious relations between two organizational fields. The ability of a microbrewer to contract
with Budweiser, for example, may be constrained by its membership in the microbrewery
organizational field, which not only resembles a social movement but whose members define their
identity in opposition to macro-brewers (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000). In such organizational
fields, the logic underlying partner selection may not be focused on partner capabilities or
bargaining power, but instead driven by the social acceptability of the partner to the organizational
field.
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That said, the scope of the research question and reliance on a large quantitative data set
has also exposed the paper to certain limitations. Chief among these, firm-activist collaborations
have been conceptualized without attention to the political opportunity structures (Kitschelt, 1986)
in which these interactions take place. While I empirically control for public policy openness to
environmental issues, the significant positive association between policy openness and
collaborations suggests opportunities for future research to shed light on how political opportunity
structures and regulatory threats (Hiatt et al., 2015; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000) influence
collaboration between firms and activists. Additionally, in focusing on partner selection, this paper
does not consider the outcomes of collaborations that do materialize. It is unclear, therefore, if firms
succeed in quelling contention from the broader movement, or if activists achieve their goal of
changing the firms’ practices and broader institutional change. This offers opportunities for future
research to explore the performance outcomes of cross-sector collaborations, for the firm, activist,
and more broadly, society. As the advancement of firms’ social and environmental performance is
a product of both contention and collaboration, this paper is a first step in eliminating blind spots
in our understanding of institutional change.
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CHAPTER 2: Co-opting Contention: Field-level Effects of Firm-Activist Collaborations
(This chapter is co-authored with Mary-Hunter McDonnell)

Market contention, or private politics, refers to the efforts of social activists to promote corporate
reform by targeting firms directly with tactics like protests, boycotts, and negative media campaigns
(Eesley and Lenox, 2006; King and Pearce, 2010; Reid and Toffel, 2009; Soule, 2009). Prior work
has demonstrated that contentious campaigns can reduce a targeted firm’s profits (Luders, 2006),
damage its reputation (King, 2008; McDonnell and King, 2013), provoke shareholder divestment
(King and Soule, 2007), and degrade its relationship with core nonmarket constituencies (Hiatt and
Park, 2012; McDonnell and Werner, 2016). Recognizing the considerable damage that contention
can do, a growing body of research explores how firms defend themselves from the threats of
contentious challenges. Targeted firms might attempt to allay contention by taking curative steps
through concession and reform (Bartley, 2003; King, 2008; McDonnell et al., 2015) or employ
more aggressively defensive tactics like attempting to co-opt threatening activists through crosssector collaborations or alliances (McDonnell, 2016). Co-optation refers to a firm’s attempt to
“manage an external threat by establishing a formal relationship… that to some extent internalizes
the threat…” (McDonnell, 2016; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Selznick, 1949). Providing activists a
voice in the firm’s decision-making process or activities may reduce contentious threats by
demobilizing social movements (Piven and Cloward, 1979; Utting, 2005). As direct empirical
evidence of this, McDonnell (2016) found that firms that allied with activists by co-sponsoring a
social campaign experienced an average 56% reduction in the number of times they were targeted
by contentious activists in the following year.
While collaborations with social activists appear to reduce the threat of contentious
challenges, the precise pathways by which this occurs remain unclear. To date, co-optation in this
context has typically been conceptualized as a direct, or dyadic phenomenon: firms ally with
potentially hostile activists in order to avoid being targeted by those same activists. In response to
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Greenpeace’s hydrofluorocarbon campaign waged against it in the late 1990s for example, CocaCola began working collaboratively with Greenpeace on refrigeration technology. Coca-Cola’s
collaboration resulted in an end to Greenpeace’s mobilization against it on issues of air emissions
and climate change. Coca-Cola’s experience is echoed in scholarly research on elite-sponsorship
of movements (Coy and Heeden, 2005; Jenkins, 1998; Mohavi, 1996) and cross-sector
collaborations (Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Burchell and Cook, 2013b; Trumpy, 2008), which points
to the demobilizing effects of such ties on the focal activist through the moderation of its goals,
tactics, and independence.
However, in its dyadic focus, existing literature has largely ignored the potential indirect
effects of firms’ co-optive tactics on the broader activist field. For instance, one untold story about
Coca-Cola’s collaboration with Greenpeace, is that following its announcement, Coca-Cola saw a
dramatic decrease in contention from other activist organizations including the Earth Island
Institute, Friends of the Earth, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Sierra Club, all of
whom had mobilized against it in preceding years. Given growing evidence of the indirect effects
of mobilization on untargeted organizations (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016), in this paper, we seek to
uncover the pathways by which firm-activist collaborations indirectly co-opt or demobilize
activists outside the collaboration. Does a firm’s collaboration with one social activist ameliorate
contentious threats from other activists in the field? And if so, how? This research question is
particularly important to explore given that direct co-optation may not always be an option, such
as when a firm’s strained relationship with a particular activist raises the cost of, or prevents, a
collaboration (Gargiulo, 1993).
Further, given social activists’ sensitivity to the risks of co-optation, it is not clear that the
broader activist field should always evaluate firm-activist collaborations as positive. In fact, the use
of such tactics by firms has from time to time resulted in criticisms of cross-sector collaboration
(Lucea, 2010), and increased mobilization. So while in Coca-Cola’s case its collaboration with
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Greenpeace reduced the contentious challenges it faced from other environmental activists from an
annual average of four to one-half, in the four years preceding and following its collaboration, not
all firms have been so lucky. Weyerhaeuser’s collaboration with the Nature Conservancy and
Conservation International to conserve forests produced no drop in contention (see Figure 5). In
fact, while on average firms with collaborations experience a drop from an average of 0.96
contentious challenges in the four years preceding a collaboration to 0.81 in those after
collaboration, considerable variation exists. Even in the presence of a firm-activist collaboration,
therefore, other activists’ propensity to be indirectly co-opted is likely to vary, but the factors that
determine this variation are not well understood.
Figure 5: Contentious challenges against firms with activist collaborations

Note. Number of contentious challenges faced by firms with collaborations (y-axis) in the four years
preceding the collaboration, and the four years after a collaboration is formed (i.e. 1 on x-axis denotes the
first year of the collaboration). Extreme values above 10 excluded to ease readability. Firms with activist
collaborations experience an average of 0.96 contentious challenges in the four years preceding a
collaboration, in comparison to 0.81 contentious challenges on average after the collaboration is formed.
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We seek to address this gap in the literature by drawing from research on
interorganizational networks to theorize two mechanisms by which firm-activist collaborations lead
to indirect co-optation, or demobilization, of the broader activist field. Given our focus on the
effects of interorganizational collaborations on actors outside the collaborating dyad, this
perspective is particularly useful because of its emphasis on the embeddedness of actors and ties
within broader structures of social relations (i.e., fields). From this perspective, the outcomes of
interorganizational collaborations are a function of the fields in which they are embedded (Gulati,
1998). Interorganizational collaborations wield influence on the broader field through their role as
pipes (conduits of information and resources) or prisms (signals that influence the perceptions of
field participants) (Podolny, 2001). We adapt and extend these mechanisms to build theory about
the indirect effects of firm-activist collaborations on the broader activist field.
We conceive of inter-activist networks as pipes of information that can reduce contentious
threats from individual members of the movement field that are indirectly tied to the firm via a
collaborating activist. As information flows are dependent on the sender of information being
motivated and perceived as reliable (Ghosh and Rosenkopf, 2014), we propose that bilateral
collaborations, where activists have more information about the firm and are more motivated to use
it, to have the greatest impact. Further, we propose that contentious threats from the broader
movement field can be reduced even in the absence of inter-activist ties. Firm-activist
collaborations also act as public signals for belief updating by the broader field where the firm
associates with activists with more desirable characteristics such as legitimacy or those most likely
to prompt belief updating such as activists for whom collaboration deviates from their normal
repertoire. We test our theorized mechanisms using a unique, large-scale and self-constructed
quantitative panel analysis of 1,823 contentious and collaborative interactions between 110
environmental social movement organizations (SMOs) and a sample of 179 of the largest firms in
the United States. Using variation in the types of collaborations formed by firms and activists, we
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also show that our results are unlikely to be driven by collaborations acting as a promise of future
improvements in firms’ environmental performance, but instead the mechanisms we propose.
Our paper contributes to social movement and organizational theory by crafting an account
of how firm-activist collaborations lead to the indirect co-optation of the members of the broader
activist field. Our findings complement a burgeoning research stream on the indirect effects of
activism on organizational fields (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016) by being the first to consider the fieldlevel effects of cooperative interactions between activists and firms. In the same way that social
activists influence each other’s mobilization and tactics (Strang and Soule, 1998), our research
highlights that they can also influence each other’s de-mobilization. We additionally contribute to
non-market strategy research by shedding light on the mechanisms by which firms can allay market
contention, not by force or coercion, but by exploiting the social networks and identity of a
collaborating social activist. In so doing, our research provides insight into the mechanisms by
which organizations exploit ties across fields as they attempt to foster more favorable
environments.
FROM DIRECT TO INDIRECT CO-OPTATION
In her typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures, Oliver (1991: 157) notes that an
“intended effect of co-optation tactics is to neutralize institutional opposition.” A long-running
body of research in non-profit and social movement research has concerned itself with how elites
can co-opt non-profits and social movement organizations (Coy and Hedeen, 2005; Jenkins, 1998;
Modavi, 1996). Collaborating with elites or external sponsorship (e.g., elite grants via foundations)
is thought to moderate social movement organization (SMO) goals and tactics, thus reducing
disruptive forms of activism (Haines, 1984; McAdam, 1982; Piven and Cloward, 1979), effectively
demobilizing the movement.
Accordingly, firms’ increasing collaboration with and support of activist organizations
may be associated with “a decline in confrontational activism and advocacy for radical alternatives”
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(Utting, 2005: 382). Researchers of firm-activist collaborations (i.e., cross-sector social
partnerships or alliances) have suggested that collaborations can compromise an activist’s
independence (Baur and Schmitz, 2012), distract it from its ultimate goals (Trumpy, 2008), and
dissuade it from challenging its partnering firm (McDonnell, 2016). To date, most discussion of
co-optation in the context of firm-activist collaborations focuses on the dyad (Baur and Schmitz,
2012; Burchell and Cook, 2013b; Trumpy, 2008). Co-optation in the dyadic setting is direct: firms
support or ally with potentially hostile activists in order to avoid being targeted by them. However,
the growing attention paid by research on the indirect effects of movements onto untargeted
organizations (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016) orients our attention to the complementary question of
whether firm-activist collaborations can have indirect co-optation effects on the broader activist
field.
While co-optation has clear, direct effects on the actor immediately targeted, a review of
the literature suggests that it also has more diffuse effects insofar as the co-opted actor holds sway
over others in the environment. For instance, Selznick (1948: 34) notes that cooptation usually
brings in actors that possess the confidence of the relevant public to “lend respectability or
legitimacy” to the organization. Similarly, Oliver (1991:158) suggests that relational ties
“demonstrate the organization's worthiness and acceptability to other external constituents.”
Scholars of interorganizational relations point out that an allies’ ties can produce diffuse
legitimation effects (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Galaskiewicz, 1985) as well as indirect access to
resources and leverage over external sources of constraint (Burt, 1983; Gargiulo, 1993; Mizruchi,
1996).
There are a number of reasons to believe that indirect co-optation might be a particularly
useful strategy in the context of firms’ management of contentious social activism. First,
relationships between firms and activists have historically been strained and some activists will
never collaborate with firms, which limits the availability of direct co-optation (Baron et al., 2016;
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Bertels et al., 2014). Further, a strained relationship between two actors is likely to raise the cost
of building a direct co-optive tie (Gargiulo, 1993). Therefore, direct co-optation may be restrained
to activists that are already positively pre-disposed to firms, limiting its additive effects. Indirect
co-optation, on the other hand, offers the firm the possibility of exploiting the status (Oliver, 1991)
and social networks (Mizruchi, 1996) of its activist partners to block the capacity of dissidents to
actively oppose it (Gargiulo, 1993). The idea of indirect co-optation has not gone unnoticed by
private sector and public sector leaders. For example, Steven W. Percy, former chairman and CEO
of BP America Inc., notes that one of the key things companies want from their association with
activists is “the halo effect that the NGO’s reputation brings to a partnership,” (Percy, 2010: 235).
A representative of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) noted that Procter & Gamble “needed WWF
to ensure that they're not attacked by NGOs,” in their pulp purchasing program (Stecklow, 2006).
And an executive quoted in McDonnell (2016:56) suggests that firms seek out collaborations with
activists to increase their social capital and networks within the activist arena to ensure that “when
the rocks get hurled, they’ll be hurled at someone else and not at us.”
While a review of extant literature suggests that interorganizational collaborations may
have spillover effects outside the collaborating dyad, and may be a particularly effective strategy
in the context of firm-activist relations, it is not clear that such a strategy will always effectively
allay ongoing contention. Similar to other organizational practices, interorganizational linkages are
subject to evaluations of their legitimacy and authenticity (Baum and Oliver, 1991). Although firmactivist collaborations are growing in prevalence (Yaziji and Doh, 2009), for some they continue
to be an emergent practice that has not achieved a taken for granted status. Some activists’
collaborations with firms are dismissed by peer activists as ‘greenwashing,’ resulting in criticism
of the collaboration (Lucea, 2010) and ostracism of the participating activist by its peers (Baur and
Schmitz, 2012). The Organic Consumers Association, for instance, dismisses Starbucks’ work with
groups like Conservation International as "greenwash" (Maitland, 2002). The acceptance of a
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donation by Sierra Club from Chesapeake Energy drew criticisms from other environmentalists
who criticized it for “sleeping with the enemy” on Twitter (Barringer, 2012). In some instances,
firm-activist collaborations have been met with mobilization rather than demobilization of other
activists. A collaboration between environmental activist Pollution Probe and a Canadian grocery
retailer to certify its products, was met with a public attack from Greenpeace shortly after its
announcement. Rather than demobilizing Greenpeace, the announcement galvanized Greenpeace
to hold demonstrations and distribute satirical leaflets at the retailer’s outlets (Stafford and
Hartman, 1996). Thus, despite both theoretical and empirical support for indirect co-optation in
this context, the relationship between firm-activist collaborations and co-optation of the broader
movement remains unclear.
To understand that relationship better, we draw from the broader literature on
interorganizational networks, which suggests that ties have dispersed effects across organizational
fields through two mechanisms that are summarized in two metaphors: pipes and prisms (Podolny,
2001). The former emphasizes the role of interorganizational relations as pipes for information and
resource flows, while the latter highlights their role as prisms through which the qualities of actors
are inferred by others (ibid.). We use these two pathways of influence to conceptualize firm-activist
collaborations as providing private information (pipes) and public signals (prisms) for belief
updating by SMOs within the activist field. In evaluating which firms to target contentiously, SMOs
have prior beliefs about the degree to which a firm presents a good opportunity for targeting (e.g.,
the firm’s social and environmental performance, the probability that the firm will concede, or the
probability other SMOs will support the action). We propose that SMOs’ prior beliefs about a firm
may be updated through private information gleaned from activists that collaborate with the firm
(pipes) or through inferences made about the firm from its public association with other activists
(prisms). Viewed from this perspective, firm-activist collaborations have more dispersed effects on
activists outside of the collaboration by providing information that activists use when making their
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assessment of the firm and deciding whether to contentiously target it. We elaborate on each of
these mechanisms below.
INDIRECT CO-OPTATION THROUGH RELATIONAL PIPES
In his critique of the dyadic focus of early alliances research, Gulati (1998) asserts that the
performance effects on organizations of an alliance are a function of the network in which the
alliance is embedded. As such, the departure point for our inquiry into indirect co-optation is the
role played by the inter-activist network in which a firm-activist collaboration is embedded.
Research that characterizes networks as pipes focuses on social networks as “influential
information conduits because they provide salient and trusted information” (Brass et al., 2004:
805), particularly where the sender of information is both motivated and reliable (Ghosh and
Rosenkopf, 2014). While most ‘networks as pipes’ research has explored information sharing about
organizational practices (e.g., poison pills), interorganizational ties can also be conduits of
information about other organizations. Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989: 454) first brought
attention to the fact that managers use information gleaned from interorganizational ties “to make
decisions on how to relate to other organizations in their task environment.” They found that
interlocked directors at non-profit organizations were conduits of information about prospective
private-sector funders (ibid.). Despite there not being a direct relationship between the privatesector funder and the focal non-profit, the focal non-profit was able to learn about the firm due to
its directors sitting on the board of another non-profit that did have a relationship with the firm.
Indirect ties (two parties connected via a third) enable information gleaned from one
interorganizational relationship to transfer to a third party outside the relationship.
Similarly, inter-activist networks can act as pipes of information that demobilize indirectly
linked activists in one of two ways. First, in the same way that narratives of mobilization can
energize other activists (Polletta, 1998), we expect that narratives of collaborations with a firm may
quell contention. That is, an activist with which the firm collaborates can transfer private
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information about the firm that it gleans from its collaboration to other activists, which can
influence their perceptions of the firm’s motives and the authenticity of its support for their cause.
Secondly, activists that are collaborating with a firm may protect it by reaching out to their
connections to advocate on its behalf. One executive quoted in McDonnell (2016:57) illustrates
this mechanism, saying:
“[T]he Greenpeace guys, they know the PETA guys… [I]f we are working with PETA on
something that might make a big difference in the animal rights world, and then, if we get
a call from Greenpeace threatening to put the heat on us, well, we’d expect PETA to call
and say ‘back off, they are one of the good guys.’”
Activists might attempt to advocate on the firm’s behalf in this way in order to ensure its continued
dedication to their collaboration and to protect its reputation, given that their open association with
the firm could expose them to adverse reputational spillovers if it is scandalized (McDonnell and
Pontikes, 2017).
All this suggests that firms should benefit more from collaborating with activists that are
embedded in a highly connected network of activists, as these activists can reach a broader
population of activists in the field to share positive information about the firm and intervene on its
behalf when necessary. Accordingly, we expect that a firm that collaborates with an activist is likely
to reap the benefits of fewer contentious challenges not just from its activist partner, but also from
those to whom they are connected.
Hypothesis 1: A firm that collaborates with a social activist will face fewer
contentious challenges from activists directly tied to their partner activist.
Recent research on interorganizational networks also highlights that the actual transmission of
information via networks varies and may depend on the sender of information (Ghosh and
Rosenkopf, 2014). Because information is more likely to flow when senders are more motivated
and perceived as reliable (ibid.), we expect bilateral collaborations between a firm and activist to
have a greater impact on the calculus of indirectly tied activists than multilateral collaborations.
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Bilateral collaborations refer to collaborations that include only a focal firm and focal activist,
whereas multilateral collaborations involve consortiums of activists and firms. Ring and Van de
Ven’s process model of cooperative interorganizational relationship formation suggests that trust
and goodwill of other parties is a cumulative product of repeated past interaction (1994). Bilateral
firm-activist collaborations offer greater opportunities for the repetitive sequences of negotiation,
commitment and execution events that underlie the building of goodwill between actors (Ring and
Van De Ven, 1994). Conversely, in a multilateral alliance, reciprocal exchange events are
supplanted with generalized social exchange (Li et al., 2012). The removal of the reciprocity
between the exchange partners will undermine the building of goodwill. As such, the information
that an activist relays to its network about its corporate collaborator is likely to be more specific
and affirming in the case of bilateral collaborations, and may be perceived as more reliable due to
the depth of interaction in a bilateral collaboration. Secondly, bilateral collaborations involve a
more overt and clear connection between an activist and a firm, given that both had to willingly
enter the collaboration in order for it to exist. Accordingly, the associative reputational risks are
likely greater for an activist engaged in a bilateral collaboration with a firm, such that their
reputations are more tightly coupled. Thus bilateral, as opposed to multilateral, collaborations
produce greater incentives for an activist to intervene to discourage its peers from targeting its ally.
Hypothesis 2. The decrease in contention in H1 will be more pronounced for
bilateral collaborations.
INDIRECT CO-OPTATION THROUGH RELATIONAL PRISMS
An alternative pathway by which a tie between two organizations influences other actors in the
field is the informational cue the tie provides “on which others rely to make inferences about the
underlying quality of one or both of the [tied] actors.” (Podolny 2001:34). This notion of
interorganizational relations as ‘prisms’ has received support in numerous contexts ranging from
investment banking syndicates (Podolny, 1994), to entrepreneurial ventures (Stuart, Hoang &
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Hybels 1999), to day care centers (Baum and Oliver, 1991). The perspective holds that actors in an
organizational field can be influenced by relationships between two organizations even when they
are not directly tied to either actor in the relationship. This is because salient signals like the
category (Zuckerman, 1999) or status (Podolny 1994; Stuart et al. 1999) of one party to the
relationship heuristically inform the inferences that field participants make about the characteristics
and quality of the other party to the relationship. We propose that the perceptual consequences of
firm-activist collaborations operate through the activist partner’s differentiation on vertical
orderings (e.g., legitimacy, status) and along horizontal categories. Differentiation of activists in
the field influence the degree to which other field member’s update their beliefs about the firm as
a result of its tie to an activist. We begin by discussing how the categorization of activists based on
their tactical repertoire influences indirect co-optation, and conclude with the influence of vertical
orderings of activists in the field.
Perhaps one of the most salient and observable dimensions on which social activists are
typically categorized is their tactical repertoire (Clemens, 1993), or the degree to which they
employ contentious tactics like protests or boycotts versus more collaborative tactics like crosssector partnerships (Bertels et al., 2014). Reflecting this distinction, organizations comprising a
social movement field are referred to variously by scholars as ‘radicals’ versus ‘moderates’
(Haines, 1984), ‘confrontational’ versus ‘cooperative’ (Baron et al., 2016), or ‘dark greens’ versus
‘light greens,’ in the environmental movement (Hoffman and Bertels, 2010). Such cognitive
classifications are based on the actions of activists in the context of prior movements, and have
been shown to be salient signals to field participants where relational ties between activists are thin
(Briscoe and Safford, 2008; McAdam and Rucht, 1993). Repertoire-based categorizations are not
only constructed implicitly from media reports of activist tactics, but also explicitly in media reports
and by the organizations themselves. Greenpeace, for instance, has a fairly strong reputation for
using a contentious repertoire when interacting with firms. It has been described in the media as
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“known for its over-the-top efforts to draw attention to various causes,” (Bostedt, 2017) and selfdescribes its work as “us[ing] peaceful protest” and is careful to note that it “never takes any money
from corporations or government” in order to stay independent (Greenpeace 2017). Conversely,
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), whose collaborations with firms such as McDonald’s and
Walmart have received much media attention, describes its work as “partner[ing] with leading
companies to achieve environmental results.” (Environmental Defense Fund 2017).
Categorization of activists as ‘confrontational’ or ‘cooperative’ create heuristic
expectations amongst observers, including other activists, about the means by which an activist
engages firms. These heuristic expectations will, in turn, inform how observers interpret the firmactivist collaboration as a signal. The announcement of a firm’s collaboration with a ‘cooperative’
activist such as the EDF conforms to existing expectations, and as such, is likely to produce little
new information. Conversely, a firm’s collaboration with a ‘confrontational’ activist violates
expectations and creates a strong stimulus for observers to re-evaluate their own beliefs (Kernahan,
Bartholow, and Bettencourt, 2000).
The public actions of activists provide valuable information to other activists because they
reveal “something about their private information and beliefs” (Dorobantu et al., 2017: 565).
Because confrontational activists don’t often engage firms collaboratively, other activists are likely
to infer a large swing in the private information or beliefs the confrontational activist has about the
firm. This information is used by other activists to update their beliefs about which firms to target
and how, and should have a particularly pronounced effect on activists that are similarly
contentious, insofar as these activists are likely to be more attuned to the actions of activists that
they see as peer referents (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016). Thus, a
collaboration with a primarily contentious activist not only creates a stronger signal by violating
expectations, but it also may be particularly important in reducing contention through its effect on
the most contentious segments of a movement. As one director at Coca-Cola said of its
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collaboration with Greenpeace: “It's very powerful for a company to be associated with an NGO,
especially if it's an activist one,” (Financial Times, 2007). Greenpeace’s recognizable brand as a
contentious campaigner acts as a strong stimulus for belief updating, suggests a change in its beliefs
about the firm, and is likely to be most influential with the subset of activists who are most prone
to employ contentious tactics.
In summary, the tactical repertoires of movement activists delineate lines within social
space that become salient boundaries or categories that are used by others in the movement when
interpreting firm-activist collaborations as informational cues. Firm collaborations with historically
contentious activists provide a strong stimulus for belief updating, relay information about the
collaborating activist’s private beliefs, and are influential on the most contentious segments of a
movement. Therefore, we propose:
Hypothesis 3. A firm that collaborates with a social activist will face fewer
contentious challenges from other activists the more their partner activist has a
history of using contentious tactics.
Another way in which a firm-activist collaboration may demobilize other activists is through the
firm’s symbolic association with respected activists (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Galaskiewicz,
1985; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). Interorganizational relationships can serve a ‘legitimating
function’ with audiences (Dacin et al., 2007), and organizations facing a legitimacy deficit can
benefit by borrowing from the legitimacy of their more esteemed partners (Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1996; Oliver, 1990; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Stuart, 2000). This holds even
when the entities to a partnership are categorically distinct, as audience members transpose their
affective response to one organization when making intuitions about its associates (Haack, Pfarrer,
and Scherer, 2013). In the context of firm-activist collaborations, moral legitimacy reflects a
prosocial logic (Suchman, 1995) that for-profit firms may struggle to build on their own, but may
nevertheless be endowed with, through their association with organizations reflecting such logic.
81

Accordingly, firms facing contention seek out collaborations with social activists in order to
“borrow from the superior social legitimacy of these organizations” (Yaziji and Doh, 2009).
Of course, the symbolic value of an alliance depends on the legitimacy of the alliance
partner. Activists vary in their legitimacy, and accordingly in their ability to provide external
legitimacy to a partnering firm as a function of their credibility within the broader field (Baron,
2012). Suchman (1995:588) implies this notion by characterizing co-optation as a moral strategy
“to associate the organization with respected entities in its environment.” (emphasis added). A firm
can only benefit from positive affective legitimacy spillovers in the broader field to the extent that
its activist partner is itself seen as legitimate by field participants. Thus the extent to which a
collaboration results in indirect co-optation depends on the legitimacy of the activist partner to the
collaboration. A collaboration with an estimable activist may win the firm positive affect and
legitimacy in the eyes of other activists, decreasing their likelihood of targeting it in the future, but
firms are unlikely to reap significant legitimacy spillovers from collaborations with lesser-known
or lesser-respected activists in the field. Therefore, we propose:
Hypothesis 4: A firm that collaborates with a social activist will face fewer
contentious challenges from other activists the greater the legitimacy of its partner
activist.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample
We test our hypotheses using a unique panel database that tracks all contentious and collaborative
interactions between 110 U.S.-based environmental SMOs and a random sample of Fortune 500
companies in the United States between 2002 and 2012. We begin our in panel in 2002 because it
is the first year when SMOs’ IRS tax filings are available consistently, from which we construct
SMO board interlocks. The sample of SMOs was created by analyzing Factiva archives of US
newspapers for all organizations described in media as an “environmental activist organization,”
“conservation activist organization,” “environmental activist group,” or “conservation activist
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group,” and matching the organization names that this search produced with formal nonprofit tax
filings made available by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). Because we are
interested in the indirect effects of one type of tactic (collaboration) on the use of another
(contention) by other SMOs, we define the boundary of the movement around an issue
(environment) rather than sampling on tactics. We employ the term ‘activist’ in the searches
because activism is a key function of an SMO and is necessary to classify an organization as
belonging to a social movement (Soule and King, 2008). This enables us to distinguish ‘activist’
SMOs from other non-advocacy non-profits listed in the NCCS database (e.g., non-profits that are
more service oriented).16
We generated the company sample by randomly drawing 250 companies from the pool of
all companies that appeared in the Fortune 500 at any point during the sample period. The Fortune
500 list was sampled because prior research has shown that activists tend to contentiously target
large, high-status firms (King, 2008; McDonnell et al., 2015). Similarly, large, visible firms are
more likely to be selected for collaborations because they are most likely to propagate new practices
to bring about field-level change, the ultimate goal of activists (den Hond and Bakker, 2007). In
commenting on the increasing prevalence of firm-SMO collaborations, the head of EDF's corporate
partnerships suggested that they are especially common amongst Fortune 500 companies
(Economist, 2010).
Data on SMO-Firm Interactions
Following common practice in social movements research (Earl et al., 2004), we rely on media
reports to code contentious and collaborative interactions between an SMO and firm. Our list of
possible sources includes all North American English-language sources included in Factiva’s

16

We also considered archival directories such as the Encyclopedia of Associations (Minkoff, 1999) or the
Yearbook of International Associations (e.g., (Smith and Wiest, 2005), however, were concerned that such
sampling would lead to underrepresentation of protest organizations (Minkoff, 1999) and small
organizations (Larson and Soule, 2009) because such directories rely on self-reporting by the SMO.
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categories of major news and business publications and press release wires17, which includes major
wire sources providing corporate press releases. Relying on media reports can create two forms of
bias: selection bias (i.e., ideological biases, over-reporting of negative events) and description bias
(i.e., the veracity of the coverage) (Earl et al., 2004). Our sample mitigates ideological selection
biases by including multiple major news and business publications rather than relying on one media
outlet. We also mitigate the selection bias introduced by the media’s over-reporting of negative
events (e.g., protests may be over-reported in comparison to collaborations), by including press
releases in our source list, which tend to report more positive news. To mitigate description bias,
we rely only on the “hard facts” of the event (e.g., who, what, when), which is relatively accurate
in media reports (Earl et al. 2004: 65).
We restrict our search to North America for two reasons. First, the impact of SMOs and
their tactics vary by institutional setting (Durand and Georgallis, 2018), therefore, SMOs’ decisionmaking on campaign strategy is often geography specific. Secondly, the environmental
performance of firms, which we expect to be one driver of contentious targeting, may vary across
countries (e.g., due to the pollution haven hypothesis) and comparable environmental performance
data is not available across countries for the same firm. Within this source list, we searched for any
articles or press releases where the firm name and SMO name appear in the same report.18 In total,
this search yielded approximately 34,720 unique media articles and press releases. Each resulting
article or press release was read by undergraduate student coders, and then reviewed again by the
authors,19 selecting instances where the SMO contentiously interacted with a firm (e.g., protests,

17

The major news and business publications category includes over 100 print and online sources from
outlets such as ABC News, The Boston Globe, and the Wall Street Journal, while the press release wire
category includes over 200 press release wires such as Business Wire, Canada Newswire and
Nasdaq/Globenewswire.
18
To ensure comprehensiveness, we searched using multiple spellings of the same SMO (e.g., ForestEthics
or Forest Ethics) and firm name (e.g., Walmart or Wal-mart).
19
During the training period, which spanned one month and approximately 2,000 articles coded by each
coder, we read every article that the undergraduate students coded and provided feedback. Once each coder
was trained to a performance level of at least 95% correct coding, we continued to read and enter into a
database every article that was coded as containing either a contentious or cooperative interaction, but not
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boycotts, shareholders’ proposals, lawsuits), or cooperatively interacted with a firm (e.g., monetary
or in-kind donations, board interlock, collaboration). All contentious and cooperative interactions
between a firm-SMO dyad are recorded by the authors with unique identifiers, allowing for
deduplication of a single event (e.g., SMO A protested against firm B) reported multiple times in
the media.
Consistent with past research, the greatest number of contentious challenges are
concentrated amongst several large firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries (e.g.,
extractives or energy). Table 6 lists the top 10 most contentiously targeted firms, and the SMOs
that engaged in the greatest number of contentious challenges over the sample period. On the
opposite end of the distribution, over half of the firms in our sample have never been contentiously
targeted, while 45 of the SMOs have never mobilized against any firm in our sample.
Table 6: Top 10 firms contentiously targeted and SMOs using contentious tactics
Firm
Monsanto
Exxon Mobil
ChevronTexaco
Entergy
American Electric Power
Smithfield Foods
Procter & Gamble
Occidental Petroleum
ConocoPhillips
Ameren

No. of contentious
challenges

63
62
56
48
30
27
22
19
18
17

Social Movement Organization
Sierra Club
Greenpeace
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
Ceres
Rainforest Action Network
Natural Resources Defense Council
Amazon Watch
Friends Of The Earth
Earthjustice
Environmental Integrity Project

No. of contentious
challenges

130
92
70
43
43
39
38
30
20
19

Identifying Firm-SMO Collaborations. In identifying firm-SMO collaborations we
concentrate on relationships aligned with Selznick's (1949: 34) conception of elements absorbed
into “into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization,” through “a formal
relationship or alliance …” (McDonnell, 2016: 4). We define a collaboration between an SMO and

those that were coded as containing neither. Inter-coder reliability tests conducted half-way through the
coding exercise demonstrated a high rate of agreement (95 percent average, three coders, random sample of
3,465 articles).
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firm as ‘organizations working together by committing resources to produce a common set of
outcomes.’ Included are what Rondinelli and London (2003) describe as interactive collaborations
and intensive environmental management alliances. Intensive environmental management alliances
are collaborations aimed at improving environmental performance within the firm, such as when
the EDF and McDonald’s created a task force to study ways in which McDonald’s can reduce waste
in its operations. Interactive collaborations are similarly purposeful and interactional but are more
externally focused and include: targeted project support (e.g., development of eco-preserves on
company property); environmental awareness and education collaborations (e.g., co-sponsorship
of education programs, producing research in support of policy change); and interactive
certification of practices or products.20 Excluded from our definition of collaboration are any armslength interactions or transactions such as corporate contributions and gifts to the SMO, marketing
affiliations (e.g., licensing of SMO name or logo), support for employee participation in SMO
activities, or market transactions such as the purchasing of the SMOs products or services (e.g.,
airlines purchasing Carbonfund’s carbon credits).
Firm-SMO collaborations were identified from the broader population of cooperative
interactions found in the Factiva media and press release search described above. Each resulting
media report and press release was read carefully by the first author, to code only those interactions
that conformed with the definition of ‘collaboration’ as such. Each report was used to code the
collaboration as bilateral (i.e., one SMO and one firm) or multilateral (i.e., one or more firms or
SMOs), as well as the year in which the collaboration began.

We classify SMO’s certification of firm products as collaborations only instances where we observe
evidence of the SMO and firm having worked together in a purposeful way with a commitment of resources.
For example, some certification processes involve a preliminary period where the SMO advises the firm on
changes needed in its processes for it to obtain certification, and the firm consults the SMO on its changes.
In the absence of such evidence, we treat SMO certification of products as arms-length transactions that do
not constitute collaborations, akin to logo licensing (Rondinelli and London 2003).
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Similar to the concentration of contention, we find that firms engaging SMOs in
collaborations are concentrated in consumer facing industries (e.g., retail and consumer products).
Table 7 lists the firms and SMOs with the greatest number of cross-sector collaborations in our
sample. A comparison of the population of SMOs appearing in Table 6 and 7 suggests that the most
contentious SMOs (e.g., Sierra Club, Greenpeace) have fewer collaborations with firms than their
more moderate counterparts.
Table 7: Top 10 firms and SMOs with cross-sector collaborations
No. of collaborations

Firm
Coca-Cola
WalMart
General Electric
Starbucks
DuPont
Entergy
Alcoa
McDonald's
Johnson & Johnson
Whole Foods
Staples

Bilateral

M ultilateral

8
9
1
6
1
2
1
4
1
1
0

7
5
10
3
6
3
4
0
3
3
4

No. of collaborations

Social Movement Organization
Environmental Defense Fund
Nature Conservancy
Conservation International
World Wildlife Fund
World Resources Institute
Natural Resources Defense Council
Global Green
Rainforest Alliance
National Recycling Coalition
Ceres
National Wildlife Federation

Bilateral

M ultilateral

15
8
11
10
1
2
3
1
1
0
0

11
15
7
7
10
6
1
3
2
3
3

Note. Number of organizations may exceed ten where two or more organizations have the same number of
cross-sector collaborations (i.e., a tie).

Modeling Approach
To test our hypotheses of indirect co-optation resulting from firm-SMO collaborations we use count
models of contentious challenges against a firm by all SMOs that have no collaboration with the
firm. We exclude SMOs that have directly collaborated with the firm since we are interested in
indirect, rather than direct, co-optation. In all our models we control for a one-year lagged version
of the dependent variable (contentious challenges) to account for the serial correlation between past
and present activist contention.21 By controlling for the previous year’s contentious challenges, we
are estimating the effect of firm-SMO collaborations on changes in contentious targeting from the
previous year.

21

Our results are substantively unchanged with the exclusion of the lagged dependent variable.
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Because our two hypothesized pathways of indirect co-optation, relational and signaling,
operate at different levels of analysis, firm-SMO dyad, and SMO field, respectively, we estimate
their effects using separate models. We test our relational indirect co-optation hypotheses (H1 and
H2) at the firm-SMO-year level to test the effects of indirect ties between the firm and SMO. Our
signaling hypotheses (H3 and H4) are tested using a firm-year panel, as we expect signaling to
operate at the SMO field level, regardless of whether the firm has indirect links to SMOs. In
additional analyses presented below, we also consider the interactive effects of these two pathways,
but we believe them to be theoretically different mechanisms that operate at different levels, and
so we model them separately in our main models.
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is the number of times a firm has been contentiously challenged via
protests, boycotts, lawsuits, etc. by an SMO in a given year (contentious challenges). We sum the
number of contentious challenges from the previously described coding of media articles and press
releases.
Independent Variables
We test our relational co-optation hypotheses using board interlocks because they serve as
“conduits for the flow of information and norms” (Davis and Greve, 1997: 12) between
organizations, and have been repeatedly shown to influence organizational behavior (Mizruchi,
1996). In a setting similar to ours, Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) showed interlocked
directors at non-profit organizations were conduits of information about private-sector funders. We
obtain SMO board of directors data from their IRS tax filing. The names of each board member
appearing in Part VII of each SMO’s Form 990 was recorded for each filing year and then matched
computationally on last name and first initial to directors of other SMOs in that year. Each resulting
match was inspected visually using additional information such as the full given name and other
identifiers such as “Jr.”, to remove any false matches. In instances of ambiguity (e.g., different
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spellings of given names) further internet and media searches were used to confirm that the board
interlock existed.
To test whether a firm faces fewer contentious challenges from SMOs directly tied to the
SMO with whom they are collaborating (H1), we capture each indirectly tied SMO with a variable
coded as 1 for any SMO-firm dyad in which the SMO is connected via a board interlock to an SMO
that is directly collaborating with a focal firm, and 0 for all other firm-SMO dyads. For example,
Starbucks’ 2007 collaboration with Global Green results in an indirect tie to the National Recycling
Coalition because the two organizations share a director (Scott Seydel) in 2007. Figure 5 depicts
the 2007 interlock network of the SMOs in our sample that shared directors. To test whether the
decrease in contention is more pronounced for bilateral firm-SMO collaborations, we create two
corresponding dummy variables. Indirectly tied SMO bilateral collaboration, is coded 1 for all
firm-SMO dyads that are indirectly connected via a bilateral collaboration, and 0 otherwise.
Correspondingly, indirectly tied SMO multilateral collaboration, is coded 1 for all firm-SMO
dyads that are indirectly connected via a multilateral collaboration, and 0 otherwise.
To test hypothesis 3, we use the number of contentious challenges mounted against any
firm in the previous year by the SMO with which the firm collaborates (SMO contentious
repertoire). Because some firms collaborate with more than one SMO in a given year, we take the
maximum value of contentious challenges across all SMOs with which the firm collaborates, as the
maximum is theoretically consistent with our ‘signal’ mechanism.
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Note. Isolates not shown (i.e., SMOs with no board interlocks).

Figure 6: SMO board interlock network graph from 2007

To test the effect of the collaborating SMO’s legitimacy (H4) we use the number of
appearances an SMO made before congressional committee hearings (SMO legitimacy).
Unfortunately, ratings commonly used as proxies for the status or legitimacy of private sector
organizations, such as the Fortune America’s Most Admired Companies list, are unavailable for
SMOs. Further, using the emotional valence of media coverage as others have done for firms
(McDonnell, 2016) to capture general public approval is unlikely to get at the underlying construct
when applied to SMOs, as the linguistic coding of articles would be confounded by the tactical
repertoire of the SMO (e.g., articles mentioning Greenpeace are likely to have relatively high
negative valence due to its use of contentious tactics). We therefore instead rely on congressional
committee hearing appearances, as invitations extended to an organization is driven by public
policy makers’ evaluations of that organization’s sociopolitical reputation (Werner 2015), an
indirect proxy for an SMO’s legitimacy. We collect data on SMOs’ invited appearances before
congressional committee hearings using ProQuest’s Congressional Hearings data archives,
searching for each SMO and hand-collecting and aggregating the number of times that a
representative of a given SMO testified in congressional hearings in a given year. Similar to the
approach used for the collaborating SMO’s contentious repertoire, SMO legitimacy is the maximum
value of congressional appearances among all SMOs with which the firm collaborates in a given
year.
Control Variables
We control for the previous year’s contentious challenges against the firm in all our models, to
account for the serial correlation between past and present activist contention. This is the dependent
variable lagged by one year in each of the respective panels: contentious challenges against a firm
by an SMO in the firm-SMO-year panel; and, sum of all contentious challenges against the firm by
any SMO in the firm-year panel. We also include time-varying firm-level controls that may drive
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contentious challenges in the following period, as well as SMO and dyad-level controls, in our
relational co-optation models.
At the firm-level, we control for a firm’s environmental performance, media attention, size,
market performance, and receptivity, based on past findings on the characteristics of firms
contentiously targeted by activists (Lenox and Eesley 2009; McDonnell 2016). We control for a
firm’s environmental performance, as activists are more likely to target firms with poor
environmental records, and commitments to environmental performance may also drive which
firms collaborate with SMOs (den Hond et al., 2015). In doing so, we also effectively control for
the improvements in environmental performance that may follow collaboration which could
demobilize other activists. We rely on Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD)
environmental concerns rating to measure a firm’s environmental performance. In an assessment
of the KLD environmental ratings, Chatterji et al. (2009: 25) find that KLD “concern” ratings are
“fairly good summaries of past environmental performance”, and are predictive of future pollution
and regulatory compliance violations. A firm’s environmental performance is the sum of seven
environmental “concern” variables provided by KLD in the prior year (i.e., hazardous waste,
regulatory problems, ozone-depleting chemicals, substantial emissions, agricultural chemicals,
climate change, and other concern).
We also expect the degree of media attention a firm receives, and its size, to be a driver of
both collaborations and contentious targeting. Firm media attention is the sum of all articles
containing the firm’s name that appeared in the six largest U.S. newspapers—the New York Times,
the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Chicago Tribune, USA Today, and the Los
Angeles Times—in the prior year (divided by 1,000 articles).22 We control for firm size by including
a firm’s logged assets and its logged employees in the previous year, obtained from the Compustat

22

We focus on the six largest newspapers to reduce variability due to organizational survival of newspapers
and changes in coverage of media outlets in Factiva over time.
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database. We control for a firm’s market-to-book value, because we expect firms competing on
more differentiated products to have higher environmental performance (Ioannou and Serafeim,
2012; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), which could influence contention. Additionally, managerial
willingness to engage in novel pro-social strategies like collaborations with SMOs, might be greater
in firms with higher market valuations.
We control for the possibility that firm ‘receptivity’ to contentious challenges not only
drives contention (McDonnell 2016), but also more contentious or legitimate SMOs’ propensity to
collaborate with such firms. Consistent with past research (Briscoe and Safford, 2008; McDonnell
and King, 2013; McDonnell et al., 2015), we rely on a firm’s history of responses to activists’
targeting them to identify ‘receptive’ firms as those that seek to address activists’ concerns. We use
firms’ responses to social-issue shareholder proposals, because this provides an observable and
unambiguous indicator of receptivity to social activism (McDonnell et al., 2015). Firms respond to
shareholder proposals in three distinct ways: positively (when the firm voluntarily cedes to the
proposal leading to its withdrawal), neutrally (when the firm does nothing and the proposal is put
to a vote at its annual meeting), or negatively (when the firm petitions the U.S. SEC to exclude the
proposal). We obtained data on firm responses to social-issue shareholder proposal from the
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) and Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS)23. We follow McDonnell et al. (2015) in measuring firm receptivity to activists using the
Janis-Fadner (JF) coefficient of imbalance,24 where a JF coefficient of -1 (minimum value),
indicates that a firm challenged all proposals in a given year, while a firm with a JF coefficient of

23

ISS has data available as far back as 1997, therefore, we supplemented with ICCR data from 1993 to 2007.
A preliminary investigation indicated that coverage of firms in our sample was inconsistent between the two
sources (i.e., ICCR had some companies that ISS didn’t in early years, and vice versa), therefore, we rely on
both sources and manually de-duplicat observations in overlapping years (1997 to 2007).
24
JF coefficient = (P2-PN)/V2 if P>N; 0 if P=N; and (PN-N2)/V2 if N>P where P is the number of positive
firm responses to social-issue proxy proposals (i.e., withdrawals), N is the number of negative responses (i.e.,
challenges), and V is the total number of social-issue proxy proposals submitted to a firm in a given year.
93

1 (maximum value) indicates that it voluntarily implemented all proposals it received.25 After
observations with missing values (e.g., privately-held companies, KLD measures) were dropped,
179 companies comprised our final sample.
We include in our specification an indicator variable capturing the presence of an SMO
collaboration in the previous year. In so doing, we seek to isolate our hypothesized mechanism as
operating through the micro-level effects of the characteristics of a specific collaborating SMO on
indirect co-optation as distinct from the more macro-level impact of the mere presence of an SMO
collaboration. We also control in our firm level models for the collaborating SMO degree centrality
in the SMO board interlock network to ensure our results capture effects above and beyond those
resulting from indirect co-optation via relational channels.
In addition to the above, in our firm-SMO-year models testing our relational indirect cooptation hypotheses (H1 and H2) we control for the contentious repertoire and legitimacy of the
SMO with whom the firm has a collaboration to isolate the effect of board interlocks above and
beyond the field-level effects of hypothesis 3 and 4 (i.e., collaborating SMO contentious repertoire
and collaborating SMO legitimacy). Additionally, we include several SMO controls that may
correlate with contentious challenges against the firm by the non-collaborating SMO. First, we
control for the contentious repertoire of SMO, or the number of contentious challenges mounted
against any firm in the previous year by the focal SMO. We control for the size of the SMO, using
the SMOs assets (logged) at the end of the prior fiscal year from their tax filings data. We control
for the focal SMO’s legitimacy, using the number of appearances a SMO made before congressional
committee hearings. We also control for the degree centrality of the SMO in the board interlock
network, because highly connected SMOs may be less likely to succumb to indirect co-optation.
We include a control for SMO media attention, constructed identically to a firm’s media attention,

If a firm did not receive a shareholder proxy proposal in a given year, we carry over the firm’s past
receptivity, and run robustness checks omitting firm-years in which no social proxy proposals were received
by a given firm.
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or the sum of all articles containing the SMO’s name that appeared in the six largest U.S.
newspapers listed previously.
Finally, the inclusion of year fixed effects accounts for time-specific events, such as
dramatic changes in government policy, which may affect SMO targeting in a given year. The
inclusion of industry fixed effects accounts for industry-specific characteristics, such as greater
environmental externalities, that may drive greater contention. We also check the robustness of our
results to firm fixed effects models that control for firm-level time invariant unobservables. Across
all models, all independent and control variables are lagged one year to avoid temporal
endogeneity.
Tables 8, and 9, present summary statistics and correlations for all variables in the dyadlevel, and firm-level, models, respectively.
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9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Mean SD
Dyad panel variables
1
0.004 0.084
1 Contentious challenges
1
0.009 0.093 0.003
2 Indirectly tied SMO
1
0.001 0.032 -0.002 0.343
3 Indirectly tied SMO bilateral collab.
1
0.005 0.073 0.003 0.787 -0.002
4 Indirectly tied SMO multilateral collab.
1
0.004 0.088 0.372 0.005 -0.002 0.004
5 Contentious challenge (lagged DV)
1
0.893 1.270 0.050 0.029 -0.014 0.034 0.052
6 Environmental performance
1
1.565 2.940 0.011 0.038 0.016 0.025 0.009 0.041
7 Firm media attention
1
9.937 1.521 0.021 0.041 0.001 0.032 0.021 0.167 0.510
8 Logged assets
1
3.562 1.279 0.013 0.062 0.043 0.033 0.011 -0.030 0.336 0.451
9 Logged employees
2.881 11.337 0.000 -0.005 0.009 -0.010 0.000 -0.044 -0.023 -0.045 0.015
10 Market-to-book value
0.313 0.626 -0.011 -0.029 -0.001 -0.026 -0.007 -0.146 -0.104 -0.192 -0.143
11 Receptivity to activism
0.181 0.385 0.027 0.199 0.068 0.156 0.026 0.169 0.192 0.155 0.319
12 SMO collaboration
13 Collaborating SMO contentious repertoire 0.346 1.291 0.002 0.131 0.013 0.096 0.001 0.096 0.110 0.085 0.195
1.566 5.326 0.010 0.180 0.023 0.144 0.006 0.153 0.153 0.186 0.186
14 Collaborating SMO legitimacy
1.018 2.087 0.096 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.131 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
15 SMO contentious repertoire
14.077 2.416 0.036 0.093 0.050 0.073 0.034 -0.002 -0.011 0.001 -0.009
16 SMO size - logged assets
0.742 2.378 0.031 0.085 0.063 0.064 0.026 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008
17 SMO legitimacy
0.975 1.495 0.025 0.155 0.065 0.121 0.022 -0.001 -0.008 -0.002 -0.008
18 SMO degree centrality
0.624 1.700 0.090 0.053 0.042 0.042 0.081 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005
19 SMO media attention
1
-0.010
0.016
-0.002
-0.013
-0.001
-0.004
0.002
-0.001
-0.001

10

1
-0.096
-0.072
-0.120
0.001
0.006
0.007
0.005
0.003

11

1
0.569
0.625
0.003
-0.003
-0.014
-0.008
-0.017

12

1
0.616
0.000
0.000
-0.013
-0.008
-0.017

13

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Firm-SMO Dyad Panel, N= 131,921)

1
0.004
0.007
-0.011
-0.009
-0.019

14

16

17

18

1
1
0.219
1
0.196 0.467
1
0.159 0.468 0.401
0.565 0.518 0.626 0.311

15

1

19
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Firm panel variables
Mean SD
1 Contentious challenges
0.438 1.366
2 Collaborating SMO contentious repertoire 0.347 1.296
3 Collaborating SMO legitimacy
1.569 5.351
4 Contentious challenges (lagged DV)
0.450 1.381
5 Environmental performance
0.894 1.273
6 Firm media attention
1.584 2.953
7 Logged assets
9.935 1.524
8 Logged employees
3.568 1.278
9 Market-to-book value
2.897 11.091
10 Receptivity to activism
0.311 0.626
11 SMO collaboration
0.182 0.386

1
1
-0.002
0.073
0.625
0.347
0.067
0.153
0.078
-0.001
-0.076
0.183

3

1
0.057
0.155
0.152
0.186
0.185
-0.013
-0.121
0.622

2
1
0.613
0.007
0.099
0.110
0.083
0.193
-0.001
-0.072
0.568
1
0.374
0.067
0.153
0.084
-0.004
-0.058
0.184

4

1
0.044
0.169
-0.028
-0.045
-0.147
0.175

5

1
0.512
0.340
-0.023
-0.103
0.194

6

7

1
0.453
-0.046
-0.193
0.154

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Firm Panel, N=1,412)

1
0.015
-0.144
0.319

8

1
-0.010
0.016

9

1
-0.098

10

1

11

RESULTS
The dependent variable, contentious challenges, is a count variable that ranges from 0 to 7 in the
dyad-level models, with the vast majority of firms never experiencing contention from a given
SMO. We use zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression in our dyad-level models of
indirect cooptation via inter-activist board interlocks because there is theoretical reason to believe
that there is a certain (probably large) proportion of firm-SMO dyads that would never experience
contention, and some other proportion that might or might not, depending on circumstances
(Greene, 2014). Although zero contentious challenges occurs frequently (Lenox and Eesley, 2009;
McDonnell, 2016), it may be that a given SMO will never mobilize against a firm, and so zero
values do not necessarily mean indirect co-optation, but may instead be constrained by the tactical
repertoire of the SMO. For example, an SMO that has never protested or boycotted any firm, is
very unlikely to do so in the future. Therefore, we use ZINB regression which allows for the
realization of zeros in the outcome variable from two separate processes, the first from a logistic
model of the binary process, and a negative binomial count model if the binary process takes on a
value of 1 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). A comparison of Akaike’s information criterion (AIC)
and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) likelihood-based measures of model fit, and the Vuong
statistic for nonnested models (Vuong, 1989) confirmed that a ZINB model better fit our data than
a negative binomial model. We also show robustness of our results to a negative binomial (NB)
model. We model firm fixed effects in the NB model using dummies, in line with the approach
recommended by Allison and Waterman (2002) in their assessment of solutions to the inability of
the conditional fixed effects estimator for NB to control for stable covariates.
Results for models testing indirect co-optation, or the reduction of contentious challenges
against a firm by an SMO, via relational means (H1 & H2) are shown Table 10. Consistent with
past research (McDonnell, 2016), we observe among the control variables that a firm faces greater
contentious challenges from an SMO if that SMO has targeted it in the previous year (Model 1).
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An SMO with a more contentious repertoire, greater degree centrality in the interlock network and
greater media attention is also associated with a greater number of challenges against the firm.
Turning to our hypothesized pathways of indirect co-optation, we find that firms do not
face significantly fewer contentious challenges from SMOs directly tied to their collaborating
activist (Model 2, p=0.214). Instead, in line with H2, we observe that indirect relational co-optation
only operates in instances where the firm-SMO collaboration is bilateral (Model 3, p=0.000).
Marginal effects analysis shows that a firm that has experienced one contentious challenge from
the focal SMO faces 0.20 fewer contentious challenges (p=0.000) the following year if that SMO
is indirectly tied to it via a bilateral collaboration (all other variables held at their means).
Conversely, indirect co-optation is not significant for multilateral firm-SMO collaborations
(p=0.307). In Model 4, we show the robustness of our results to a firm fixed effects specification.
Absent firm-specific effects, there may be some unobserved attribute that varies across firms and
leads firms with an ability to indirectly link to SMOs to also have a disproportionate drop in
contention (e.g., social skill of its managers). The effect size is commensurate in the firm fixed
effects estimation; a firm faces 0.16 fewer contentious challenges (p=0.000) from an SMO that has
targeted it once previously if that SMO is indirectly tied to it via a bilateral collaboration. Finally,
in Models 5, and 6, we show robustness of our results to a negative binomial model with industry,
and firm fixed effects, respectively.
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Table 10: Regressions Exploring the Relationship Between Board Interlocks to SMOs with a
Firm Collaboration and Future Activist Challenges Against the Firm
Zero-inflated negative binomal regression of activist
challenges
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Independent variables
Indirectly tied SMO (H1)

Negative binomial regression
of activist challenges
Model 5
Model 6

-0.621
(0.499)

Indirectly tied SMO bilateral collab. (H2)

-16.08***
(0.328)
-0.644
(0.630)

-16.44***
(0.424)
-0.556
(0.696)

-19.45***
(0.346)
-0.488
(0.651)

-18.00***
(0.393)
-0.383
(0.661)

1.495***
(0.177)

1.494***
(0.177)

1.285***
(0.147)

0.359***
(0.089)

0.392***
(0.101)

0.0445
(0.115)
Firm media attention
0.0731
(0.047)
Logged assets
0.287
(0.239)
Logged employees
0.435
(0.271)
Market-to-book value
0.00877
(0.013)
Receptivity to activism
0.0888
(0.151)
SMO collaboration
0.101
(0.197)
Collaborating SMO contentious repertoire -0.0910
(0.091)
Collaborating SMO legitimacy
-0.00489
(0.019)
SMO control variables
SMO contentious repertoire
0.0426**
(0.015)
SMO size - logged assets
-0.0761*
(0.032)
SMO legitimacy
-0.0801***
(0.023)
SMO degree centrality
0.155***
(0.045)
SMO media attention
0.190***
(0.028)

0.0405
(0.116)
0.0749
(0.047)
0.285
(0.240)
0.437
(0.272)
0.00879
(0.013)
0.0897
(0.151)
0.131
(0.205)
-0.0893
(0.088)
-0.00393
(0.019)

0.0392
(0.116)
0.0757
(0.047)
0.283
(0.240)
0.438
(0.272)
0.00906
(0.013)
0.0878
(0.151)
0.140
(0.202)
-0.0911
(0.089)
-0.00462
(0.019)

0.0959
(0.131)
0.0854
(0.052)
-0.262
(0.408)
1.019+
(0.597)
0.0114
(0.007)
-0.182
(0.161)
-0.0944
(0.155)
-0.173+
(0.097)
0.0134
(0.019)

0.0231
(0.103)
0.0868*
(0.040)
0.485*
(0.218)
0.384+
(0.218)
0.00809
(0.009)
0.0148
(0.163)
0.222
(0.168)
-0.130
(0.091)
0.0144
(0.019)

0.0798
(0.128)
0.0788
(0.052)
-0.131
(0.391)
0.824
(0.529)
0.00914
(0.007)
-0.183
(0.161)
0.0213
(0.175)
-0.178+
(0.092)
0.0196
(0.019)

0.0413**
(0.015)
-0.0727*
(0.032)
-0.0791***
(0.023)
0.160***
(0.045)
0.190***
(0.028)

0.0413**
(0.015)
-0.0725*
(0.032)
-0.0778***
(0.023)
0.160***
(0.044)
0.190***
(0.028)

0.0463**
(0.015)
-0.0699+
(0.036)
-0.0794***
(0.024)
0.168***
(0.047)
0.193***
(0.030)

0.0701***
(0.015)
0.111***
(0.027)
-0.0837***
(0.025)
0.278***
(0.048)
0.281***
(0.027)

0.0763***
(0.015)
0.106***
(0.027)
-0.0880***
(0.026)
0.279***
(0.048)
0.277***
(0.027)

Fixed effects

Yr, Ind

Yr, Ind

Yr, Ind

Yr, Firm

Yr, Ind

Yr, Firm

Constant

-25.33***
(1.504)

-24.92***
(3.733)

-24.40***
(2.697)

-8.452*
(3.506)

-32.72***
(4.835)

-12.75***
(3.660)

N
ll

131921
-2037.4

131921
-2036.3

131921
-2035.2

131921
-1934.0

131921
-1996.5

131921
-1923.7

Indirectly tied SMO multilateral collab. (H2)
Dyad Control
Contentious challenge (prev. yr)

1.495***
(0.174)

Firm control variables
Environmental performance

Note. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Models 1 through 3, and 5 include year
and industry fixed effects, while Models 4 and 6 include year and firm fixed effects.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001.
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Table 11 presents firm level models of indirect co-optation via signals or relational prisms
(H3 and H4). The dependent variable, contentious challenges, ranges from 0 to 17 at the firm-year
level and exhibits overdispersion (variance=1.867; mean=0.438). Therefore, we use a negative
binomial model.26 Models 7 to 10 are estimated using year and industry fixed effects with standard
errors clustered at the firm level. We check the robustness of our results to a firm fixed effects
negative binomial model (Model 11) to ensure firm-level, time-invariant potential sources of
endogeneity are not biasing our random effects estimation results.
We find support for our hypothesis that a firm that collaborates with a social activist will
face fewer contentious challenges from other activists if their SMO partner has a history of using
contentious tactics (Models 8, 10 and 11). An increase of one contentious challenge in the repertoire
of the collaborating activist is significantly associated with a 0.17 decrease in the expected count
of contentious challenges against the firm (p=0.024 in Model 10). Overall in our sample, firms
collaborating with activists that had a non-contentious repertoire (i.e., no contentious challenges in
the previous year), experienced on average 1.38 contentious challenges themselves, compared to
0.62 contentious challenges against firms collaborating with an activist with 1 or more contentious
challenges in the previous year.

26

While being contentiously targeted remains a rare occurrence for most companies, nearly half of the
companies in our sample (48.6%) have been contentiously targeted at least once, and a comparison of
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) likelihood-based measures
of model fit suggest that the negative binomial model is a better fit than a zero-inflated model. Our results
are robust to a zero-inflated negative binomial (results available from authors).
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Table 11: Regressions Exploring the Relationship Between Collaborating SMO’s Characteristics
and Future Activist Challenges Against the Firm

Note. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Models 7 through 10 include year and
industry fixed effects, while Model 11 includes year and firm fixed effects.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001.

Conversely, we find the legitimacy of the activist with which the firm collaborates has no
significant effect on the contentious challenges it receives from other activists (p=0.201). We
explored two possible explanations for this insignificant finding. First, we explored if the
legitimacy of the collaborating activist matters more for firms with little media attention because
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legitimacy spillovers are most likely where there is little knowledge of the entity (Kostova and
Zaheer, 1999). Interacting the firm’s media attention with the legitimacy of the collaborating
activist yielded no significant results. Secondly, we explored an alternative measure of activist
legitimacy since our measure of legitimacy reflects public policy makers’ evaluations rather than
that of field peers. To the extent that our proxy is uncorrelated with the legitimacy of the activist in
the eyes of other activists, our results may be biased. We relied on scores from Charity Navigator,
an independent charity watchdog organization, which evaluates non-profits on financial health and
accountability. Once again, we observe no significant difference in the contention that firms face
following a collaboration with a more legitimate SMO.
Additional Analyses
We perform several supplemental analyses to investigate possible interactions between our
hypothesized effects and alternative explanations for our results. First, while we believe indirect
co-optation through relational pipes and prisms operate via theoretically different mechanisms, we
also explore the possibility of their interactive effects. We investigate how the repertoire of the
collaborating SMO affects indirect relational co-optation via the inter-SMO interlocks. While the
contentiousness of the collaborating SMO is associated with a marginally significant fall in the
number of challenges the firm faces from the focal SMO (p=0.076, Model 4), its interaction with
relational co-optation produces an attenuating effect (p=0.053, results available from authors).
Specifically, as the contentiousness of the collaborating SMO increases, the influence of indirect
ties to the focal SMO in reducing contention is decreased. This suggests that indirect co-optation
via relational pipes and prisms may be partial substitutes.
We also conduct supplementary analyses to attempt to rule out other possible explanations
for our findings. While the inclusion of lagged contentious challenges against the firm as well as
firm fixed effects help us to rule out bias resulting from firm-level time invariant unobservable
variables or those changing in the preceding year, our indirect relational co-optation results may
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suffer from simultaneity bias. Specifically, if some SMOs chose to leave the boards of SMOs that
are mulling a collaboration with a firm, our relational co-optation effects may be a result of SMOs
selecting out of board-interlocks. While the fact that multilateral firm-SMO collaborations do not
result in indirect co-optation gives us some confidence in our results, we explore the possibility of
SMOs selecting out of boards by comparing the number of board interlocks that SMOs with a
bilateral firm collaboration have before and after the collaboration is announced. While we do
observe a differences in means between the board interlocks of SMOs with bilateral firm
collaborations before and after the announcement of the collaboration (t=-5.9631 for two-tailed test
of means, p=0.000), that difference is in the opposite direction than would suggest simultaneity
bias (i.e., the number of board interlocks is higher in the first year of the bilateral firm-SMO
collaboration).
We also investigate the possibility that our results are driven by activists’ belief that the
firm is more likely to improve its environmental performance in the future if it collaborates with a
more contentious SMO (H3) or one with whom it has a bilateral collaboration (H2). To do so, we
re-estimate our models disaggregating our key independent variables across two different types of
collaborations: intensive collaborations, aimed at improving environmental performance within the
firm; and, interactive collaborations, which are more externally focused (Rondinelli and London,
2003). If our results are driven by the belief that firms will improve in the future, our results should
be more pronounced for intensive collaborations which focus on improving the firm’s
environmental performance, and attenuated for interactive collaborations. In our relational prisms
models, we find that firms face fewer contentious challenges from other activists the greater the
contentious repertoire of their SMO in interactive collaborations (p=0.035, and p=0.045 in crossfirm and within-firm models). Conversely, the repertoire of SMO partners in intense collaborations
is not significantly associated with a drop in contentious challenges against the firm. We also find
that overall, SMOs involved in intense alliances are on average less contentious than those that
104

participate in interactive collaborations. This suggests that our results are likely driven by the
identity of the partner SMO as contentious rather than that identity providing an assurance of better
environmental performance by the firm in the future.
In our dyad-level models where we test the effects of indirect ties between the firm and
SMO, we find that firms face significantly fewer contentious challenges from SMOs directly tied
to their collaborating activist in both bilateral intensive and interactive collaborations. Further, the
magnitude of the effects are similar across intensive and interactive collaborations (t-test of equality
of coefficients yields a p=0.667). A firm that has experienced one contentious challenge from the
focal SMO faces 0.201 fewer contentious challenges (p=0.000) the following year if that SMO is
indirectly tied to it via a bilateral intense collaboration, and 0.200 fewer contentious challenges if
they are indirectly tied via a bilateral interactive collaboration (p=0.000).
DISCUSSION
A growing body of research is concerned with the indirect effects of social movements on firms
(Briscoe and Gupta, 2016) showing that activists can influence change beyond the organization
they target. In this article, we shift the directionality of inquiry to the indirect effects of interactions
between activists and firms on the broader social movement in which activists participate. We
expand on a long-standing concept in social movements research, co-optation, and draw on
interorganizational network research to theorize and develop two mechanisms by which firmactivist collaborations lead to the indirect co-optation of the movement. Our theoretical framework
suggests firms can indirectly co-opt the broader activist field by exploiting the social networks and
identity of their partner activist.
Using data on both contentious and collaborative interactions between 19,690 dyads
representing annual interactions between 110 environmental SMOs and 179 of the largest firms in
the United States over 10 years, we find support for our theorized mechanisms of indirect cooptation. Specifically, we find that the activists who share directors with an activist that collaborates
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bilaterally with a firm are less likely to mobilize against that firm. This adds a new perspective on
the interconnectedness of stakeholders in the firm’s environment, which has been conceptualized
as a source of pressure and mobilization against the firm (Rowley, 1997; Wry et al., 2013). Our
findings suggest that an interconnected stakeholder environment may be more susceptible to
indirect influence by a firm that succeeds in allying with a well-connected stakeholder.
Secondly, we find that the collaborating activist’s identity as a ‘contentious’ activist helps
demobilize others. This is correlative to Briscoe and Safford’s (2008) finding that identities of
target organizations affect activists’ likelihood of indirectly affecting other organizations in the
field. We argue that this operates via inferences activists make about the private information or
beliefs the confrontational activist has about the firm. We find no evidence for the alternative
mechanism of the collaborating activist’s contentious identity acting as an assurance mechanism
that the firm will improve its environmental performance in the future via the collaboration.
This paper contributes to both social movements research as well as organizational theory.
First, our findings inform a long-running stream of literature exploring the tactical repertoire of
activists. Although the role of networks in social movement mobilization and tactic choice has long
been acknowledged (e.g., Larson and Soule, 2009; Osa, 2003; Diani, 2003), movements, and their
tactics, have typically been studied as self-contained fields or in relation to the state. Our paper
highlights that networks are equally operative as pathways by which the tactical repertoire of
activists can be altered by actors outside the field (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Moreover, in
tracing how firm-activist collaborations impact contentious private politics, our research highlights
the importance of accounting for cooperative private politics in future research on interactions
between social activists and firms. By taking account of both contentious and cooperative private
politics, as well as the interconnections between the activists, we respond to the need articulated by
McAdam and Scott (2005: 12) that a “field-level conception becomes indispensable to tracing the
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complexities of contemporary changes” as the boundaries of fields blur and new linkages across
fields form.
Further, by theorizing and empirically testing the concept of indirect co-optation, we
highlight an alternative strategy by which firms can manage threats from their environment, a
question central to organizational theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Indirect co-optation is likely
to be a theoretically and empirically meaningful oversight, as managing constraint via direct cooptation may be limited where firm-stakeholder relations are strained by prior conflict (Gargiulo
1993). However, this does not negate the possibility of co-optation, or blocking the capacity of
dissidents to actively oppose the firm, of a broader swathe of stakeholders by exploiting the social
networks and identity of a collaborating stakeholder. By theorizing the mechanisms underlying
indirect co-optation, our framework complements and extends prior work showing firms’
cooperative engagement of one stakeholder produces positive spillovers onto others (Dorobantu et
al., 2017; Werner, 2015).
Despite its potential contributions, our research has several limitations that offer
opportunities for future research. First, we only observe the indirect effects of firm-activist
collaborations within a single movement (i.e., environmental movement), rather than between
multiple movements. However, McDonnell (2016) suggests that movements can effect each other
and McDonnell, King and Soule (2015) find that firms’ interactions with one movement can be
used as signals by other movements. Future research could explore whether indirect co-optation
can operate across movement fields, or on other stakeholders central to firm performance, such as
the state. Secondly, our inquiry stops short of evaluating the degree to which the firm-activist
collaboration results in changes in the firm’s operations and strategy. In line with Selznick’s (1949)
original conceptualization of co-optation as bi-directional, Van Wijk et al. (2013) find that cooptation may be mutual. Therefore, an important question remains to what extent and under what
circumstances firm-activist collaborations result in changes within the firm. Finally, despite our
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findings on co-optive effects of firm-activist collaborations, such cross-sector collaborations are
not always viewed favorably by external observers. Negative evaluations may be particularly acute
when new interorganizational forms first emerge, as was the case in the early 1990s for cross-sector
collaborations, when it was “heresy to say that companies and NGOs could work together”
(Economist, 2010). Constrained by the availability of SMO board interlock data dating back to
2002, we were unable to consider how the legitimacy of cross-sector collaborations may attenuate
co-optation. We believe this is an important, and largely overlooked, direction for future research.
Despite the ubiquity of the ‘legitimacy’ construct in organizational theory, few studies have
considered how the legitimacy of interorganizational relationships or linkages (Baum and Oliver,
1991; Dacin et al., 2007) impacts interorganizational strategies and outcomes.
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CHAPTER 3: Webs of Influence: National Stakeholder Fields and Corporate Social Performance
(This chapter is co-authored with Witold J. Henisz)

In the past decade, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has received increasing attention among
practitioners and academics, with more than 8,000 companies from more than 150 countries now
signatories to the United Nations’ Global Compact, covering human rights, labor standards, and
the environment (Wang et al., 2016b). Despite this globalization of CSR, large differences remain
across countries in the magnitude and efficacy of firms’ CSR activities. Recent research analyzing
heterogeneity in corporate social performance (CSP) across countries (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012;
Matten and Moon, 2008), has relied on either comparative legal or comparative institutional
analysis (Williams and Aguilera, 2008). For example, cross-country differences in corporate
governance arrangements (Aguilera et al., 2006) and political, labor and cultural institutions
(Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) have been shown to explain differences in firms’ CSP across
countries.
At the same time, stakeholders occupy a central role in many single-country studies of CSR
as catalysts for corporate investment in environmental and social performance improvement
(Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda, 2009; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996, 1999; Kim and Lyon, 2015).
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) uncover and publicize environmental or labor violations;
workers picket for fair wages; governments legislate, regulate and disseminate best practices;
investors demand ‘social impact’ funds or funds focused on strong Environmental, Social and
Governance (ESG) performers; and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) set up voluntary
organizations such as the UN Global Compact where companies pledge to principles. From a
stakeholder theory perspective, CSP is a strategic response to pressure from stakeholders
(McDonnell et al., 2015; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008; Yang and
Rivers, 2009). Improvements in CSP may be farsighted attempts by firms to pre-empt or mitigate
stakeholders’ pressure which may otherwise result in institutional change forcing even higher or
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more costly CSP or, alternatively, stakeholders’ direct threats to the firm (Jones, Harrison, and
Felps, 2018).
In this article, we bring stakeholders into comparative of accounts of CSP by drawing on
field theory, which explains how change is effected by social actors, such as stakeholders, in
circumscribed social arenas, such as countries (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011, 2012). Moving
beyond dyadic treatments of stakeholder pressure and influence, we conceptualize stakeholder
pressure within a country emanating from the set of interconnected government actors, IGOs, labor
unions, NGOs, and communities, that populate a stakeholder field within that country and seek to
influence corporate practices (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012; Rowley, 1997). The stakeholders that
populate a country’s stakeholder field, their engagement with other socio-political actors within a
country, and their use of direct pressure tactics on a country’s private sector jointly determines
corporate practices by influencing managerial perceptions of their salience (Mitchell et al., 1997),
and in turn, responsiveness to issues advocated by the stakeholder field. In countries where
stakeholder fields are populated by prominent stakeholders which can wield influence on
regulations or norms, and draw on a heterogeneous base of adherents, managers are more likely to
be responsive to the issues advocated by the field. Managers are equally attuned to extrainstitutional mobilization (King and Pearce, 2010) by influential stakeholders on peer firms in their
country, responding with expressions of the organization’s commitment to socially acceptable
norms and activities (McDonnell and King, 2013) in the hopes that they can avoid becoming a
target. Further, the characteristics of stakeholder and business fields vary across countries which
alters firms’ susceptibility to direct or indirect stakeholder channels of influence.
Our work thus represents a significant theoretical shift in comparative CSP research,
stakeholder theory, as well as in research on organizational fields. Cross-national variation in
institutions has been shown to strongly influence CSP (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Jackson and
Apostolakou, 2010; Matten and Moon, 2008), and cross-national variation in internal stakeholder
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(i.e., shareholders, creditors, employees) influence has been shown to influence corporate
governance and reputation (Schneper and Guillen, 2004; Soleimani, Schneper, and Newburry,
2014). Conversely, cross-national variation in external stakeholder (i.e., governments, NGOs,
IGOs, communities) influence has not previously been linked to CSP, arguably due to an inability
to objectively compare external stakeholders’ influence across nations. A stakeholder field
perspective can enrich comparative CSP research by addressing this gap and incorporating
mechanisms shown to impact firm behavior within the stakeholder literature. It also offers a more
dynamic view of how once ‘latent’ stakeholders can quickly transform into ‘definitive’
stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997) through their relational ties, raising the salience of CSR issues
and performance across countries. Secondly, conceptualizing stakeholder influence as operating
more broadly via country-level business fields in which firms are embedded, relaxes the assumption
that firms are responsive to direct stakeholder pressures alone. Instead a field-theory perspective
on stakeholder influence recognizes that stakeholders strive to “bring about field-level change”
(den Hond and Bakker, 2007: 918) and answers calls to include non-targeted firms in research on
stakeholder influence (Briscoe et al., 2015). Relative to existing work in organizational fields, we
broaden the scope of inquiry beyond the treatment of fields as “self-contained, autonomous worlds”
(Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 18), highlighting that changes in a focal field can emanate from
changes in the dynamic structural and compositional characteristics of the complex webs of fields
surrounding it.
Finally, our work represents an important empirical contribution to the literature on CSP,
stakeholder networks, and fields. Using 250 million machine-coded media-reported interactions
among economic, political and social actors, we introduce to management a novel source of data
capturing the shifting structure of interconnected fields within which organizations operate (Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978). While manual coding of media-reported events have been employed within
social movement scholarship (King, 2008; King and Soule, 2007; McDonnell and King, 2013), the
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dataset we employ expands the scope of media coverage by several orders of magnitude, and allows
us to study not just contentious interactions but the full scope of interactions related to
environmental and social issues in each country for a decade. From this corpus, we collect directed
and valued networks of relations between CSP stakeholders (de Bakker, 2012; Lucea and Doh,
2012; Rowley, 1997), and other business and socio-political actors within a country. To our
knowledge, our construction of stakeholder, business, and socio-political fields across 42 countries,
represents the first cross-national study of fields of this scale.
STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND FIELD THEORY
Stakeholder theory posits that strategic management involves consideration of stakeholders who
can affect, or are affected by, the accomplishment of an organization’s purpose (Freeman, 1984;
Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar, 2004). However, not all stakeholders are created equal. Stakeholder
influence on corporate practices is mediated by the salience of stakeholder groups, or the degree to
which managers give priority to stakeholder claims (Mitchell et al., 1997). Hence, one prominent
area of inquiry in stakeholder theory is how managerial perceptions of stakeholder attributes
(Eesley and Lenox, 2006; Yang and Rivers, 2009) or their relationship with the organization (Agle
et al., 1999) can “explain to whom and to what managers actually pay attention,” (Mitchell et al.,
1997: 854). Most research on stakeholder salience has focused on arguments derived from dyadic
resource dependence (Frooman, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997).
However, resource dependence theory also emphasizes the interconnectedness of actors as
an important structural characteristic of environments in which an organization is embedded
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The interconnectedness of organizations and actors creates “webs of
power” that affect the level of influence associated with different interests (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978: 65–71; Wry et al., 2013). In other words, organizations are not perceiving, and responding
to, atomistic stakeholders, but rather the interaction of multiple inter-connected influences from
their entire stakeholder environment (Rowley, 1997). Therefore, a growing stream of research
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argues for a relational perspective on stakeholder salience that takes account of inter-stakeholder
ties (Rowley, 1997) and of ties to other actors in an organization’s external environment.
More recently, stakeholder influence on firm’s practices has been further complicated by
findings that managers take action on issues in response to stakeholder pressure on other firms in
the business field (Briscoe et al., 2015). In other words, in making judgements on stakeholder
salience, managers are attuned not only to stakeholder pressure directed at them but, more broadly,
stakeholder interactions with other firms (Yue et al., 2013). This perspective is particularly
important for secondary stakeholders (e.g. NGOs, regulators) which are typically interested in
effecting field-level change (den Hond and Bakker, 2007; Van Wijk et al., 2013). As such,
researchers have called for research to acknowledge stakeholders wield influence beyond a single
point of interaction (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016) and adopt a field level perspective because
“substantial economic change does not stay contained within organizational or industry
boundaries,” (Davis and Marquis, 2005: 341).
We bring together and extend these three perspectives to develop a theoretical framework
of stakeholder influence operating through managerial perceptions of country-level stakeholder
fields to explain differing levels of firm responsiveness to stakeholder interests which manifest in
observable patterns of practices across countries (i.e. CSP). Field theory suggests that social actors
are embedded in fields, or meso-level social orders, where actors interact with knowledge of one
another under a set of common understandings about the field’s purposes, the relationships in the
field, and the field's rules (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). Fields can form around issues (Hoffman,
1999; Zietsma et al., 2017), specific industries or sectors (e.g. state field), or geographies (Fligstein
and McAdam, 2012; Zietsma et al., 2017). Critically, the field of which an organization is a member
is, in turn, embedded in complex webs of other fields (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) which
influence practices in the focal field. For example, the European Union (EU) moratorium on
genetically modified (GM) products which affected firms across a multitude of industries (e.g.
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agriculture, biotechnology, retail) was the product of complex interactions between NGOs,
producers, policy makers and consumers. Doh and Guay (2006) contrast the EU outcome with that
of the U.S. where no such consensus on GM products emerged as the issue failed to gain
prominence because of a lack of news-grabbing biotechnology accidents that would create political
space, NGOs’ failure to use the judicial system, and elite capture by the biotech industry. In a
separate case, the comparatively lower involvement of U.S. firms in the Publish What You Pay
initiative in comparison to their U.K. peers has been attributed to considerably less NGO,
institutional investor, and policy maker’s pressure in the U.S on revenue transparency (Aguilera et
al., 2007).
We thus share with field theory a conception of a set of stakeholders concerned with
collective strategic action to achieve tangible change in CSP outcomes in the business field,
working or embedded within a broader societal field (Bansal, 2005). CSP stakeholders can include
regulatory or government agencies whose mandates comprise environmental, labor, or human
rights issues (Aguilera et al., 2007; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008),
IGOs (Aguilera et al., 2007; Williams and Aguilera, 2008), NGOs (Arenas et al., 2009; Doh and
Guay, 2006; Eesley and Lenox, 2006), and communities and residents (Henriques and Sadorsky,
1996; Maignan and Ralston, 2002; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008) identifying or concerned with those
same issues. A field perspective on stakeholder influence and salience relaxes the focus on
stakeholder power as a discrete organizational characteristic operating at the organizationstakeholder dyad level. Instead, it shifts analytical focus to how the constellation of interconnected
stakeholders with interests in bringing about field-level change (den Hond and Bakker, 2007) in
corporate performance on environmental, human rights and labor issues, and their relations with
other fields within countries condition firm responsiveness to their interests. Re-conceptualizing
stakeholder salience across countries as operating through cross-field influence acknowledges that
stakeholder influence is not limited to, or even focused on, any one firm (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016).
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A framework that brings to the fore the interconnectedness of heterogeneous stakeholders
interested in field-level change is particularly important in the context of CSP, where some of the
greatest pressure for firms to adopt environmentally or socially responsible practices have come
from interconnected networks of activists, inter-governmental efforts, or cross-sectoral efforts.
STAKEHOLDER FIELDS
We propose that stakeholder salience in a given country, and in turn CSP, is informed by managerial
perceptions of the stakeholder field’s ability to leverage two mechanisms to influence practices in
the business field: institutional change and extra-institutional tactics (Aguilera et al., 2007; Hiatt et
al., 2015; King and Pearce, 2010). The first focuses on stakeholders as institutional entrepreneurs
that effect change by leveraging the state to exert coercive influence (Hiatt et al., 2015), providing
normative support for alternative practices (Durand and Georgallis, 2018), or propagating cognitive
frames regarding appropriate behavior for corporations. A stakeholder field whose members are
prominent within the broader socio-political network and one composed of heterogeneous actors,
signals to managers that CSP has gained legitimacy with a broad constituency within their country
and that stakeholders can draw on a multitude of sources of influence (i.e., regulative, normative,
and cognitive) to foster institutional change. In countries where the business field does not enjoy
privileged access to elites to impede institutional change, managers will be particularly responsive
to these stakeholder field characteristics.
The second mechanism for cross-field influence emphasizes the role of secondary
stakeholders as ‘extra-institutional entrepreneurs’ (King and Soule, 2007) that employ direct,
contentious targeting of select firms to bring about change in the broader business field (Briscoe et
al., 2015; den Hond and Bakker, 2007). Contentious targeting of firms in a country attunes
managers to issues advocated by the stakeholder field, and may result in practice change where
stakeholders articulate specific proscriptions for alternative practices and can mobilize in a
coordinated and repeated manner. The mechanisms underlying our framework of stakeholder
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salience find parallels in Zietsma et al.'s (2017) review of literature on field-level change, where
business field members are drawn into issues when the state field imposes a change or a social
movement pressures for one. Importantly, our framework does not address the determinants of
different stakeholder and business field structures that emerge across countries nor how they
evolve.
Stakeholder Field Prominence
Prominent actors within and across fields disproportionately “influence the rules of the game and
the cultural norms and belief systems” (King and Walker, 2014: 135) that govern corporate
practices. The prominence of members of a stakeholder field within the broader socio-political
network is material to observers because it is associated with potential subsequent shifts in formal
state policies, informal norms or values influencing perceptions of appropriate behavior (Bansal,
2005; Briscoe et al., 2015; Sharfman, Shaft, and Tihanyi, 2004) or cultural-cognitive belief systems
as to practices that must be followed (i.e. institutional change). Mitchell et al. (1997: 865) suggest
that a stakeholder “has power to the extent it has or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or
normative means, to impose its will.” Prominent stakeholders are more likely to be perceived as
being able to gain access to influence over the business field via indirect channels afforded by other
fields to which the business field is connected. For example, influence in domestic policy networks
and ties to legislators are important to CSR outcomes (Hiatt et al., 2015), as stakeholders often turn
to the state because of its capacity to regulate industry (King and Pearce, 2010).
Generally, “actors with greater access to authority, resources, and discursive legitimacy”
(Hardy and Phillips, 1998: 219) are those with the best chance of influencing other fields. In
countries where members of the stakeholder field are more prominent they are more likely to have
a larger impact either on government policy or on norms, values and cultural-cognitive beliefs that
influence behavior. In policy networks consisting of many different actors, actors with prominent
positions can “set agendas, frame debates, and promulgate policies that benefit them,” (Beckfield,
116

2003: 404). In cultural networks, prominent actors are key influencers that define attributes of
products or practices that are desirable for or expected of peers and lead cascades of adoption
(Centola, 2015). The prominence of Greenpeace in the solar photovoltaics industry, for example,
increased private sector commitment to this ‘greener’ technology because it acted as a signal of
shifting public preferences, reflected active advocacy for an alternative technology, and defined
new contours for reputation building (Durand and Georgallis, 2018). Being well-connected within
the socio-political network allows stakeholders to leverage the network to propagate their ideas and
“may even create the actual or virtual ‘space’ for the creation of new norms.” (Aguilera et al., 2007:
853). The foregoing suggests that managerial attention and action will be most attuned to issues
advocated by prominent stakeholders because such stakeholders can draw on a multitude of sources
of influence (i.e., regulative, normative and cognitive) to foster institutional change. Therefore, we
propose that managers’ evaluations of stakeholder salience, and in turn their CSP, will be greater
in countries where the members of the stakeholder field are prominent within the broader sociopolitical network.
Hypothesis 1: The prominence of members of the stakeholder field within a country
is positively associated with a firm’s corporate social performance.
Relative Strength of Business Ties to Elites
Characteristics of the business field can alter managerial perceptions of the likelihood that a given
level of stakeholder prominence will generate institutional change (King and Walker, 2014). In
some countries, the business field may enjoy a blocking position between even prominent
environmental or social stakeholders and their goals of regulative, normative or cultural-cognitive
institutional change. Of particular importance in any process of institutional change whether
through policy, norms and values or culture, is the support of elites (Greenwood and Suddaby,
2006; Seo and Creed, 2002).
In many institutional change processes, shifting positions among elites play a critical role
in the process of transformation from one set of rules, values and norms or culture to another.
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Where businesses enjoy privileged or superior access to these elites relative to public sector or civil
society stakeholders, they are more likely to be able to use lobbying, framing battles or cultural
tropes to impede the passage of new laws, push back against the growing acceptance of new norms
and prevent any change in what environmental and social practices are seen as expected. Prakash
and Kollman (2003), for example, highlight the critical role played by the relative connectedness
of the biotechnology industry to key U.S. regulators in attenuating regulative and normative threats
to GM products.
Businesses with strong ties to elites can use their resources to impact legislation or
regulation directly by controlling or shaping the agenda of legislative debate and regulatory
implementation. Their advertising or discourse also shapes stakeholders’ perceptions of the
appropriateness of improved environmental or social practices. In cases where incumbent business
interests are particularly well connected, it is hard to imagine how a cultural-cognitive belief that
strong environmental and social practices are expected could emerge. Even in cases where
environmental and social stakeholders are actively influencing regulation, values and norms and
culture, the relative strength of business ties to elites will undermine the efficacy of such efforts at
institutional change, sowing competing forms of targets for regulation, alternative interpretations
of causal mechanisms underlying beliefs, and even confusion over the facts themselves. Given this
ability to block, confuse or obfuscate, business fields that enjoy relatively strong connections to
national elites should be less sensitive to stakeholder prominence.
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between stakeholder prominence and a
firm’s corporate social performance decreases in the relative strength of business
ties to elites.
Stakeholder Field Heterogeneity
Fields are constructed on a situational basis, as shifting collections of actors come to define new
issues and concerns as salient (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). The constellation of actor types (e.g.
international NGOs, local NGOs, regulators) that identify with a particular issue is material to
118

observers assessing the likelihood of institutional change. Where a stakeholder field includes
NGOs, government, IGOs, organized labor etc., managers see that the issue has gained legitimacy
with a broad base of constituents within their country. Such diversity in support enhances the
receptivity of policymakers to regulative policy change (Henisz and Zelner, 2005) as well as the
pressure for conformity with norms, values and beliefs guiding appropriate or necessary behavior
(Oliver, 1991) through the reduction of complexity in the external environment (Greenwood et al.,
2011). Organizations surrounded by fields where the constellation of stakeholders identifying with
an issue is heterogeneous are more likely to acquiesce to institutional pressures because stakeholder
field heterogeneity suggests that an institutional expectation has diffused more widely (Oliver,
1991).
Heterogeneity of stakeholders also enhances the sources of influence and resources that
stakeholders can wield in support of these objectives (Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl, 1988). Political
or regulatory stakeholders can deploy coercive pressure via legislation or regulation. NGOs can
exert normative pressures through issue framing. Organized labor has avenues for pressure directly
into firms through its membership. Similarly, levers for institutional change may vary by the
geographic breadth of stakeholders. Stakeholders with international reach, for example, may have
greater access to financial or political resources than national or more regional groups (Eesley and
Lenox, 2006), and can make issues more visible to a geographically broader swath of audiences
(Lucea and Doh, 2012).
For both these reasons, we expect managers to perceive a stakeholder field composed of
connected heterogeneous actors, each possessing different influence tactics, levers and resources,
and representing broad-based issue support to be more likely to influence political actors’
deliberations and the shared construction of values, norms and beliefs, increasing a firm’s CSP.
Hypothesis 3: The heterogeneity of members in the stakeholder field within a
country is positively associated with a firm’s corporate social performance.
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While managers are in tune with the potential material impact of institutional change resulting from
the prominence and heterogeneity of stakeholder fields, the influence of stakeholder fields can also
be more direct. Stakeholders can also deliver “an exogenous shock to change the frame of
discussion and potentially shift norms of acceptable social conduct” (Aguilera et al., 2007: 857) by
directly mobilizing against the business field in a country. In other words, stakeholder fields can
also influence CSP where members of those fields apply direct pressure on business through extrainstitutional tactics (e.g., boycotts, protests).
Proselytizing Stakeholder Pressure
Stakeholders can promote corporate reform by pressuring firms directly with tactics like protests,
boycotts, and negative media campaigns (Eesley and Lenox, 2006; King and Pearce, 2010; Soule,
2009). Firms respond by adopting new policies and practices and increasing prosocial disclosures
(McDonnell and King, 2013). The responsiveness of firms to contentious targeting is not limited
only to instances when they are targets. Firms are responsive to contentious targeting of other firms
in the business field (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016; Briscoe et al., 2015; Yue et al., 2013) including,
but not limited to, those operating in sectors to whom they are linked through supply chains (Bartley
and Child, 2014). Protests and boycotts send informational signals to non-targeted firms about the
preferences of stakeholders (e.g. proscriptions for practices) and increase the risk of them becoming
targets in the future. If non-targeted firms fail to proactively change practices they risk becoming
targets themselves. PETA’s campaign for improved treatment of animals in the U.S. in the early
2000s, for instance, began with McDonald’s, but spread quickly to others, including Burger King,
Wendy’s, and key suppliers (e.g. Smithfield Foods). While contentious targeting typically focuses
on a select few, visible firms in a country, it must be understood in light of stakeholders’ ambitions
“to bring about field-level change,” (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007: 901). As such, following
contentious targeting of the business field by stakeholders, the salience of issues they advocate is
heightened for all firms in the country.
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Stakeholders that frame the discussion of acceptable social conduct (Aguilera et al., 2007)
are most likely to elicit concrete responses in CSP because they articulate proscriptions for practices
that replace existing frames rather than just deinstitutionalizing existing frames (den Hond and
Bakker, 2007). Den Hond and Bakker (2007), illustrate this point with the animal rights movement,
which is populated by organizations that categorically oppose raising animals for consumption, as
well as those that focus their campaigns on improving conditions under which animals are raised.
Practice change in response to pressure from the former is circumscribed by their challenge to the
very existence of an industry, while response to the latter is enabled by their championing of
concrete proscriptions for practice change. Powell et. al. (2017) refer to actors who champion
proscriptions as proselytizers. Within a stakeholder field, proselytizing stakeholders are those
actors who organize and champion information about an alternative means of engaging with
environmental and social challenges, providing guidance and orientation to both corporate targets
of their efforts at conversion as well as corporate (and government) observers.
When proselytizers engage not only in verbal framing within their field but also apply
direct pressure on the business field through extra-institutional tactics, they send an important
signal to managers. Such behavior highlights a focus not only on institutional change, but also
extra-institutional change where success depends upon perceptions of a material risk to
organizational performance. Such a strategy may directly target the performance of the manager’s
firm or simply attune the manager to a threat of future stakeholder attacks. In either event, preemption or mitigation of the emergent threat can be achieved through increasing CSP.
Hypothesis 4: Pressure from proselytizing stakeholders towards the business field
in a country is positively associated with a firm’s corporate social performance.
Proselytizing Stakeholder Density
Not all contentious targeting of the business field by proselytizers is equally salient to managers.
Isolated one-off incidents by unconnected or peripheral proselytizing stakeholders will elicit less
responsiveness than contentious targeting of members of the business field by a tightly connected
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group of mainstream organizations. In general, managers will look for indications of the ease with
which stakeholders can deploy pressure directly (as opposed to indirectly through institutional
change) against them in a coordinated and repeated manner. Such stakeholders pose a more credible
and sustained threat to the firm (Coff, 1999). Therefore, we propose that managerial responsiveness
to proselytizing stakeholder pressure will be informed by their evaluations of the degree to which
proselytizing stakeholders can coordinate for future collective action.
Stakeholders face substantial collective action challenges in achieving their objective of
changing firms’ environmental, human rights, or labor practices. Dense social relations or ties
among actors deter free-riding in collective action, and facilitate the diffusion of norms and
expectations (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003), both of which increase the probability of future
collective action. Dense networks of ties between proselytizing stakeholders can also reduce
variation in their evaluation and framing of issues and the number of competing issue resolution
coalitions that form (Mahon et al., 2004), translating into more sustained efforts at issue resolution.
The sustainability of pressure is also more likely within dense networks where there are limits on
firms’ ability to use ‘divide-and-conquer’ tactics (Mahon et al., 2004), and relational ties enable
the sharing of resources, frames and tactics (Soule, 2012). Given the link between dense social
relations and sustained collective action, it is perhaps unsurprising that protesting organizations
that participate in coalitions are also more likely to have higher levels of success (Larson and Soule,
2009). Scholars studying the influence of social movements on public policy also emphasize crossorganizational ties, suggesting success in influencing policy depends on the strength and density of
the network (Keck and Sikkink, 1999).
The preceding suggests managerial attention to contentious targeting by proselytizing
stakeholders, and therefore a firm’s CSP, will increase with the density of cooperative ties among
proselytizers in the country in which the firm is headquartered.
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Hypothesis 5: The positive relationship between pressure from proselytizing
stakeholders towards the business field and a firm’s corporate social performance
increases in the density of cooperative ties between proselytizing stakeholders.

DATA AND METHODS
Constructing Stakeholder Fields
Since the salience of CSP issues is determined by managerial perception of stakeholders (Mitchell
et al., 1997) within the corresponding field, our operationalization of these fields must be readily
observable by managers. Consistent with this objective, we identify membership based upon the
population of stakeholders identified with CSP issues in a country (e.g., environmental, human
rights and labor issues) connected by actions or statements reported in the media. Media is an
information intermediary that provides stimuli that affect impression formation (Pollock and
Rindova, 2003) and “influences decision makers by identifying the topics, issues, activities, and
events that are perceived as notable and salient,” (Aharonson and Bort, 2015: 313). Acknowledging
sources of bias in media-reported events (e.g. ideological biases, over-reporting of negative events),
we do not claim all stakeholder ties will be reported by media. Instead, we suggest an approach that
relies on media conforms with stakeholder salience being a 'socially constructed' reality (Mitchell
et al., 1997). Organizational researchers have shown what stakeholders know about organizations
is largely shaped by what the media reports about them (Deephouse, 2000; Petkova, Rindova, and
Gupta, 2013; Pollock and Rindova, 2003). Therefore, while other studies have relied on archival
data, such as the financial resources at the disposal of an NGO, to measure stakeholder salience
(Eesley and Lenox, 2006), we believe studying media-reported stakeholder fields better reflects the
limited perceptual energy managers can devote to understanding their stakeholder environment
(Mitchell et al., 1997).
Archival media data has been used in analyses of firm response to stakeholder pressures
(Eesley and Lenox, 2006), and social movement research to identify boycotts, the size of protests,
the number of organizations involved and issues (King, 2008; King and Soule, 2007; McDonnell
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and King, 2013). In political science, scholars leverage automated linguistic coding algorithms and
exponentially increasing computational power to construct geographically coded datasets of mediareported events. An “event” is a discrete interaction between two actors that can be located at a
single time and geography (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013). We introduce one such dataset, the Global
Database on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) to the management literature and use it to
construct stakeholder fields, business fields, as well as the broader national socio-political networks
in which they are embedded (http://www.gdeltproject.org/). GDELT is arguably the largest event
data collection in social science with over a 250 million events reported in print, broadcast, and
web news media across the world. GDELT data are coded using the Textual Analysis by
Augmented Replacement Instructions (TABARI) system. GDELT’s reliance on both domestic and
international news sources reduces the likelihood of bias due to varying levels of domestic press
freedom because an event is likely to be reported to the extent that foreign correspondents
representing foreign news wires are present in the country. In Appendix A.3, we provide a
description of media sources included in GDELT, and tests we conducted to address concerns
regarding media bias.
Each event record in GDELT includes information on the time and location of a mediareported event, the “source” (i.e., who said the expression or took the action) and “target” (i.e.,
towards whom the expression or action was directed or taken) actors, and the characteristics of the
interaction between them. The interactions vary from cooperative, such as “express intent to
cooperate” or “engage in material cooperation,” to conflictual, such as “demand,” “threaten,” and
“protest” and are coded according to whether the interaction was verbal or material. GDELT deduplicates events by collapsing multiple references to the same event across one or more articles
into a single event record (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013), while separately recording the number of
articles carrying the event.
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Using GDELT allows us to address Rowley’s (1997) recommendations for constructing
stakeholder networks or fields. First and foremost, events capture (media-reported) interactions
(i.e., ties) between actors that are both directed and classified according to positive versus negative
affect. Second, ties can be valued by number of occurrences and media mentions, which is
important for understanding the intensity of each relation as represented by the number of possible
media impressions. Finally, event databases capture the census of actors that appear in the media
and, by geographically locating where the event took place, enable construction of national
stakeholder fields, business fields, as well as socio-political networks. Despite the advantages in
using event databases, mindful of their documented shortcomings, we take several steps to
minimize possible bias due to measurement error. Efforts at validating GDELT against other event
databases like the Integrated Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS) and the Dynamics of
Collective Action dataset, have yielded two cautions: over-reporting of false positives (i.e. more
events) and increase over time in events (Ward et al., 2013). Although high cross-sectional
correlations between protests events in GDELT in comparison to ICEWS (r=0.84) (Ward et al.,
2013) and DCA (r=0.83) (Claassen and Gibson, 2018), give us confidence in GDELT’s reliability,
we still normalize our key constructs by corresponding country-level measures for all actors to
account for any changes in over-reporting of events over time. In Appendix A.3, we discuss in
greater detail the issue of event count bias, how we address it in the calculation of our measures,
and additional validation tests we perform.
All actors in GDELT are assigned role codes, which indicate broader functional categories
to which they belong (e.g. government, NGO, business, media) and their specialty or area of interest
(e.g. actors whose primary area of operation or expertise is human rights) (Leetaru and Schrodt,
2013). Actor role and specialty codes facilitate our categorization of GDELT actors as CSP
stakeholders. First, we used GDELT role codes to identify stakeholders classified as national or
international political or regulatory actors (including government, judiciary, opposition, or
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legislative role codes), labor organizations, IGOs, NGOs and communities or residents. We chose
this subset of roles (i.e., excluding such roles as insurgents, military, rebels and intelligence
services) due to their association with advocacy for environmental and social issues of relevance
to firms. Second, we used GDELT specialty codes to identify actors with interests or mandates in
issues corresponding to our outcome of interest, CSP. Specifically, CSP stakeholders are all actors
in roles described above whose primary, secondary, or tertiary specialty code is ENV (i.e.,
environment), HRI (i.e., human rights) or LAB (i.e., labor). Appendix A.3 describes the process of
stakeholder identification, and provides a mapping of GDELT role and specialty codes to
stakeholder categories, as well as illustrative examples of actors included in each category. The
population of these actors then constituted the members of the CSP stakeholder field. GDELT role
codes also enabled us to identify the business field within a given country as all private sector
actors, both domestic and multinational, that participated in events occurring in a given country.
Business fields consist of both prominent organizations identified by name (e.g. Starbucks, Toyota
and Boeing) and organizations identified by the sector in which they operate (e.g. computer maker,
car manufacturer, and airline).
Sample
The initial sample of firms used in our analysis is defined by the coverage of the ASSET4 database
(Thomson Reuters), which provides CSP scores on 4,600 companies headquartered in 58 countries,
from 2004 to 2013, for which we obtained accounting data from Thomson Reuters WorldScope.
After case-wise deletion of observations with missing data at the firm-level (e.g. accounting
measures) and country-level (e.g. laws encouraging competition), we are left with 20,047 firm-year
observations from 3,566 firms, headquartered in 42 countries over ten years.
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is firm-level CSP, which we obtain from ASSET4. With growing
importance placed on CSP, several independent organizations provide firm-level CSP metrics or
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rankings (e.g. Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini). We follow others (Hawn and Ioannou, 2016;
Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) in choosing the ASSET4 database due to the breadth of coverage
across firms and time as well as the methodological rigor it employs drawing information from
“objective, comparable and transparent data” sources and subjecting each data point to a “multistep verification and quality control process” (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012: 846), and most
importantly, the geographic breadth of the companies it evaluates.
CSP scores are calculated based on a firm’s performance on several key environmental,
human rights and labor performance indicators gathered from public sources. The indicators
evaluate the policies or principles to which the firm subscribes (e.g. emissions reduction policy or
employment quality policies), the implementation of those policies (e.g. environmental R&D
spending or employment awards), and finally, the observable outcomes (e.g. CO2 emissions or
employee turnover). We follow Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) in constructing the CSP composite
as the equally weighted average of social (i.e., human rights and labor) and environmental
performance for each firm-year observation (scale of 0 to 100) as well as separately analyzing
results for the two sub-indexes.
Independent Variables
Stakeholder prominence. In hypothesis 1, we propose managers’ evaluations of stakeholders’
influence on regulative, normative and cognitive institutions will increase in the prominence of
those stakeholders in the country socio-political network. We equate stakeholder prominence with
the number of media-reported out-going and in-coming ties stakeholders have with other actors
within the country. Actors with high prominence enjoy influence and access to resources via their
plentiful relations (Mahon et al., 2004). We calculate prominence using both cooperative and
conflictual ties, since stakeholder influence bases include coercive and normative power. While a
stakeholder’s number of cooperative ties provides managers with signals as to how many possible
alters an actor can influence or get resources from, conflictual ties are salient to managers because
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they are an indicator of the exercise of stakeholders’ voice and power against enemies. In
calculating prominence, we also weight ties by the number of media mentions each tie garnered
(Durand and Georgallis, 2018). We calculate stakeholder prominence by summing the mentionsweighted prominence of all members of the stakeholder field, and then normalize this sum by the
sum of mentions-weighted prominence of all actors in the country’s socio-political network. This
ensures we are not privileging stakeholder fields in countries with greater media coverage, while
accounting for any changes in the universe of source documents and, by extension, media-reported
events over time.
Business ties to elites. To capture the relative extent of business ties to elites, we compare
the network constructed from the full set of media-reported events in a given country-year to the
sub-network constructed from media reported events in which a member of the business field
undertakes the action on another actor or speaks about another actor. Specifically, we follow Neal
(2008) in using the Herfindahl index of stakeholder degree centrality as a measure of hierarchy in
the two networks and then compare (normalizing for the relative size of the two networks), the
degree of hierarchy in business outbound events to that in the overall network:
Where:
𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 = # of media mentions of ties between stakeholder 𝑛 and other
stakeholders within country 𝑖 in year 𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑡 = # of media mentions of ties between stakeholders within country
𝑖 in year 𝑡
At the extreme, if each business were connected to a single actor, that network would form a perfect

hierarchy. The greater the concentration of connections among business actors to different alters
within the business outbound network as compared to the overall network, the stronger are the
business field’s relative ties to elites.
Stakeholder heterogeneity. We classify heterogeneous stakeholders based upon
differences in the organizational forms or purposes (e.g. government versus non-governmental
organization), issue interests (e.g. environmental versus labor issues), and locations (e.g., domestic,
foreign or multinational) of the members of each country-year stakeholder fields. We use the raw
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count of unique actor types in each stakeholder field to measure heterogeneity. Although we
explored more complex heterogeneity measures such as Blau’s (1977) index, these measures
reward equal balance of actors in each category while our arguments center on variety in
stakeholders.
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure. We follow Powell et al. (2017) in identifying
proselytizing stakeholders as those whose ties to other stakeholders (i.e., outbound) are twice their
incoming ties (i.e., inbound). These stakeholders proselytize new practices and ideas by spreading
to others the attention that they receive (ibid.). After identifying proselytizers in the stakeholder
field, we count the number of times proselytizer stakeholders engaged in material conflict (e.g.,
protests, boycotts) aimed at the business field in a given year. Proselytizing stakeholder pressure
is the sum of proselytizer material conflict directed at the business field in a country-year,
normalized by the relative number of media-reported conflictual events to all media-reported events
in the country to account for differing degrees of media bias across countries (e.g., media in some
countries may over-report negative news).
Proselytizing stakeholder density. We calculate the relative density of cooperative ties
among proselytizer stakeholders as a ratio of the density of cooperative ties in the socio-political
network of the country as a whole. The density of media-mentions-weighted cooperative ties
between proselytizing stakeholders is calculated as follows:
𝐷𝑖𝑡 =

∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡 (𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 1)

Where:
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = # of media mentions of cooperative ties between proselytizing
stakeholders within country 𝑖 in year 𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡 = # of proselytizing stakeholders in country 𝑖 in year 𝑡

Since our network is directed, our denominator (number of possible ties) is not divided by two as
in an undirected network. We then divide by the analogous measure of density in the national sociopolitical network as a whole to ensure we account for the secular increase in the corpus of source
documents and resulting increase in density of media-reported events over time.
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Country institutional controls. While our arguments are stakeholder-centered, we
acknowledge a country’s institutions condition firm behavior, and control for those shown to
influence CSP. We control for institutions encouraging competition in a country (competition
laws), laws protecting minority shareholders (anti-self-dealing index), the political ideology of
legislators (left/center ideology), and perceptions of corruption (absence of corruption) (Ioannou
and Serafeim, 2012). We control for cultural institutions (Williams and Aguilera, 2008) with
measures of power distance and individualism (Hofstede 1997 2001). CSP improves firms’
attractiveness to employees (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012), therefore we control for the
competitiveness of the country’s labor market (skilled labor availability). Similarly, we control for
union density, as unions typically advocate for health and safety related performance included in
our CSP measure and may influence practices at non-unionized firms (McWilliams and Siegel,
2001). Financial institutions influence companies’ CSP because capital providers are important
stakeholders, therefore we control for the degree to which the financial system is credit- or marketbased (country debt over assets), the size of the capital market (market capitalization) and whether
a socially responsible market index exists (SRI index). We also control for the competitiveness and
openness of the national economy (balance of trade and trade) and the quality of its basic
infrastructure (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). We control for the degree of press freedom because
our stakeholder field measures are based on media reports and media may improve institutional
compliance (Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou, 2016) by increasing firm and issue visibility to
stakeholders. Finally, an alternative explanation for cross-country heterogeneity in CSP may be
that firms experience varying degrees of external pressure from the degree of attention given to
environmental, human rights and labor issues across countries (Flammer, 2013). To the extent this
correlates with the attention media gives stakeholders interested in such issues, our results would
be biased. Therefore, following Flammer (2013), we control for the percent of media articles
mentioning “environment” or “human rights” or “labor” and “corporate social responsibility” in a
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given country-year (issue prevalence), and rely on Factiva media reports to construct this measure,
to reduce single-source bias.
Firm-level controls. We control for several firm characteristics shown to be associated
with CSP. We expect more profitable (ROA) firms (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Jackson and
Apostolakou, 2010), larger firms (firm size) (Campbell, Eden, and Miller, 2011; Chih, Chih, and
Chen, 2010; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) and those competing on more differentiated products
(market to book ratio and R&D expenses) to have higher CSP (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012;
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). CSP may also be higher in more diversified firms (number of
segments), those more visible, proxied by whether the firm trades an American Depository Receipt
(ADR company) (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012), and multinational enterprises (foreign assets). We
also control for a firm’s stock volatility as CSP may change with firm risk, as well as the degree to
which shares are closely held (closely held shares), and its leverage (leverage) (ibid.). Table 12
describes all independent and control variables in detail and their sources. All independent and
control variables are lagged one year, unless otherwise noted.
We include industry fixed effects to account for systematic differences in CSP across
industries (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) and year fixed effects to account for patterns of
institutionalization of CSR norms (Flammer, 2013). Appendix A.3 presents the distribution of
observations by country, the average CSP score of firms headquartered in the country, and the
prominence and heterogeneity of stakeholder fields, and proselytizing stakeholder pressure across
all years. Summary statistics and correlations are presented in Table 13.
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Table 12: Variable Definition and Source
Variable
Independent Variables
Stakeholder prominence
(H1)

Measurement (annual unless noted otherwise)

Sum of all stakeholder outgoing and incoming ties divided by outgoing
and incoming ties of all actors (ties weighted by media mentions);
measure is logged due to skewness
Business ties to elites
The ratio of the herfindahl index of degree centrality for actors in the
(H2)
sub-network of business initiated statements or actions to that of the
overall socio-political network
Stakeholder heterogeneity Count of unique actor types in the stakeholder field
(H3)
Proselytizing stakeholder Frequency-weighted material conflict brought by proselytizing
pressure (H4)
stakeholders against business field. Proselytizer stakeholder are those
with outdegree twice their indegree in the stakeholder field. Measure
normalized by relative number of conflictual events in country.
Proselytizing stakeholder Mentions-weighted cooperative ties between proselytizers as a ratio of
density (H5)
number of possible ties, normalized by the density (calculated in the
same manner) of all actors
Controls: Country
Competition laws
Laws encourage competition in the country
Anti-self-dealing index
Laws limit self-dealing of insiders (measured as of 2001)
Left/center ideology
Chief executive and largest party have left/center political orientation (%
of years between 1928 and 1995)
Absence of corruption
Inverse of average corruption perceptions score
Power distance
“The extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and
institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally”
Individualism
“The degree to which individuals are integrated into groups”
Skilled labor availability Skilled labor is readily available in a country
Union density
Employees are densely organized in unions (measured as of 1997)
Country debt over assets Average debt over assets ratio for all firms within a country-year pair
Market Capitalization
SRI index

Log of total market capitalization
Indicator variable for country-years where a socially responsible stock
market index exists (1/0)
Balance of trade
(Exports-Imports)/Gross Domestic Product
Trade
(Exports+Imports)/Gross Domestic Product
Basic infrastructure
Quality of basic infrastructure in a country
Press freedom
Composite score of the legal, political and economic environment for
press freedom (0 to 100, where lower values indicate more freedom)
Issue prevalence in media Percent of articles in a country mentioning environmental, human rights,
labor issues in a given year.
Controls: Firm
ROA
Net income over total assets - logged due to skewness
Firm size
Logarithm of total assets
Market to book ratio
Market value of equity over book value calculated at fiscal year-end
R&D expenses
Research and development expenses over sales
Number of segments
Logarithm of number of four-digit SIC codes the firm operates in
ADR company
Company trades an American Depositary Receipt
Foreign assets (%)
Percentage of assets in foreign (non-headquarters) countries
Stock volatility
Daily stock return volatility over the fiscal year
Closely held shares (%) Percentage of shares held by investors owing more than 5%
Leverage
One minus the ratio of shareholder’s equity over total assets
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Source
GDELT

GDELT

GDELT
GDELT

GDELT

World Competitiveness Report
La Porta et al. (2006)
Botero et al. (2004)
World Bank
Hofstede (1997, 2001)
Hofstede (1997, 2001)
World Competitiveness Report
Botero et al. (2004)
Worldscope
World Competitiveness Report
World Federation of Exchanges
World Competitiveness Report
World Competitiveness Report
World Competitiveness Report
World Press Freedom Index,
Freedom House
FACTIVA

Worldscope
Worldscope
Worldscope
Worldscope
Worldscope
Worldscope
Worldscope
Worldscope
Worldscope
Worldscope
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Note. 20,047 firm-year observations

Mean Std. Dev.
50.571 29.550
1 CSP index
0.373
1.437
2 Stakeholder prominence (H1)
0.170
0.226
3 Business ties to elites (H2)
4.141
7.663
4 Stakeholder heterogeneity (H3)
0.291
5 Proselytizing stakeholder pressure (H4) 0.226
0.018
6 Proselytizing stakeholder density (H5) 0.004
0.675
6.178
7 Competition laws
0.187
0.639
8 Anti-self-dealing index
0.287
0.433
9 Left/center ideology
0.604
-1.414
10 Absence of corruption
46.373 13.740
11 Power distance (Hofstede)
70.417 24.736
12 Individualism (Hofstede)
0.932
6.332
13 Skilled labor availability
0.130
0.228
14 Union density
4.303
2.380
15 Country debt over assets
1.436
8.068
16 Market capitalization
0.427
0.760
17 SRI index
0.058
-0.023
18 Balance of trade
32.548 39.737
19 Trade
14.254 12.398
20 Basic infrastructure
22.198 11.264
21 Press freedom
0.021
0.022
22 Issue prevalence in media
1.025
1.636
23 ROA
1.605
22.583
24 Firm size
7.162
2.697
25 Market to book ratio
4.573
1.805
26 R&D expenses
0.662
1.132
27 Number of segments
0.358
0.151
28 ADR company
16.291 25.739
29 Foreign assets (%)
9.516
28.518
30 Stock volatility
24.072 23.159
31 Closely Held Shares (%)
58.989 22.048
32 Leverage

1
1.00
0.07
-0.01
-0.03
-0.05
0.03
0.02
-0.11
-0.09
0.01
-0.02
0.01
-0.10
0.08
-0.07
-0.07
0.00
-0.01
-0.07
0.11
-0.07
-0.05
-0.02
0.39
0.11
0.09
0.22
0.26
0.17
-0.16
-0.09
0.13

3

1.00
-0.15
-0.10
0.03
-0.10
0.17
0.16
0.03
0.23
-0.23
-0.08
0.07
-0.12
-0.27
-0.12
-0.30
0.56
0.20
0.14
0.29
0.10
-0.04
0.14
-0.08
-0.01
0.12
0.08
0.15
0.23
-0.05

1.00
0.30
-0.11
-0.24
0.04
0.17
0.16
-0.12
-0.04
0.07
-0.03
-0.36
0.24
-0.32
-0.38
-0.27
0.02
0.20
0.26
0.11
0.20
0.06
-0.10
0.05
-0.11
-0.02
0.14
0.14
0.01
0.14
-0.03
1.00
0.72
0.18
-0.01
0.12
0.55
0.13
-0.31
0.59
0.18
-0.45
0.61
0.71
0.46
-0.35
-0.47
-0.32
-0.21
-0.20
0.08
0.05
-0.09
0.09
-0.11
-0.27
-0.10
0.00
-0.36
0.01

4

1.00
0.09
-0.16
0.14
0.52
0.09
-0.30
0.52
0.13
-0.36
0.77
0.60
0.34
-0.30
-0.27
-0.34
-0.19
-0.14
0.08
0.03
-0.08
0.09
-0.11
-0.22
-0.08
0.00
-0.29
0.03

5

1.00
0.08
-0.01
0.07
0.02
-0.08
0.14
0.01
-0.03
-0.02
0.05
0.01
-0.03
-0.02
0.03
-0.06
-0.02
0.03
0.01
-0.03
0.00
-0.02
-0.02
0.03
0.00
-0.07
0.02

6

1.00
0.05
0.02
-0.61
-0.43
0.28
0.08
0.27
-0.20
-0.05
-0.05
0.17
-0.05
-0.32
-0.31
-0.16
0.03
-0.07
-0.18
0.00
-0.04
0.00
0.10
-0.12
-0.17
-0.06

7

1.00
0.03
-0.23
-0.12
0.22
-0.28
-0.08
0.04
0.08
0.15
-0.29
0.33
-0.05
0.21
0.08
0.18
-0.19
0.15
-0.06
-0.18
0.03
0.06
0.05
-0.06
-0.07

8

1.00
-0.04
-0.33
0.57
0.25
-0.24
0.50
0.40
0.03
-0.31
-0.20
-0.43
-0.19
-0.13
0.19
0.05
-0.02
0.04
-0.14
-0.24
-0.05
0.03
-0.24
0.04

9

1.00
0.56
-0.38
-0.21
-0.34
0.05
-0.05
0.10
-0.03
-0.15
0.54
0.50
0.21
-0.03
0.11
0.21
-0.02
0.09
-0.03
-0.17
0.09
0.21
0.07

10

1.00
-0.77
-0.05
-0.32
-0.25
-0.29
-0.25
0.17
0.41
0.35
0.72
0.53
-0.08
0.11
0.27
-0.05
0.15
0.11
-0.10
0.08
0.44
-0.01

11

1.00
0.06
-0.10
0.45
0.55
0.24
-0.37
-0.52
-0.41
-0.62
-0.48
0.13
-0.05
-0.24
0.06
-0.18
-0.19
0.04
-0.10
-0.47
0.04

12

1.00
-0.15
0.24
0.40
0.03
0.04
-0.02
-0.55
-0.27
-0.06
-0.07
0.13
-0.10
0.13
0.06
-0.15
-0.05
-0.04
-0.15
-0.01

13

1.00
-0.36
-0.56
-0.21
0.36
0.17
0.17
-0.17
-0.05
-0.02
-0.12
-0.06
-0.06
0.02
0.14
0.18
0.03
0.04
0.00

14

1.00
0.57
0.29
-0.25
-0.24
-0.37
-0.22
-0.12
0.06
0.05
-0.10
0.10
-0.08
-0.22
-0.10
0.00
-0.25
0.01

15

1.00
0.59
-0.41
-0.47
-0.53
-0.38
-0.36
0.01
0.11
-0.13
0.15
-0.07
-0.27
-0.14
-0.07
-0.43
0.01

16

1.00
-0.35
-0.35
-0.04
-0.20
-0.24
0.00
0.00
-0.06
0.09
-0.01
-0.14
-0.12
0.06
-0.22
-0.02

17

1.00
0.01
-0.02
0.26
0.08
-0.10
-0.03
0.02
-0.01
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.00
0.13
-0.03

18

19

1.00
0.08
0.42
0.49
0.07
-0.04
0.19
-0.09
0.02
0.21
0.10
0.12
0.34
-0.07

Table 13: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
2

1.00
0.35
0.21
-0.05
-0.05
0.11
-0.10
0.09
0.17
-0.02
0.09
0.30
0.04

20

1.00
0.50
0.02
0.02
0.37
-0.09
0.07
0.12
-0.07
0.11
0.41
-0.01

21

1.00
0.01
0.01
0.25
-0.08
0.05
0.08
0.00
0.07
0.30
-0.03

22

1.00
-0.45
0.10
0.11
-0.18
-0.04
0.07
0.04
0.02
-0.43

23

1.00
0.20
-0.10
0.32
0.21
-0.01
-0.26
-0.09
0.49

24

1.00
0.00
0.06
0.17
0.01
0.02
0.18
0.07

25

1.00
-0.11
0.00
0.02
0.12
-0.09
-0.29

26

1.00
0.12
-0.02
-0.13
0.04
0.22

27

1.00
0.15
-0.04
0.09
0.04

28

30

31

32

1.00
0.05 1.00
-0.02 0.12 1.00
-0.03 -0.13 -0.07 1.00
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RESULTS
We use panel linear regression to estimate our models with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level, and industry and year fixed effects (Table 14). In line with past research
on institutional determinants of CSP (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012), in Model 1, laws promoting
shareholder protection, a leftist political ideology, and skilled labor availability are negatively and
significantly associated with CSP. Conversely, firms in countries with lower corruption, higher
union density, and higher power distance and individualism indices have higher CSP. Turning to
financial institutions, credit-based financial systems and a socially responsible market index are
positively and significantly associated with CSP, while the size of a country’s capital market has
the opposite effect. We also obtain results consistent with past findings that more profitable, larger,
more diversified and visible firms have higher CSP, while those with higher stock volatility have
lower CSP.
We focus our discussion of results on Model 2, the fully saturated industry and year fixed
effects model with robust standard errors (Table 15 contains results with each hypothesis added
individually in Models 4 to 8). The prominence of members of the stakeholder field in the national
socio-political network is positively and significantly associated with CSP (p=0.000), as predicted
in hypothesis 1. Comparisons across countries suggest that, all else equal, a firm that is
headquartered in a country in the 25th percentile of stakeholder prominence, relative to the 75th
percentile, will have 4.1% higher CSP. This equates to between 40% and 5% of a standard deviation
difference in CSP, depending on the year and industry in which the firm operates. To put the
magnitude of the effect of stakeholder prominence in context, the impact on CSP of a one standard
deviation increase in stakeholder prominence is greater than a one standard deviation increase in
firm profitability (ROA). Past research has repeatedly shown firm profitability to be a significant
predictor of CSP (Campbell et al., 2011; Chih et al., 2010; Hartmann and Uhlenbruck, 2015;
Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). We also find support for hypothesis 2, that the effect of stakeholder
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centrality is attenuated in countries where the business field is well connected to elites (p=0.008).
In countries two standard deviations below the mean in business ties to elites, a one standard
deviation increase in the relative prominence of stakeholders is associated with a 5.5% increase in
CSP (p=0.000), while in countries two standard deviations above the mean in business ties to elites,
stakeholder centrality is not significantly associated with CSP (p=0.419). In support of hypothesis
3, we find that heterogeneity of stakeholders is positively associated with CSP (p=0.011). All else
equal, a firm that is headquartered in a country in the 25th percentile of stakeholder heterogeneity,
relative to the 75th percentile, will have almost 3.8% higher CSP. This equates to between 38%
and 5% of a standard deviation difference in CSP, depending on the year and industry.
Turning to the direct influence wielded by stakeholders via extra-institutional tactics on
CSP, we find that proselytizing stakeholder pressure is positively and significantly associated with
CSP (p=0.002). All else equal, a firm that is headquartered in a country in the 25th percentile of
proselytizing stakeholder pressure, relative to the 75th percentile, will have almost 5.7% higher
CSP. This equates to between 62% and 8% of a standard deviation difference in CSP, depending
on the year and industry in which the firm operates. We also find support for hypothesis 5, that the
effect of proselytizing stakeholder pressure is higher in countries where proselytizing stakeholders
are densely connected (p=0.008). The positive impact of proselytizing stakeholder pressure on CSP
more than triples between those countries two standard deviations below and above the mean of
proselytizing stakeholder density. In countries where proselytizing stakeholder density is two
standard deviations above the mean, a one standard deviation increase in proselytizing stakeholder
pressure is associated with an increase of 14.4% in CSP (p=0.000).
In Model 3, we replicate our results controlling for time-invariant, firm-level unobserved
heterogeneity with the inclusion of firm fixed effects, in addition to year fixed effects, with robust
standard errors. A firm fixed effects model provides the most stringent test of our propositions by
reducing the impact of difficult to observe firm and country level variables influencing CSP.
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Evidence suggests firms vary in their stakeholder responsiveness (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996)
for various reasons that are not easily measurable, such as dynamic capabilities (Holburn and
Zelner, 2010; Julian et al., 2008) or the issues’ alignment with organizational and individual values
(Bansal, 2003) and perceptions (Crilly, Zollo, and Hansen, 2012). As none of the firms in our
sample change their headquarters country, a firm fixed effects estimation also controls for timeinvariant country characteristics, such as differences in managerial responsiveness across countries
due to sticky cultural institutions (Williams and Aguilera, 2008). Our hypothesized results are
robust to firm fixed effects estimation, suggesting stakeholder field characteristics have explanatory
power with respect to CSP across countries, as well as within countries over time. While several
country and firm level controls become insignificant, stakeholder prominence (p=0.000),
heterogeneity (p=0.020) and proselytizing stakeholder pressure (p=0.005) remain positively and
significantly associated with CSP, as does the attenuating effect of business ties to elites (p=0.004)
and increased effect of pressure where proselytizing stakeholders are more densely connected
(p=0.003).
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Table 14: Panel Regression Models of Corporate Social Performance
Model 1
Stakeholder prominence
H1
Stakeholder prominence
H2
x Business ties to elites
Stakeholder heterogeneity
H3
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure H4
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure H5
x Proselytizing stakeholder density
Country control variables
Business ties to elites
Proselytizing stakeholder density
Competition laws
Anti-self-dealing index
Left/center ideology
Absence of corruption
Power distance (Hofstede)
Individualism (Hofstede)
Skilled labor availability
Union density
Country debt over assets
Market capitalization
SRI index
Balance of trade
Trade
Basic infrastructure
Press freedom
Issue prevalence in media
Firm-level controls
ROA
Firm size
Market to book ratio
R&D expenses
Number of segments
ADR company
Foreign assets (%)
Stock volatility
Closely Held Shares (%)
Leverage
Constant
Observations

4.082
7.375
0.546
-7.588
-13.681
2.244
0.172
0.318
-1.533
14.531
0.163
-3.239
2.317
-9.729
-0.038
-0.038
-0.135
21.452

*

*
***
**
**
***
***
**
***
***
***
*
*
*

(1.678)
(4.133)
(0.343)
(3.059)
(1.901)
(0.841)
(0.062)
(0.038)
(0.314)
(4.613)
(0.046)
(0.441)
(0.647)
(6.556)
(0.016)
(0.032)
(0.056)
(10.694)

0.911 *** (0.176)
7.585 *** (0.355)
0.167 *** (0.036)
0.106
(0.074)
1.394 *** (0.422)
11.728 *** (1.178)
0.008
(0.007)
-0.185 *** (0.037)
-0.017
(0.010)
0.015
(0.017)
-97.224
(10.855)
20,047

Model 2
3.254 *** (0.673)
-4.809 ** (1.799)

Model 3
3.005 *** (0.696)
-5.269 ** (1.834)

0.155 * (0.061)
3.098 ** (1.010)
84.763 ** (31.034)

0.146 * (0.063)
2.887 ** (1.019)
96.272 ** (32.246)

10.630
1.843
0.373
-8.810
-12.807
0.420
0.181
0.258
-1.823
14.444
0.187
-3.463
2.410
-14.194
-0.048
-0.018
-0.138
28.050

*** (3.016)
(4.459)
(0.362)
** (3.081)
*** (1.918)
(0.852)
** (0.062)
*** (0.039)
*** (0.312)
** (4.586)
*** (0.048)
*** (0.448)
*** (0.650)
* (6.480)
** (0.017)
(0.034)
* (0.056)
** (10.726)

0.916 *** (0.176)
7.639 *** (0.355)
0.167 *** (0.036)
0.102
(0.073)
1.352 ** (0.420)
11.563 *** (1.177)
0.008
(0.007)
-0.179 *** (0.037)
-0.016
(0.010)
0.015
(0.017)
-98.996
(10.887)
20,047

8.460 ** (3.037)
0.803
(4.168)
0.291
(0.388)

1.296

(1.270)

-1.464 *** (0.348)
0.251 ***
0.654
3.074 ***
-13.609
-0.051
-0.043
0.065
24.366 *
0.598 ***
3.189 ***
0.119 **
0.010
0.854

(0.050)
(0.934)
(0.739)
(8.690)
(0.037)
(0.039)
(0.133)
(11.276)
(0.177)
(0.619)
(0.041)
(0.090)
(0.489)

0.003
(0.007)
-0.139 ** (0.049)
-0.009
(0.011)
-0.017
(0.020)
-20.302
(15.872)
20,047

R-squared
0.436
0.439
0.193a
Note. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Models 1 and 2
include year and industry fixed effects; Model 3 includes year and firm fixed effects.* p<0.05; ** p<0.01;
*** p<0.001. a denotes within firm R-squared.
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Table 15: Individual Hypotheses Panel Regression Models of Corporate Social Performance
Stakeholder prominence
Stakeholder prominence
x Business ties to elites
Stakeholder heterogeneity

Model 4
H1 1.816***
(0.419)
H2

Model 5
3.238***
(0.652)
-5.676**
(1.785)

H3

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

2.080*
(0.996)

1.849
(0.964)
78.66**
(29.934)

3.712*
(1.657)
8.089
(4.169)
0.769*
(0.370)
-7.353*
(3.065)
-13.35***
(1.892)
1.776*
(0.807)
0.188**
(0.062)
0.304***
(0.038)
-1.542***
(0.313)
14.99**
(4.595)
0.127***
(0.038)
-3.296***
(0.442)
2.342***
(0.645)
-10.44
(6.546)
-0.0425**
(0.016)
-0.0244
(0.032)
-0.142*
(0.056)
23.79*
(10.721)

3.888*
(1.657)
2.948
(4.443)
0.703
(0.371)
-7.709*
(3.063)
-13.62***
(1.899)
1.414
(0.805)
0.196**
(0.062)
0.303***
(0.038)
-1.549***
(0.314)
15.12***
(4.592)
0.173***
(0.047)
-3.467***
(0.448)
2.540***
(0.645)
-12.10
(6.548)
-0.0461**
(0.016)
-0.0344
(0.033)
-0.133*
(0.056)
24.59*
(10.746)

0.205***
(0.058)

Proselytizing stakeholder pressure

H4

Proselytizing stakeholder pressure
x Proselytizing stakeholder density
Country control variables
Business ties to elites

H5

Proselytizing stakeholder density
Competition laws
Anti-self-dealing index
Left/center ideology
Absence of corruption
Power distance
Individualism
Skilled labor availability
Union density
Country debt over assets
Market capitalization
SRI index
Balance of trade
Trade
Basic infrastructure
Press freedom
Issue prevalence in media

4.108*
(1.657)
7.857
(4.172)
0.331
(0.340)
-8.915**
(3.077)
-13.68***
(1.896)
2.080*
(0.850)
0.140*
(0.062)
0.302***
(0.038)
-1.660***
(0.313)
13.80**
(4.617)
0.187***
(0.046)
-3.030***
(0.441)
2.257***
(0.646)
-11.83
(6.545)
-0.0365*
(0.016)
-0.0390
(0.032)
-0.119*
(0.056)
21.32*
(10.686)

Table continued on next page
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12.44***
(3.030)
8.126
(4.178)
0.101
(0.337)
-7.843*
(3.089)
-12.67***
(1.921)
1.878*
(0.858)
0.154*
(0.062)
0.288***
(0.038)
-1.708***
(0.313)
13.42**
(4.619)
0.186***
(0.046)
-3.124***
(0.444)
2.230***
(0.646)
-11.06
(6.503)
-0.0415*
(0.017)
-0.0442
(0.032)
-0.146**
(0.056)
21.26*
(10.673)

3.903*
(1.660)
4.847
(4.200)
0.515
(0.343)
-8.416**
(3.061)
-13.97***
(1.901)
1.815*
(0.866)
0.168**
(0.062)
0.308***
(0.038)
-1.645***
(0.313)
14.77**
(4.617)
0.170***
(0.046)
-3.377***
(0.441)
2.222***
(0.647)
-9.495
(6.541)
-0.0329*
(0.016)
-0.0206
(0.032)
-0.132*
(0.056)
24.33*
(10.677)

Table 15 (Continued): Individual Hypotheses Panel Regression Models of
Corporate Social Performance
Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

0.903***
(0.176)
7.594***
(0.355)
0.165***
(0.036)
0.109
(0.074)
1.371**
(0.421)
11.60***
(1.179)
0.00727
(0.007)
-0.185***
(0.037)
-0.0177
(0.010)
0.0165
(0.017)
-96.53***
(10.832)

0.906***
(0.176)
7.591***
(0.355)
0.166***
(0.036)
0.107
(0.074)
1.366**
(0.421)
11.67***
(1.179)
0.00736
(0.007)
-0.183***
(0.037)
-0.0179
(0.010)
0.0170
(0.017)
-96.18***
(10.830)

0.899***
(0.176)
7.585***
(0.354)
0.167***
(0.036)
0.108
(0.074)
1.381**
(0.421)
11.69***
(1.178)
0.00768
(0.007)
-0.187***
(0.037)
-0.0173
(0.010)
0.0160
(0.017)
-96.75***
(10.832)

0.923***
(0.177)
7.612***
(0.355)
0.168***
(0.036)
0.103
(0.074)
1.390***
(0.421)
11.71***
(1.178)
0.00828
(0.007)
-0.182***
(0.037)
-0.0175
(0.010)
0.0143
(0.017)
-99.97***
(10.863)

0.922***
(0.177)
7.615***
(0.354)
0.168***
(0.036)
0.102
(0.074)
1.394***
(0.421)
11.69***
(1.178)
0.00845
(0.007)
-0.182***
(0.037)
-0.0161
(0.010)
0.0133
(0.017)
-98.84***
(10.912)

Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
N

YES
YES
20047

YES
YES
20047

YES
YES
20047

YES
YES
20047

YES
YES
20047

R-squared

0.437

0.437

0.437

0.437

0.437

Firm control variables
ROA
Firm size
Market to book ratio
R&D expenses
Number of segments
ADR company
Foreign assets (%)
Stock volatility
Closely held shares (%)
Leverage
Constant

Note. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. All
models include year and industry fixed effects. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.

Robustness Checks
We perform additional analysis to check the robustness of our results to alternate specifications,
sub-samples, and disaggregated environmental and social performance scores. The full results of
these analyses are presented in Table 16. First, we replicate our results controlling for timeinvariant, country-level unobserved heterogeneity with the inclusion of country dummies, in
addition to year and industry fixed effects, with robust standard errors (Model 9). Our results remain
substantively unchanged. We also replicate our full model excluding the United States (Model 10),
to address any potential bias in our results due to the over-representation of the United States, which
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accounts for 33% of our observations. Again, our results remain substantively unchanged except
for the influence dense ties between proselytizing stakeholders no longer exerts an upward effect
on the influence of proselytizer pressure. We also explore the robustness of our results for the
subsample of firms that are multinational. While we control for foreign assets in our main models,
our models identify stakeholder field effects off the country in which a firm is headquartered. For
firms operating in multiple countries and subject to the influence of multiple national-level
stakeholder fields and institutions, the influence of the headquarters country may be attenuated.
Replicating our model only on the subsample of firms whose foreign assets constitute at least 5
percent of total assets, we find our hypothesized effects are consistent for multinational firms
(Model 11).
Further, past research suggests that the responsiveness of firms to extra-institutional
mobilization may vary in the size of the firm (Bartley and Child, 2012; King, 2011) or its financial
performance (King, 2008). We explore this in Model 12 (Table 16) by interacting proselytizing
stakeholder pressure with firm size and the change in net sales from two years prior (2-period
decline in net sales). In line with King’s (2008) finding that performance declines make firms more
responsive to extra-institutional mobilization, we find that the effect of mobilization by
proselytizing stakeholders against the business field is greater for firms that have experienced sales
declines (p=0.000). Conversely, for larger firms the effect is attenuated (p=0.011). Although our
theoretical inquiry focuses on stakeholder field characteristics, the preceding suggest opportunities
for future research on how firm-level characteristics may moderate the effects of stakeholder fields.
Finally, we disaggregate our dependent variable into its respective component
environmental and social scores from ASSET4, and estimate the models constructing our
stakeholder variables on only environmental or social stakeholders (Table 16, Models 13 and 14).
The prominence and heterogeneity of environmental and social stakeholders are positively and
significantly associated with the disaggregated social and environmental scores, and the
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magnitudes of the stakeholder field effects are higher for the social performance score. The
attenuating effect of business ties to elites on stakeholder prominence is only marginally significant
(p=0.083) for environmental performance. Turning to the direct influence wielded by stakeholders,
proselytizing stakeholder pressure is positively associated with environmental performance
(p=0.000), but is not significantly associated with social performance of a firm (p=0.129). In
supplementary analysis (not shown) we find that a 2-year lag of proselytizing social stakeholder
pressure in a country is positively and significantly (p=0.003) with a firm’s social performance
score. It is plausible that the social performance score is temporally less responsive than the
environmental score to extra-institutional mobilization as it includes several indicators related to
the firm’s supply chain where it may take longer for the firm to implement changes (while the
environmental score does not). Particularly, indicators measuring performance on issues where
extra-institutional mobilization is common, such as child labor and human rights, all include an
assessment of supplier performance.
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Table 16: Robustness of Panel Linear Regression Models of Corporate Social Performance
Model 9
Stakeholder prominence
Stakeholder prominence
x Business ties to elites
Stakeholder heterogeneity
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure
x Proselytizing stakeholder density
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure
x Firm size
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure
x 2-period decline in net sales
Country control variables
Business ties to elites
Proselytizing stakeholder density
Competition laws
Anti-self-dealing index
Left/center ideology
Absence of corruption
Power distance
Individualism
Skilled labor availability
Union density
Country debt over assets
Market capitalization
SRI index
Balance of trade
Trade
Basic infrastructure

Model 14
Social Score
3.806***
(0.687)
-4.814*
(1.894)
0.405***

Model 15

H1 2.960***
(0.700)
H2 -5.614**
(1.855)
H3 0.130*

Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Enviro Score
2.839*** 3.873*** 3.197*** 1.045*
(0.697)
(0.930)
(0.674)
(0.489)
-3.871*
-4.946*
-4.680** -2.055
(1.843)
(2.350)
(1.803)
(1.186)
0.176**
0.221*
0.152*
0.223*

(0.063)
H4 2.783**
(1.019)
H5 106.8***
(32.299)

(0.066)
2.763*
(1.261)
-24.02
(30.857)

(0.089)
5.827***
(1.620)
162.3***
(46.878)

(0.061)
29.53**
(10.429)
98.95**
(31.094)
-1.152*
(0.451)
0.688***
(0.188)

(0.104)
8.418***
(2.226)
76.90
(87.184)

(0.098)
1.702
(1.120)
64.88
(38.875)

(0.061)
3.093**
(0.981)
84.25***
(24.725)

5.441
(3.125)
8.017
(8.092)
0.644
(0.378)
-9.357**
(3.206)
-5.491*
(2.183)
0.820
(0.985)
0.182**
(0.062)
0.281***
(0.040)
-1.614***
(0.338)
9.072
(4.764)
0.558
(0.354)
-1.443*
(0.561)
2.851***
(0.670)
-16.27*
(7.102)
-0.0308
(0.019)
-0.0208
(0.036)

12.25**
(3.966)
-4.786
(3.828)
0.492
(0.532)
-20.42***
(3.916)
-16.48***
(2.645)
-2.333
(1.195)
0.218**
(0.077)
0.243***
(0.054)
-1.570***
(0.432)
21.39***
(5.502)
0.290***
(0.074)
-2.076***
(0.618)
2.323**
(0.870)
-23.60**
(8.640)
-0.0740***
(0.021)
0.00809
(0.047)

10.49***
(3.021)
1.219
(4.507)
0.440
(0.362)
-8.670**
(3.085)
-12.91***
(1.919)
0.569
(0.855)
0.180**
(0.062)
0.256***
(0.039)
-1.892***
(0.313)
14.76**
(4.589)
0.203***
(0.048)
-3.472***
(0.449)
2.348***
(0.650)
-13.24*
(6.500)
-0.0467**
(0.017)
-0.0220
(0.034)

4.819*
(1.898)
0.439
(0.681)
-0.397
(0.412)
-6.741*
(3.212)
-16.35***
(2.059)
1.183
(0.900)
0.133*
(0.064)
0.231***
(0.039)
-1.424***
(0.355)
16.04***
(4.831)
-0.0354
(0.047)
-2.867***
(0.481)
1.554*
(0.769)
-0.898
(7.449)
-0.0465**
(0.017)
-0.0391
(0.036)

8.001**
(2.911)
-2.530
(4.863)
1.046**
(0.396)
-9.031**
(3.328)
-10.29***
(2.088)
0.151
(0.974)
0.245***
(0.067)
0.314***
(0.042)
-2.132***
(0.360)
12.12*
(4.972)
0.268***
(0.061)
-4.489***
(0.507)
3.645***
(0.745)
-25.19***
(7.052)
-0.0490**
(0.018)
-0.0110
(0.037)

10.65***
(3.128)
1.858
(4.432)
0.372
(0.361)
-8.806**
(3.081)
-12.81***
(1.943)
0.417
(0.863)
0.181**
(0.062)
0.258***
(0.039)
-1.822***
(0.313)
14.44**
(4.587)
0.186***
(0.044)
-3.467***
(0.471)
2.413***
(0.650)
-14.23*
(6.735)
-0.0479**
(0.017)
-0.0183
(0.034)

9.296**
(3.068)
-0.0474
(4.402)
0.484
(0.386)
266.7***
(48.837)
217.2***
(51.544)
0.893
(1.265)
3.701***
(0.792)
-0.359
(0.187)
-1.350***
(0.349)
381.7***
(90.206)
0.266***
(0.050)
-0.605
(0.928)
2.483***
(0.723)
-7.016
(8.474)
-0.0282
(0.036)
-0.0618
(0.039)

Table continued on next page
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3.255***
(0.677)
-4.815**
(1.826)
0.155*

Table 16 (Continued): Robustness of Panel Linear Regression Models of
Corporate Social Performance
Model 9

Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Model 14
Model 15
Enviro Score Social Score

0.0325
(0.132)
25.37*
(11.267)

-0.170**
(0.062)
25.95*
(10.787)

0.0656
(0.094)
16.40
(16.360)

-0.142*
(0.056)
28.44**
(10.737)

-0.231***
(0.061)
28.63
(17.537)

-0.0598
(0.062)
44.49
(26.833)

-0.138*
(0.057)
28.04**
(10.719)
0.0019
(0.000)

0.847***
(0.176)
7.527***
(0.355)
0.200***
(0.038)
0.105
(0.073)
1.335**
(0.420)
9.618***
(1.133)
0.00423
(0.007)
-0.186***
(0.037)
-0.0193*
(0.010)
0.0000208
(0.017)

0.735***
(0.204)
7.633***
(0.445)
0.119**
(0.038)
0.0634
(0.079)
1.098*
(0.490)
11.33***
(1.229)
0.00399
(0.007)
-0.151***
(0.045)
-0.00205
(0.011)
-0.00560
(0.022)

0.765**
(0.267)
7.589***
(0.505)
0.194***
(0.049)
0.00497
(0.088)
1.030
(0.642)
11.89***
(1.335)
-0.00806
(0.008)
-0.206***
(0.052)
-0.0314*
(0.014)
0.0303
(0.025)

0.929***
(0.179)
7.865***
(0.379)
0.163***
(0.036)
0.0961
(0.073)
1.352**
(0.420)
11.46***
(1.180)
0.00800
(0.007)
-0.175***
(0.036)
-0.0149
(0.010)
0.0139
(0.017)
-0.152
(0.087)

0.780***
(0.213)
8.373***
(0.369)
0.160***
(0.041)
0.118
(0.083)
1.794***
(0.477)
9.681***
(1.222)
0.0113
(0.008)
-0.147***
(0.042)
-0.0135
(0.011)
0.0400*
(0.020)

1.140***
(0.194)
7.604***
(0.370)
0.176***
(0.039)
0.130
(0.082)
1.079*
(0.449)
12.43***
(1.235)
0.00731
(0.007)
-0.225***
(0.040)
-0.0229*
(0.011)
-0.00381
(0.018)

0.916***
(0.176)
7.641***
(0.355)
0.167***
(0.036)
0.102
(0.073)
1.353**
(0.420)
11.56***
(1.177)
0.00815
(0.007)
-0.179***
(0.037)
-0.0163
(0.010)
0.0147
(0.017)

Constant

-610.8*** -113.1*** -112.1*** -103.5*** -106.1***
(100.674) (12.940)
(14.855)
(11.161)
(11.509)

-101.3***
(11.586)

-99.02***
(10.886)

Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Country fixed effects
N

YES
YES
YES
20047

YES
YES
NO
13333

YES
YES
NO
8938

YES
YES
NO
20047

YES
YES
NO
20047

YES
YES
NO
20047

YES
YES
NO
20047

R-squared

0.495

0.432

0.460

0.437

0.445

0.409

0.439

Country control variables
Press freedom
Issue prevalence in media
GDELT media-reported events
Firm control variables
ROA
Firm size
Market to book ratio
R&D expenses
Number of segments
ADR company
Foreign assets (%)
Stock volatility
Closely held shares (%)
Leverage
2-period decline in net sales

Note. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Model 9 includes
country fixed effects. Model 10 excludes firms headquartered in the United States. Model 11 includes only
firms with greater than 5% of total assets in foreign countries (i.e., multinational firms). In Model 12, we
interact proselytizing stakeholder pressure with firm size and the change in net sales from two years prior.
The dependent variable in Model 13 is the firm’s environmental score, and all stakeholder field covariates
are constructed using environmental stakeholders. The dependent variable in Model 14 is the firm’s social
score, and all stakeholder field covariates are constructed using social stakeholders. Model 15 includes the
sum of all GDELT reported events in a given country-year as a control. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.
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DISCUSSION
Our study was motivated by the desire to explicitly incorporate stakeholders and stakeholder theory
in comparative analysis of corporate social performance (CSP), which to date has largely advanced
institutional explanations. Our conceptualization of stakeholder influence moves beyond dyadic
resource dependence to stakeholder influence operating through cross-field influence mechanisms,
drawing and building upon calls for a field theory perspective that accounts for the
interconnectedness of actors and fields in driving organizational behavior (Davis and Marquis,
2005; McAdam and Scott, 2005; Rowley, 1997). We develop field-level constructs that embody
two mechanisms by which stakeholders influence corporate behavior: institutional vs. extrainstitutional change. In the former case, stakeholders influence corporate behavior by increasing
the likelihood of government legislation or regulation, the diffusion of values or norms regarding
appropriate behavior for corporations or the cultural-cognitive belief that certain behaviors or
actions by corporations are necessary. In the latter case, managers respond to the threat of protests
or boycotts that threaten to directly impact business revenues or costs. We hypothesize that
managers perceive the risk of institutional change to increase in stakeholder field prominence and
heterogeneity while the adoption of direct material pressure by proselytizing stakeholders increases
perceptions of a risk of extra-institutional change. The relative ties the business field enjoys with
elites moderates the threat of institutional change whereas proselytizer density aggravates the risk
of extra-institutional change.
Using a panel dataset of firms headquartered in 42 countries between 2004 and 2013, we
find support for each of these arguments. The impact of stakeholder prominence within a country
on CSP reinforces the importance of indirect influence strategies for stakeholders (Frooman and
Murrell, 2005), whereby stakeholders who target change via indirect avenues (i.e., public politics)
can dramatically affect corporate practice adoption (Hiatt et al., 2015). In line with Oliver’s (1991)
prediction that firms acquiesce to consistent demands and pressures exerted by multiple means, we
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also find that in countries where stakeholder fields are composed of heterogeneous actors, each
possessing different means of influence and representing broad issue support, firms’ CSP is higher.
The positive association between CSP and proselytizing stakeholder pressure against the business
field in a country complements past findings that non-targeted firms are often responsive to
stakeholder extra-institutional influence tactics (Briscoe and Safford, 2008; Julian et al., 2008). The
strength of institutional and extra-institutional pathways are themselves influenced by field
characteristics within a country which alter managerial perceptions of the efficacy of business field
resistance to institutional pressure and stakeholder field mobilization. Our empirical results are
robust to identification on within country differences in business and stakeholder field
characteristics over time. We therefore show that, as the prominence and heterogeneity of
stakeholder fields or proselytizing stakeholder pressure increase, firms make substantive
improvements in CSP conditional upon the time varying levels of relative business ties to elites and
proselytizer density. Similar to a country’s political or legal institutional environment, its landscape
of stakeholder fields is a source of risks and opportunities for firms that conditions the salience of
stakeholders and firm responsiveness.
Our study has implications for several areas important to theory and research on
institutional change and stakeholders, beyond comparative CSP research. First, our use of
stakeholder fields and field-level change from field theory (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011, 2012;
Zietsma et al., 2017) offers new ways of seeing corporate practices as emanating from field-level
change influenced by stakeholder fields (in addition to country institutions). We believe this
answers calls for a more blended institutional perspective (Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008), where
the social embeddedness of organizations is intertwined with ideas of social agents, social
construction, and power and politics. Second, a field theory perspective challenges the notion that
stakeholder power and influence is primarily derived from individual attributes or operates in an
atomistic firm-stakeholder dyad. Instead, the dynamic structural perspective provided by field
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theory highlights that stakeholder salience and influence is related to the composition and ties
within a stakeholder field as social actors coalesce around issues, as well as between that field and
the broader socio-political network and business field.
Both stakeholder and social movement theory have long included calls for a more holistic
approach to the socio-political environment in which firms compete (Diani and McAdam, 2003;
Rowley, 1997). Despite these calls, empirical progress has been limited with a few exceptions
which rely on painstakingly constructed ego networks of firms and stakeholders (Dorobantu et al.,
2017a), rather than more comprehensive systems in which these partial networks are embedded.
We draw upon an exciting new data source to overcome the challenge of constructing nationallevel socio-political networks that are directed, valued, and include every organization or individual
actor involved in over 250 million media-reported events. Although used extensively in political
science, machine-coded event databases are new to management (see Zelner, Henisz, and Holburn,
2009), and offer new empirical avenues for exploring how the dynamic interconnectedness of an
organization’s environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) impacts organizational practices and
outcomes.
Limitations and Future Research
Our work stops short of considering the position of the focal firm within the socio-political
network and its direct ties to the stakeholder field, which Rowley’s (1997) arguments suggest is
important. Future work could explore whether specific firms in our analysis are proactively
connected to, or attacked by, specific members of stakeholder fields and how the prominence of
individual stakeholders, the heterogeneity of peers to which they are directly tied and the ties to
elites of individual firms influence a given firm’s responsiveness to pressures from different
stakeholders who are more or less densely tied to their peers (Rowley, 1997). Such analysis would
allow for greater attention to the moderating or mediating role of firm- or stakeholder-specific
characteristics within a country. Further, following other studies of changes in corporate practices
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within a country, we conceptualize firms as embedded in business fields at the country level,
controlling for the industry in which a firm operates. Future research could explore how stakeholder
field influence may vary with the structure and composition of industry fields and position of the
firm within the industry field (King and Walker, 2014). Our conception of stakeholder fields is also
relatively coarse at the level of environmental and social issues broadly, whereas issues may
potentially be sub-divided into discrete issue fields such as drinking water, waste disposal,
hazardous waste, air pollution, etc. Future work could explore variation in how well stakeholder
fields are embedded within the state field which itself could be broken down into different fields
and levels of power (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). At present, our use of GDELT precludes such
additional granularity at the firm-, stakeholder- and state-level across 42 countries. Subsequent
research should explore narrower and deeper sampling strategies possibly combining GDELT with
richer qualitative sources in a mixed method design. Such methodology may better illuminate the
underlying causal mechanisms of influence generating the patterns of association we have
identified in our cross-national comparative design.
Finally, our arguments and analysis focus on what are commonly referred to as ‘secondary
stakeholders’ (Clarkson, 1995; Eesley and Lenox, 2006), who typically do not have a formal
contractual bond with the firm (as is the case with employees and shareholders). While the inclusion
of firm fixed effects and a proxy for the importance of CSP to equity markets (e.g. social
responsibility market index dummy) may absorb some of the effects of these primary stakeholders
in our analysis, we cannot observe ties between primary and secondary stakeholders likely to
influence firm responsiveness (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016). Future work could explore how the
degree of connectivity between primary and secondary stakeholders influences primary
stakeholders (e.g. managers) readings of their interconnected environments (Crilly et al., 2012),
and correspondingly, firm responses to stakeholder pressures. Finally, the process by which
managerial perceptions of salience actually form in response to primary and secondary stakeholder
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pressure and the mechanisms by which such perceptions lead to variation in responsiveness are
both omitted from our analysis but important topics for future research.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation provides evidence that the relationships, norms and actor identities that
characterize stakeholder fields play an important role in firms’ strategic management of non-market
stakeholders and the outcomes of those efforts. Whereas prior research has focused on stakeholder
characteristics, organizational characteristics and institutions as explanatory factors in non-market
strategy, the studies presented herein demonstrate the value of a more socially embedded view of
stakeholder influence and firm action. In the first two chapters, I explored the antecedents and
outcomes of cooperative non-market strategy, an understudied phenomenon (Heyes and King,
2018) where firms attempt to allay threats by establishing formal collaborations with stakeholders.
In chapter 1, I show that firms seeking collaborations with social activists are circumscribed in
forming collaborations when the field in which the activist is embedded is relationally segmented
across contentious and collaborative factions. In chapter 2, I show that the efficacy of formal
stakeholder relationships in quelling threats is contingent on the ties that an allied stakeholder has,
and their identity within the stakeholder field. In chapter 3, I provide evidence that stakeholder
fields are equally important to more unilateral efforts by firms to address stakeholder interests
through improvements in corporate social performance. I find that the composition of stakeholder
fields, their connectedness to broader socio-political networks and direct mobilization against
firms, are associated with considerably different corporate social performance (CSP) profiles of
firms across 42 countries.
In addition to establishing that stakeholder fields matter to non-market strategy, the
chapters in this dissertation suggest that the mechanisms underlying their impact are multi-faceted.
Embeddedness in fields can constrain stakeholders from engaging firms in novel ways (chapter 1)
because fields are characterized by a shared understanding of the rules in the field, or “what tactics
are possible, legitimate, and interpretable,” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 11). While building
cooperative relationships with well-connected stakeholders is a valuable non-market strategy, those
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same networks can constrain the stakeholder in cooperating with firms. The relationships and
identities that stakeholders have in their fields are also pathways of influence for those firms
successful in establishing a formal cooperative relationship with a stakeholder to foster more
advantageous stakeholder environments (chapter 2). Finally, who participates in a stakeholder field,
their ties to the broader socio-political network and direct action they take against firms (chapter 3)
matter for non-market strategy because they influence managerial perceptions of the salience of
issues advocated by the field. In sum, stakeholder fields matter to firms’ strategic management of
non-market stakeholders because field norms can constrain stakeholder action, fields are
susceptible to influence through their relational structures and member identities, and fields
influence issue salience.
Moreover, the intersection of the findings across the studies suggests important ways in
which stakeholder fields and cooperative and unilateral non-market strategy may interact. First, the
role that the density of inter-stakeholder ties plays in increasing the salience of mobilization to
managers (chapter 3) complements the role that inter-SMO density plays in enabling collaboration.
While I cannot empirically distinguish whether increases in CSP are a product of firm-stakeholder
collaboration, the overlap in the findings suggest that it could be. Second, proselytizing
stakeholders (chapter 3) are those that have specific proscriptions for how firms can address social
or environmental issues, and conceptually correspond to those SMOs that I have classified as
‘moderate’ in the first two chapters based on their repertoire in respect of firms. Combined, this
suggests that stakeholder issue fields and movements that accommodate moderate members with
solutions to intractable social and environmental problems are most likely to be successful in
expanding the frontiers of corporate social and environmental change practices.
Important interactions are also evident across the first two chapters where both the
antecedents and outcomes of cooperation non-market strategy are investigated. Given the evidence
on indirect co-optation via relational ties (chapter 2), I find in supplementary analysis that firms are
150

more likely to collaborate with moderates that have ties to SMOs that targeted the firm in the
previous year. This results in a considerable number of imbalanced triads between SMOs and firms
(i.e., SMO A is cooperative with SMO B and firm X, while SMO A has conflict with firm X). The
inclusion of imbalanced triads in the collaboration formation regression models (chapter 1) does
not alter the negative correlation of movement segmentation, but ceteris paribus, collaborations are
more likely to materialize in imbalanced triads. While some of this may be driven by the greater
interconnectedness of moderates and radicals in less segmented movements, chapter 2 suggests it
may also be driven by firms’ anticipation of the indirect co-optation effects via relational ties. That
is, firms may be strategically seeking out collaborations with moderates that have greater ties to
radicals. From the perspective of more radical SMOs, who may be aware of the co-optive effects
of collaborations, this also raises the question of whether they are more likely to criticize moderate
peers they are connected to for fear of being co-opted, or seen as such. Finally, taken together the
first two chapters highlight how the composition and relational configuration of stakeholder fields
changes over time with incursions by firms through collaboration. As the number of collaborations
increases, and therefore co-optation of the SMOs in various movements, there is simultaneous
growth in the proportion of the movement that is moderate over time. As the number of moderates
grows, the segmentation of the movements also appear on average to decreases over time, which,
in turn, makes the social conditions for further collaborations more favorable. The interplay
between strategic collaborations co-opting movement fields and field structures enabling
subsequent collaboration may explain why firm-SMO collaborations have grown exponentially
over the past 25 years.
Empirical Note
This dissertation draws on two different data sets that contain interactions between firms
and stakeholders, as well as inter-stakeholder relationships. The first is data that is hand-coded from
news media, press releases, congressional hearings, legal alerts and firm and SMO financial filings.
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The second, GDELT, relies instead on natural language processing (NLP) of millions of articles
from hundreds of media sources around the world. Each data set has a different data collection
methodology applied to publicly available information, and as a result offers different benefits and
shortcomings to the researcher. While I have not conducted an analysis comparing the two data
sets, I offer some observations on the benefits and shortcomings of each based on my experience
and some cautions for future research.
Comparatively, the clear benefit of using NLP-based data sets like GDELT is the
magnitude of the data that can be processed and obtained, versus hand-coded data. In this
dissertation, GDELT allowed me to expand the scope of the stakeholder fields to include
governments, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, SMOs and
communities that coalesce around environmental and social issues, and the networks of media
reported verbal and material, cooperative and conflictual interactions between them and businesses
and other socio-political actors in 42 different countries over a decade. Relying on a secondary
source of NLP-based interactional data, however, has two major shortcomings that cannot be
overcome unless the researcher has access to open code. First, the researcher is circumscribed in
the dictionaries on which the data set relies. Because GDELT has its origins in political science,
and conflict studies particularly, the dictionaries it employs for coding firms are limited. As such,
strategy researchers interested in firm-level data are challenged in finding it in GDELT as just over
100 of the most prominent firms in the world are coded by name with remaining firms being coded
with generic terms such as “business” or “auto manufacturer.” Second, the researcher is
circumscribed in the data sources on which the data set relies, in the case of GDELT, that is mediabased data. Leaving aside issues of media-bias (Earl et al., 2004), the researcher must be mindful
of what media reports and captures. I employed GDELT’s media-based data in a study that argues
that stakeholder salience is the mechanism by which CSP is affected by stakeholder field
composition and ties. Given that stakeholder salience is defined as socially constructed perceptions
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of managers, the media-based measures I employed conformed with the construct’s definition. The
threshold for justifying the use of media-based data will be higher for research that extends its use
to non-perceptual constructs. Both these cautions may be overcome or mitigated where the
researcher can construct their own actor dictionaries and corpuses of text if the NLP code is open
source.
Conversely, the benefits and limitations of the hand-collected data are the exact obverse.
The researcher is able to specify company or stakeholder samples ex ante, as well as the corpus of
publicly available sources to be coded. While the first is obvious, the latter is particularly important
in the context of inter-organizational interactions or ties. Specifically, I found that collaborations
between SMOs and firms are considerably underreported in news media, but instead figure
prominently in press releases. This echoes past work on media being biased towards negative news.
As such, future research interested in cooperative non-market strategy will have to expand the scope
of publicly available data beyond that contained in media alone to include press releases and
company financial filings. This is in line with the approach taken to data collection in alliances
research (Schilling, 2009). It is similarly important to consider what type of ties are of interest in
inter-stakeholder relationships. Co-organization of, or participation in, extra-institutional tactics
like protests are likely well covered by media. However, I found that a considerable number of
inter-SMO collaborations were actually reported in Congressional Proceedings and legal alerts, and
in some cases were not reported on by media. Additionally, SMOs also issue press releases which
detail campaigns in which they are participating with others and those press releases are not always
subsequently reported in the media. This would suggest that past research that has relied on mediareported co-location at a protest event to create inter-activist ties, may be underestimating the ties
of those SMOs whose tactics are not exclusively focused on extra-institutional mobilization but
instead rely also on institutional channels like courts to mobilize. Finally, some inter-stakeholder
ties, like board interlocks, are never reported in the media, press releases or any other sources other
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than financial statements and therefore necessarily require hand-collecting. The ability to specify
the sample of relevant actors and the publicly available data sources and considerable increase in
the granularity of data that is offered by hand-coding is offset by the resources, both financial and
time, involved in such an effort. As such, the sample of organizations and geographies are
necessarily circumscribed by the sheer effort it takes to collect this data – I employed 14 research
assistants that assisted in the collection of the inter-stakeholder and stakeholder-firm interactions
data over the course of two years.
Future Research
In developing a socially embedded perspective on non-market strategy this dissertation
speaks to, and complements, research at the intersection of social movements and markets (chapter
1), social movements and organizational theory (chapter 2), and comparative analysis of corporate
social performance and stakeholder theory (chapter 3). Simultaneously, the findings and limitations
of this dissertation, reveal several questions left unanswered that offer opportunities for future
research. First, this dissertation provides evidence that cooperative stakeholder strategy (e.g., firmactivist collaborations) has indirect co-optive effects on stakeholders outside the focal dyad,
however, the scope of these effects were investigated within a single stakeholder field (i.e., one
social movement). Insofar as stakeholders and firms are simultaneously embedded in multiple
fields, the scope and pathways of possible indirect effects on other fields merit exploration in future
research. Secondly, in the same way that stakeholders and firms are simultaneously embedded in
multiple fields, so are the individuals that populate these organizations. As such, inquiries into how
individual level characteristics may interact with organizational level determinants of non-market
strategy offer opportunities to build a more integrative multilevel perspective on non-market
strategy. Finally, evidence that firms’ cooperative non-market strategy can alter stakeholder fields
suggests several opportunities for exploring how firms’ actions shape the composition, relations
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and norms in stakeholder fields. The remainder of my discussion focuses on these three broad
research opportunities.
Indirect effects across market and non-market fields
Recent evidence that contentious interactions between activists and firms have spillover
effects onto firms’ relationships with politicians (McDonnell and Werner, 2016) suggests a
complementary inquiry into the indirect effects of cooperative firm-activist interactions. Can firms
leverage their collaborations with activists that are well-regarded by, or well-connected to,
politicians, for influence in policy-making? The central role that activist identities plays in my
context (chapter 2) also suggests that spillover effects may depend on the identities of politicians.
While in my context I focus on field members’ tactical repertoires and ideologies about whether
corporations can be part of the social change that activists seek, such ideological differences also
manifest amongst policy markers or regulators. For example, regulators may have different beliefs
about the capacity of firms to self-regulate versus the need for coercive regulation, which may
moderate the degree to which collaborations with activists influence their calculus in respect of
firms.
Further, an extension of the indirect effects of firm-activist interactions into market settings
is also warranted given evidence that firms with cooperative stakeholder relationships benefit from
superior market returns (Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2017; Henisz et al., 2014). Are firms with
cooperative stakeholder relationships seen similarly more valuable to potential acquirers or alliance
partners? While there is some evidence that acquirers consider corporate social and environmental
performance when evaluating targets (Berchicci et al., 2012), a firm’s connections to broader
stakeholder fields via cooperative stakeholder ties has not been previously considered by corporate
strategy nor alliances research. The embeddedness of firms in value chain networks, also offers
possibilities for investigating the indirect effects of firm-activist interactions on firms along a value
chain. Given the selection of firm targets for contention is informed by their position and power in
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global commodity chains (Bartley and Child, 2014), we might expect that the effects of contentious
targeting of downstream consumer-facing firms travel through value chain networks to produce
collaborations upstream of the original point of contention. Such inquiries would extend a
burgeoning body of work investigating the indirect effects of activism against firms on their
industry peers (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016) to a broader set of firms that may be equally susceptible
to indirect effects by way of their inter-firm relationships (i.e., production networks).
Individual-level embeddedness in fields
In the same way that stakeholders and firms are simultaneously embedded in multiple fields
that affect non-market strategy, so are the individuals that populate these organizations. Given the
macro-level focus on firms, social movement organizations, and other non-market stakeholders of
this dissertation, non-market strategy research would be enriched by lowering the level of analysis
to the individuals that shape firms’ non-market strategies and those shaping stakeholder influence
tactics. How does the embeddedness of individuals, such as board members, across multiple fields
(e.g., private versus non-profit sectors) shape firms’ non-market strategy? Evidence abounds in the
domain of public government experience, where the ‘revolving door’ between government and
firms influences regulatory outcomes (Katic and Kim, 2013) and market returns (Faccio, 2006).
We know considerably less about the ‘revolving door’ between firms and other non-market
stakeholders, such as social movement organizations or other non-profit organizations. Are firms
with board interlocks to social movement organizations or former employees from those
organizations less likely to be contentiously targeted because individual level ties act as substitutes
for formal organization-level ties? Future research that considers how individual-level
characteristics and embeddedness interacts with organization- and field-level characteristics is
critically important to advancing multilevel perspectives on non-market strategy.
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Stakeholder field structure and tactics
Finally, this dissertation focuses on the stakeholder field as the explanatory variable,
however, to offer a more strategic view of non-market strategy, it is equally important to understand
how firm characteristics or actions may alter stakeholder fields in their favor (or disfavor).
Therefore, another area that merits further consideration is what determines stakeholder field
structures and the tactics employed by field members in engaging firms. Extending past work that
takes a network perspective on social movements (Diani, 2013; Wang and Soule, 2012), future
research could explore if social activists are more likely to mobilize collectively against more
stalwart firm targets or industries with closed opportunity structures. Insofar as collaborations with
firms garner criticisms of social activists by their peers, it is likely that the structure of movement
and other stakeholder fields change in response to changes in the tactics of their members as some
organizations may distance themselves from stigmatized entities. Finally, comparative research that
explores the drivers of differences in stakeholder fields across countries, and their evolution is
another area ripe for inquiry. While I find considerable variance in the composition and prominence
of stakeholder fields across and within countries, it remains unclear the extent to which these are
attributable to relatively stable institutional characteristics of countries, such as cultural or political
institutions, or more dynamic factors such as transnational advocacy networks.
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APPENDIX
A.1 DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION OF FIRM-ACTIVIST COLLABORATIONS
This appendix provides details on the definition of a firm-activist collaboration used in this
research. It includes a description of the key defining features of a firm-activist collaboration, as
well as firm-activist interactions that do not meet the criteria for classification as a collaboration.
Below I use the term social activist and social movement organization (SMO) interchangeably.
What is a firm-activist collaboration?
Definition: A collaboration between a social activist and firm is defined as ‘organizations working
together by committing resources to achieve mutually relevant outcomes.’ The outcomes can be
focused on improving performance within the firm by changing its practices, or externally focused,
where the outcome has a more ‘public good’ character, such as educational programs or habitat
protection. The key defining features are that the interorganizational relationship is interactive,
involves the commitment of resources by each party, and is purposeful. Importantly, evidence must
be available that all three key features are present in order for the firm-activist relationship to
qualify as a collaboration.
Key features:
1. Interactive (i.e., working together) – Interactive denotes that the collaboration involves an
interactive process where a “change-oriented relationship of some duration exists and that
all participating stakeholders are involved in that relationship.” (Wood and Gray, 1991:
148). This means that interactions mediated by third parties or an umbrella organization
are excluded in that the firm and activist must participate in the relationship. For instance,
a trade association that includes firm A, working on a project with an SMO, does not
constitute a collaboration between firm A and that SMO. Participation suggests the
interaction of the parties, meaning staff or representatives of their respective organizations
interact directly as part of the collaboration. Further, ‘change-oriented’ suggests that the
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parties are working together for an outcome (see Purpose below) that involves a change in
the status-quo. As such, arms-length transactions such as licensing of SMO logos are
excluded.
2. Commitment of resources by both parties (rather than simple exchange) – A collaboration
involves the commitment of resources, understood broadly to include human, financial, or
capital resources. The broad definition of ‘resources’ to include human resources, means
collaborations can include advisory roles (e.g., SMO advising firm on its sustainable
purchasing policy) where no financial commitment of resources is made by the parties.
Further, the commitment needs to be by both parties, meaning, a mere exchange or flow of
resources by one party to another does not qualify (e.g., donations, employees volunteering
at SMO).
3. Purpose – The collaboration has an articulated objective or outcome. Outcome articulation
is typically in a particular problem domain, such as water use at a firm’s facility or climate
change awareness amongst students. This does not necessarily imply that the firm and
activist have identical goals in the collaboration (e.g., firm may want to repair its
reputation, and the activist may be seeking funds for a pet project). However, it does imply
that there is a desired outcome that is relevant to both (i.e., both want to achieve it). Further,
because a collaboration is directed toward an outcome, the participants must intend to act
to pursue that outcome. In other words, the realization of the outcome does not define a
collaboration, but instead the engagement of the actors in a process intended to result in
action on the outcome (Wood and Gray, 1991).
Exclusions
The following arms-length relationships are not considered firm-activist collaborations:
1. Corporate contributions and gifts, examples include:
a.

Grants or monetary donations to SMOs
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b.

In-kind, material, equipment or technology gifts to SMOs

2. Corporate support for employee participation in SMOs activities, examples include:
c.

Corporate outreach

d.

Release time for employee volunteers

e.

Compensation for employee participation

f.

Corporate matching of employee gifts

g.

Corporate awards for employee volunteers

3. Corporate–SMO marketing affiliations, examples include:
h.

Licensing of SMOs name or logo (e.g., certification without interactive component
or Sierra Club’s logo on GreenWorks line of products and donations resulting)

i.

Purchase of SMOs endorsement

j.

Joint fund-raising campaigns

k.

Product price supplements as donations

4. SMO-firm interactions mediated by a larger body or third party
5. SMO-firm market interactions, examples include:
l.

SMO sells the company its products or services (e.g., Carbonfund’s carbon credits)

m.

Firm sells the SMO its products or services (e.g., Greenpeace purchases advertising
space from the New York Times)
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A.2 DESCRIPTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE CATEGORIES
Table 17: Environmental Issue Categories
Code and Topic

Description

701: Drinking Water Safety

Domestic drinking water safety, supply, polution, fluridation, and conservation (e.g.
Clean Water Act, pesticides in groundwater)
Disposal and treatment of wastewater, solid waste and runoff (e.g. federal
management of municipal waste, municipal sewage problems)
Hazardous waste and toxic chemical regulation, treatment, and disposal (e.g.
hazardous waste sites cleanup, hazardous materials transportation, pesticide
regulation)
Air pollution, climate change, and noise pollution (e.g. Clean Air Act, EPA
regulation of chemical plant emissions)
Recycling, reuse, and resource conservation (e.g. beverage container recycling)
Indoor environmental hazards, indoor air contamination (including on airlines), and
indoor hazardous substances such as asbestos (e.g. lead exposure reduction, EPA
regulation of indoor disinfectants)
Species and forest protection, endangered species, control of the domestic illicit
trade in wildlife products, and regulation of labratory or performance animals (e.g.
endangered species protection act, marine mammal protection, old growth forest
protection)
Land and water conservation in coastal and navigable waterways (e.g. pollution
from cruise ships, plastic pollution/invasive species control, oil spills)

703: Waste Disposal
704: Hazardous Waste and Toxic
Chemicals
705: Air pollution, Global Warming,
and Noise Pollution
707: Recycling
708: Indoor Environmental Hazards

709: Species and Forest Protection

710: Pollution and Conservation in
Coastal & Other Navigable
Waterways
711: Land and Water Conservation

Land and water conservation other than coastal and navigable waterways (e.g.
watershed protection, pollution/invasive species in small lakes, rivers, and streams)

806: Alternative and Renewable
Energy

Alternative and renewable energy, biofuels, hydrogen and geothermal power (e.g.
promotion of solar and geothermal power, promotion of alternative fuels for
automobiles, issues of ethanol gasoline, biomass fuel and wind energy programs)

807: Energy Conservation

Energy conservation and energy efficiency, including vehicles, homes, commerical
use and government (e.g. home energy efficiency programs, energy conservation
standards for household appliances, motor vehicle fuel efficiency)

405: Animal and Crop Disease, Pest
Control, and Domesticated Animal
Welfare
408: Fisheries and Fishing

Animal and crop disease, pest control and pesticide regulation, and welfare for
domesticated animals (e.g. welfare of domesticated animals or animals under
human control, use of animals for research, sale or transportation of animals)
Fishing, commercial fishery regulation and conservation (e.g. fisheries
conservation and management; fish hatchery development)
Agricultural research and development (e.g. organic farming research, potential
uses of genetic engineering in agriculture)

498: Agricultural Research and
Development

Note. The above includes issues codes from the Comparative Agendas Project’s sub-category of
‘Environment’, as well as issue topics that fall under other sub-categories but which are applicable to the
broader environmental movement (e.g., alternative & renewable energy; energy conservation; pesticide
regulation; fishery conservation; and GMOs).
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A.3 DESCRIPTION OF GDELT SOURCES, DATA AND MEASURES
This appendix provides additional information on the Global Database on Events,
Language and Tone (GDELT) including its sources and potential biases therein as well as in its
coding thereof, the steps we took to identify environmental and social stakeholders relevant to
corporate social performance (CSP) to facilitate replication and summary statistics of the
underlying data. We begin with a discussion of the media sources from which GDELT collects
event and actor data, and our efforts to minimize potential sources of bias and validate our
measures. In the second section we describe how the actor codes in GDELT were employed to
classify individuals and organizations appearing in GDELT into our social and environmental
stakeholder categories, as well as providing illustrative examples of actors included in each
category. We conclude with descriptive statistics by country.
GDELT Sources & Bias
GDELT data are based on both international and translated local news sources coded using
the Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions system (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013).
Sources include all international news coverage from AfricaNews, Agence France Presse,
Associated Press Online, Associated Press Worldstream, BBC Monitoring, Christian Science
Monitor, Facts on File, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, United Press International, and the
Washington Post; all national and international news coverage from the New York Times, all
international and major US national stories from the Associated Press, and all national and
international news from Google News with the exception of sports, entertainment, and strictly
economic news (ibid.)
Media bias
GDELT’s reliance on not only domestic (via the BBC and the Central Intelligence
Agency’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service) but primarily international news sources
attenuates the likelihood of bias due to varying levels of domestic press freedom because an event
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is likely to be reported to the extent that foreign correspondents representing foreign news wires
are present in the country. Nevertheless, we explore whether media bias influences any of the
measures we derive from GDELT. In order to do so, we rely on a measure compiled annually by
the V-Dem Project (Coppedge et al., 2017) of the extent to which the media in a given country is
“(a) un-biased in their coverage (or lack of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical
of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?” Pairwise correlations
between the V-Dem media bias measure and our independent variables did not exceed 0.100, with
the highest correlation of 0.097 reported for stakeholder heterogeneity. Bivariate regressions
confirmed no significant association between this measure of domestic media bias and freedom and
any of the measures we derive from GDELT to test our hypotheses.
While the heavy reliance on international media coverage may bias coverage away from
small peripheral stakeholders and rural areas, arguably corporations headquartered in a given
country are going to be most heavily influenced by stakeholders in the major urban areas and those
represented in the domestic and international media.
Event count bias
Two additional concerns regarding the use of GDELT are the shifting scope of coverage
of source material over time (i.e., users are unable to choose specific common sources across a
panel of data), and the potential for over-counting of single events (Wang et al., 2016a; Ward et
al., 2013). Variation across time in certain measures can therefore be driven by both change in the
underlying construct and change in sources. Within a given year, over-counting of events may bias
any measures based on discrete counts of events.
In order to address these two concerns, we normalize the stakeholder field and business
field variables we calculate using either the equivalent measures for all actors in a given countryyear, or the count of all reported events as appropriate. For example, in the construction of our
measure of stakeholder prominence in the overall socio-political network, we are assessing the
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relative prominence of environmental and social stakeholders as compared to the prominence of
other actors. Any changes in the scope of coverage over time or over-reporting of single events
should impact both the numerator (i.e., stakeholder prominence) and denominator (i.e., actor
prominence). The same argument holds for our measure of the relative strength of business ties to
the elite which is a ratio of the distribution of centrality in the sub-network of interactions initiated
by business actors as compared to the distribution of centrality in the overall network. Our measure
of material pressure by proselytizers is also normalized by the overall level of conflictual events in
the country’s socio-political network. Our measure of proselytizer density is similarly normalized
by the country’s overall level of density. Only our measure of stakeholder heterogeneity is a raw
count. To further explore whether the scope of media coverage, which is strongly increasing over
time, could be biasing this measure, as well as the other four ratios, we performed a bivariate
regression and found that both stakeholder heterogeneity and proselytizing stakeholder pressure
were positively and significantly associated with the number of GDELT reported events across
countries (p=0.000 in bivariate regression results). However, a within country bivariate regression
analysis (i.e. with country fixed effects) indicated no significant association between the number
of events and either stakeholder heterogeneity (p=0.391) or proselytizing stakeholder pressure
(p=0.147). This suggests that time trends in GDELT reported events are less problematic for our
country and firm fixed effects analyses than for analyses whose primary focus is tracking the
incidence of events of a certain type over time. To address the potential bias in our comparative
analyses (i.e., those without country or firm fixed effects), we test the robustness of our results by
including the sum of all GDELT reported events in a given country-year, and our results remain
substantively the same (Table B2 Model 15).
Ideally, we would have liked to reconstruct each of our measures using a data source such
as King and Lowe (2003) that draws only on Reuters Business Briefing albeit using an alternative
natural language parsing algorithm. Unfortunately, this data is only available from 1990-2004 and,
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more importantly, does not incorporate sufficient detail on the role codes we use to classify the
stakeholder fields. However, authors’ analyses comparing GDELT to this alternative source not
subject to the criticism of shifting scope of coverage, reveals correlations of the average ordinal
measure of conflict and cooperation directed at stakeholders in high-level sectors (e.g., Government
or Business) ranging from 0.49 to 0.76 across 1990-1999 increasing our confidence in the validity
of GDELT for the purposes of our analysis. Furthermore, the highest correlations are found in the
earliest time period when the scope of coverage was the most similar. The declining correlations
over time are likely due to more expansive media coverage by GDELT.
Alternatively, we could have used the International Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS)
data which makes a more stringent effort to de-duplicate events and confirm that each event record
reflects an actual event. As noted by Ward et al. (2013), however, such a focus on eliminating false
positives comes at the cost of reducing coverage:
“GDELT has many more events per country per unit time, since it does not winnow
stories extensively. GDELT has about 68,000 country-months (34 years by 167
countries) compared to about 24,000 in ICEWS. Yet, GDELT has an order of
magnitude more events. Importantly, the volume of data being harvested by
GDELT is growing exponentially, as are the base level of events therein–the
density of data is about 100 Giga bytes in 1997 and has grown to over 600 Gb in
2011.” (Ward et al., 2013: 5)
As our focus is on the development of a comprehensive structure of stakeholder fields and
their interactions with the full socio-political network in a country rather than a precise count of
certain types of events for the purposes of predicting changes therein (e.g., escalations of time series
patterns in protest events), we believe the benefits in terms of coverage offered by GDELT
dominate the costs in terms of false positives and duplicated events which we use normalization
procedures to partially address.
GDELT Actor Codes & Stakeholder Mapping
In order to identify CSP stakeholders in GDELT we took the following steps. We began
with a careful review of what policies and initiatives are evaluated by Thompson Reuters’ analysts
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in determining environmental and social performance scores for firms. We were interested in
mapping the topics or issues reflected in our outcome variables to actors within GDELT with
mandates over (e.g. government agencies), or interests in (e.g. NGOs) the same issues.
Environmental performance evaluates the efficiency of natural resource use in production
processes, emission reduction, eco-efficiency of products and services, as well firms’ past
environmental controversies. Social performance reflects the quality of both labor-related issues
such as employee benefits, past strikes, HIV/AIDS programs, as well as human rights issues such
as human rights policies and monitoring, policies on indigenous peoples and child labor.
The second step in our stakeholder identification was a literature review of research on
stakeholder pressure for environmental, human rights and labor issues, including surveys of
managerial perceptions of their importance in these issues, to identify stakeholders most commonly
associated with the issues and firm policies captured in our CSP measure. From this review, we
identified five broad categories of actors external to the firm or its value chain typically associated
with stakeholder pressure on CSP: governments and regulators (Aguilera et al., 2007; Henriques
and Sadorsky, 1999; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008); intergovernmental organizations (Christmann,
2004; Lim and Tsutsui, 2012); NGOs and activists (Doh and Guay, 2006; Keck and Sikkink, 1999;
Lim and Tsutsui, 2012); organized labor groups (Briscoe and Safford, 2008); and community
stakeholders (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; Maignan and Ralston, 2002).
The third and final step in our stakeholder identification was to map the stakeholder
categories identified in the literature review and the issues captured in our dependent variable onto
the actors contained in the GDELT database of actor-event triads. All actors in GDELT are assigned
multiple role and specialty codes based on the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations Event
and Actor Codebook (Schrodt, 2012). An actor can be assigned up to 5 role codes indicating broader
role categories to which the actor belongs (e.g. government, media, NGO) and the actor’s specialty
(e.g. actors whose primary area of operation or expertise is human rights). For example, Greenpeace
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is coded as NGOENV or an NGO for whom environmental and ecological issues (ENV) are their
primary focus (ibid.).
In order to identify GDELT actors as ‘environmental’ or ‘social’ stakeholders, we mapped
the CAMEO role codes in combination with the CAMEO actor specialty codes. We read the names
of the actors contained in each role and specialty code to ensure we were correctly identifying
stakeholders based on the CAMEO codes. Environmental stakeholders are all actors whose
primary, secondary, or tertiary specialty code is ENV, and whose primary, secondary, or tertiary
role code represents any of the five stakeholder categories previously identified (e.g. government
or regulatory includes government, judiciary, opposition, or legislature). Social stakeholders
include actors whose primary, secondary, or tertiary specialty code is HRI (human rights) or LAB
(labor), and whose primary, secondary, or tertiary role code represents any of the five stakeholder
categories previously identified (e.g. international governmental organizations). We make
adjustments to account for the fact that GDELT uses the LAB specialty code to denote both
organizations concerned with labor issues as well as actors that are employees of organizations
(e.g. LABAGR are agricultural workers). First, we identify organized labor groups based on the
actor names recorded in GDELT rather than the specialty code (e.g. labor union, trades union).
Secondly, we only classify actors whose secondary or tertiary specialty codes are LAB, excluding
those whose primary code is LAB because these are workers rather than organizations or
individuals with interests in labor issues.
Table 18 presents CSP stakeholder categories, the GDELT codes included in each
category, and examples of actor names that appear in GDELT in these categories. Table 19 presents
the distribution of observations by country, the average CSP score of firms headquartered in the
country, and stakeholder prominence, heterogeneity of the stakeholder field, and proselytizing
stakeholder pressure, across all years.
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Table 18: CSP Stakeholder to GDELT Mapping
GDELT Codes included in category
Stakeholder Issue
Regulatory or government
Environment GOVENV; COPENV; LEGENV;

Human rights
Labor rights

ENVGOV; ENVJUD; ENVLEG;
ENVCOP; GOVGOVENV;
MEDGOVENV; ELIGOVENV;
COPGOVENV
GOVHRI; JUDHRI; GOVGOVHRI;
COPGOVHRI; LEGGOVHRI
GOVLAB; GOVGOVLAB

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
Environment IGOENV; IGOGOVENV;
Human rights
Labor rights
NGOs and activists
Environment

IGODEVENV
IGOHRI; IGOGOVHRI; IGOREFLAB;
IGODEVHRI
IGOLAB; IGODEVLAB;
IGOGOVLAB
NGOENV; ENV

Human rights

HRI; HRILAB; NGOHRI;
NGOJUDHRI; NGODEV

Labor rights

NGOLAB; NGODEVLAB

Labor organizations
Labor rights

Minister or Ministry of the Environment; Maria Mutagamba
(Ugandan Minister of Water and Environment)

Human Rights Commission; Minister for Women
Labor Minister; Labor and Employment Ministry; Minister of
Employment and Vocational Training; Rosalinda DimapilisBaldoz (Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment of the Philippines)
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development;
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
UN High Commission for Human Rights; Louise Arbour (UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights)
International Labor Organization

Greenpeace; Sierra Club; Friends of the Earth; La Sociedad
Peruana de Derecho Ambiental; activists unassociated with a
named organization denoted with 'conservationist' or
'environmentalist'
American Civil Liberties Union; Transparency International;
Shirin Ebadi (Nobel Peace Prize winner from Iran); activists
unassociated with a named group are denoted with terms
such as 'rights group' or 'rights activist'
International Trade Union Confederation; World Federation
of Trade Unions

LAB, where actor name corresponds to union, organized labour, workers federation; labor activist;
an organized labor organization or
striking worker
workers with labor issues (e.g. striking
worker)

Communities and residents (incl. local authorities)
Environment CVLENV; ENVCVL; CVLGOVENV
Human rights
Labor rights

Examples of GDELT actor names

CVLHRI; REFHRI; OPPHRI
CVLLAB; OPPLAB

community, residents, villagers, civil society, landowner,
voter, citizen
immigrant, migrant worker, voter, peasant
community, village, civil society, immigrant, peasant

Note. Specialty code HRI corresponds to human rights, LAB to labor issues, and ENV to environment.
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Table 19: Descriptive Statistics by Country

Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea, South
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

Firms
277
14
15
33
221
20
56
3
4
16
20
83
55
13
132
4
80
14
13
13
34
412
90
40
11
32
10
16
1
20
20
9
46
119
47
19
35
118
7
23
325
1,046

Obs.
1,186
89
61
86
1,052
81
195
4
18
115
121
559
274
40
650
16
304
51
77
47
211
3,172
289
152
20
187
73
106
4
69
69
64
310
316
180
123
202
436
26
94
2,204
6,714

CSP index
42.60
60.90
55.72
52.38
39.80
44.10
33.93
70.05
58.18
52.54
74.02
76.13
68.35
48.60
35.13
79.02
57.03
51.79
41.21
47.97
52.95
52.75
61.67
42.55
42.40
72.95
48.45
55.47
32.00
36.63
41.15
75.52
37.74
60.12
72.58
66.88
58.87
38.21
53.86
53.92
62.22
45.82
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Stakeholder
prominence
1.638
1.318
1.483
1.886
1.864
1.635
1.404
1.059
1.781
1.741
1.855
1.818
1.397
1.712
1.763
1.906
1.887
1.888
1.919
0.927
1.546
1.334
0.853
1.812
1.353
1.574
1.541
1.440
1.515
1.388
1.273
1.369
1.344
2.380
1.499
1.753
1.644
0.996
1.736
0.996
1.591
1.215

Stakeholder
heterogeneity
6.335
1.663
3.197
5.465
7.676
1.247
9.897
2.750
3.944
3.139
2.099
5.925
5.898
2.575
1.286
3.000
10.299
7.686
3.831
7.298
3.251
5.424
4.727
3.934
6.250
3.610
2.575
2.208
2.250
5.464
3.116
1.688
2.129
7.753
3.206
2.317
3.649
2.913
6.731
5.670
7.503
11.827

Proselytizing
stakeholder
pressure
0.123
0.004
0.029
0.336
0.116
0.053
0.250
0.054
0.007
0.005
0.007
0.077
0.074
0.017
0.027
0.005
0.080
0.031
0.022
0.060
0.038
0.020
0.084
0.051
0.055
0.049
0.064
0.003
0.021
0.073
0.000
0.006
0.018
0.085
0.018
0.033
0.035
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.199
0.515
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